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ABSTRACT
The Kemubu Irrigation Scheme was designed around the objectives 
of increased national self-sufficiency in rice and the promotion of more 
equitable development among the regions in Malaysia. This study attempts 
to measure the short term responses of marketable and marketed surpluses 
of padi in the Kemubu Project as a result of investments in the scheme.
This is made possible by available cross sectional data for a comparison 
of farms outside (without) and inside (with) the project.
The study uses quadratic multiple regression to measure the 
determinant causality of marketable and marketed surpluses according to 
aggregate level, tenancy groups, net padi operational area size groups, 
total farm operational area size groups and districts. As was found in 
other studies it is observed that total padi production, net padi production 
(minus rent, wages and religious contributions), total off farm income and 
family size has significant effects on the surpluses.
It is shown that there is a narrowing of differences between 
farmers in the tenancy groups of pure tenants, owner-operators and mixed 
owner operators inside the project as compared with the outside.
The study indicates that the farmers attempted to increase both 
the marketable and marketed surplus of padi and non padi income. This 
raises the problem of choice in the allocation of their available supply of 
labour. It was found too that the existing level of crop diversification 
does not reduce the responsiveness of farmers in production of padi surpluses.
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GLOSSARY
General
Padi = Paddy
Currency
M$23 = US$1 (31 October, 1982)
Weight Equivalent of Volume Measures of Padl (approximate)
1 gantang padi 
1 gantang padi 
1 lb unmilled padi 
394 gantangs of padi 
615 gantangs of padi
5.6 lbs padi = 2.5 kg padi
3.64 lbs milled rice = 1.6 kg milled rice
0.65 lb milled rice
1 tonne of padi
1 ton of rice
Yields
long tons per acre x 2.51 = tonnes per hectare
pounds per acre x 1.12 = kilograms per hectare
Weights and Surface Conversion
1 lb = 0.454 kg
1 long ton = 2,240 lbs
1 tonne = 2,204 lbs
= 2.471 acres1 hectare
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 1 discusses 
the definitions of marketable and marketed surpluses with reference to padi 
farm households in Malaysia. Section 2 sketches the role of marketable 
and marketed surpluses of food in economic development. In Malaysia, rice 
has traditionally played a key role in food production, so Section 3 
describes padi and rice economy in Peninsular Malaysia with the aim of 
providing a background to analyse in later chapters of this study.
An outline of policy relevence, objectives and scope of the study are 
presented in Section 4. Section 5 outlines the organisation of the study.
1.1 Definitions of Marketable and Marketed Surpluses
Various definitions have been given by economists to distinguish 
between marketable and marketed surpluses. Although differences between 
the two concepts according to any of these look small, the implications can 
be larger. In the context of this study in which the crop involved is padi, 
a subsistence crop, it is worthwhile to attempt differentiating between the 
two terms as clearly as possible.
Disposal of padi output by a farm household, for example in 
Malaysia, can be schematically described as in Figure 1.1 in the various 
categories of consumption, sale, rent, wages, taxes, religious contribution, 
storage, etc.
Marketed surplus is defined as being equal to net sales. Sales 
are considered necessarily as being net because some farmers buy padi or 
rice in the market while such farmers may make sales, these may be out of 
the quantity preferably destined for household consumption, and they later 
have to buy back such food in the market.
2FIGURE 1.1
CATEGORIES OF PADI DISPOSAL
Household
Consumption
Rent
Wages
Total Padi 
Production Other Disposal >Religious Contribution 
(Zakat)
Storage
Others
Net Sale
The marketable surplus of padi is defined as the sum of net sales 
and other disposal, i.e. categories other than household consumption. It 
is assumed here that other disposal component will eventually find its way 
into the market. Studies have shown, for example, that rent and wages are 
paid in cash rather than in kind, thus sales are made to enable payments in 
this form (Fujimoto, 1980; and Horii, 1981). There is also a tendency in 
some parts of Malaysia for the religious contribution known as zakatto be
1 Farmers are expected to pay zakat of 10 per cent of padi output where 
total output per farm exceeds 400 gantangs or 1 ton to the government 
or to persons as specified by Islamic religion.
3given in cash. More generally, as an agricultural sector develops, and 
as the economy becomes more monetised, there is a strong tendency for 
exchanges such as rent and wage payments and religious donations to be 
paid in cash, which is obtained from market sale of commodities. This 
has actually been the case in irrigated padi areas such as Muda and Kemubu 
in Malaysia. If we define the marketable surplus as the sum of market 
sales and the disposal categories other than household consumption, the 
progressive monetisation of transactions and other exchanges which 
traditionally took place in kind can be expected to bring about a progressive 
convergence and eventual coincidence of marketed and marketable surpluses.
In the case of Kemubu in 1979/80, traditional influences were still strongly 
evident in the predominant payment of rent and zakat in kind and of some 
wages in kind. Hence in this study it was considered appropriate to 
present the analysis to follow in terms of the two concepts of marketable 
and marketed surpluses.
1.2 Role of Marketable Surplus in Economic Development
The emergence and persistence of a marketable surplus of food as 
one of the preconditions of economic development is given theoretical 
validity by a number of noted economists including Nurske (1953), Lewis 
(1954), Rostow (1960), Jorgenson (1961) and Fei and Ranis (1964) in their 
respective models of development. In short, the essential theme of the 
models developed by these economists is the dominant position of food as 
a basic wage good in less developed countries, where 50 to 60 per cent of 
consumption expenditure is devoted to food (Johnston and Mellor, 1961, p.573). 
In order to support and sustain industrial development, the agricultural 
sector in these countries must supply food to industrial workers at prices 
favourable to the profitability of new industry (Nicholls, 1964, p.12).
4The role of increased marketable surplus of agriculture in the 
economic development of developed countries has been important and relevant 
as has been shown in the development of countries like the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Russia, Japan, West European countries, South Korea 
and Taiwan (Hayami and Ruttan, 1971). Marketable surplus provides food 
and other raw materials and contributes to capital formation in a country.
It has been observed that the size and distribution of marketable surplus 
are major determinants of the pace and pattern of a country’s economic 
developmen t.
In most countries, the marketable surplus provides food to meet 
the needs of a growing population and of urbanisation. Also, the 
marketable surplus is exported to earn foreign exchange which enables the 
importation of capital goods and services for use as inputs into economic 
development. As most less developed countries have relatively large 
agricultural sectors their industrial development depends on the sustained 
transfer of marketed surpluses of food and other agricultural products to 
the industrial sector. Thus the basis for economic development is a 
marked rise in production and productivity in agriculture leading to an 
increased marketable surplus for economic development (Kuznets, 1959, 1971).
If the marketable surplus of food grains needed to sustain a 
given increase in industrial employment and development is not forthcoming, 
either industrial development will stagnate or decline or inflationary 
tendencies will develop in the economy, eventually jeopardizing the process 
of economic development.
1.3 Significance of Marketable Surplus of Rice in Malaysia
In Malaysia, the relevance of marketable surplus in her economic 
development is basically as outlined above. As padi production is a major
economic activity and rice is the staple food in Malaysian diet, the
5and political significance in her development (Appendices 1 and 2).
As mentioned earlier, at least some marketable surplus of food 
may be exported. But in Malaysia, the padi supplies have never reached 
a net exportable position. Nevertheless, the Malaysian rice producing 
sector has been called upon by the government to provide for a growing 
population particularly in the other, and fast expanding, non-padi sector 
comprising the rubber, oil palm, mineral, manufacturing and service industries.
Growth in population at 2.6 per cent per annum (1970 to 1980) 
and a rise in real per capita income at a rate of 4.9 per cent annually 
(1970 to 1980) are increasing the demand for rice in Malaysia (Fourth 
Malaysia Plan, 1981, p.2). Also, the rice crises which occurred as a 
result of world rice shortages (Rice Cultivation Committee, 1956; Fisk,
1969; Rudner, 1975 and Goldman, 1975) have firmly impressed upon the 
Malaysian Government that, even with surplus foreign reserves rice may well 
be difficult to import.
In addition to its strategic importance as explained above, the 
rice industry currently provided employment for 20 per cent of the active 
population (Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981). Moreover, most (97 per cent) of 
padi farmers are ethnic Malays (Selvadurai, 1972, p.19). Hence, they form 
a significant majority in the rural electorates and exert considerable 
political influence in the democratic political system of Malaysia 
(Fisk, 1969 and Rudner, 1980).
The majority of the padi farmers earn a low income due largely 
to their small padi holdings. The average area of a padi farm is about
3.4 acres. Hence the necessity to produce a padi surplus for the market 
as a source of income for purchases of goods and services is keenly felt by 
padi farmers in Malaysia as it is in other developing countries.
production and marketing of padi and rice have social, economic
6It is, therefore, evident that the question of marketable surplus 
of padi is important in Malaysia from the viewpoints of both the individual 
padi farmer and the overall national levels.
1.4 Objectives and Scope of the Study
Despite the obvious importance of the issue of marketable surplus 
of padi in Malaysia there has so far been only one study, namely by Lim 
(1974), and relatively little is yet known about the factors influencing it. 
The study in hand attempts to partly fill the existing gap in our knowledge 
in this area. It focuses on both the marketable and marketed surpluses of 
padi in and around the Kemubu Irrigation Project in the North East State of 
Kelantan(Figure 1.2,p. 8) . It is based on individual padi farms and the farm 
household data for 1979/80 gathered by a sample survey procedure.
The study attempts to provide insights into the economic factors 
affecting the marketable and marketed surplus of padi. The findings of 
the study are likely to be useful for the policy formulation and also 
relevant to the development strategy of integrated land development projects 
being implemented in Malaysia and other less developed countries.
This is basically a comparative study which examines the 
marketable and marketed surpluses in the Kemubu Irrigation Project area and 
adjacent to it. It provides a "with and without" project comparison of 
those farmers inside who benefit from the on-going scheme and those outside 
who are excluded from the project (Gittinger, 1979, pp.II-9-10 and Shand 
et al, 1982, p.7).
The specific objectives of the study are:
(1) To identify and empirically measure the variables and
relationships underlying the availability of marketable 
and marketed surpluses of padi both inside and outside the 
project area of the Kemubu Scheme.
7(2) To measure empirically these relationships amongst sub­
groupings of farmers according to tenure, padi operational 
area, total farm operational area and location (district).
(3) To estimate the elasticities of the marketable and marketed 
surpluses with respect to the explanatory variables.
(4) To examine the effectiveness of the Integrated Area 
Development Project approach, such as the Kemubu Scheme, 
in increasing the supply of rice.
(5) To derive policy implications of the findings.
1 .5 Organisation of the Study
This study is organised into seven chapters. Following this 
chapter, Chapter 2 contains a review of literature and conceptual framework 
of the study.
In Chapter 3, the framework of the model for the study is developed 
and the sources of data and their limitations are discussed.
Chapter 4 deals with the study area, i.e. the Kemubu Irrigation 
Project. It mainly covers agricultural land use patterns, socio economic 
characteristics with emphasis on disposal of padi.
The analysis of results of estimating functions for marketable 
and marketed surpluses are presented in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 6, the various elasticities of marketable and marketed 
surpluses are computed and compared with those from other studies.
Finally, Chapter 7 presents a summary and conclusions, and 
outlines major policy implications.
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9CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND THEORETICAL 
AND EMPIRICAL APPROACHES
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first 
section will deal with the broad conceptual frameworks of profit and 
utility maximisation in a farm household. A review of theoretical and 
empirical approaches in the study of marketable and marketed surpluses 
will be discussed in Section 2. This review will be particularly useful 
when developing estimation models for this study in Chapter 3. In the
last section of this chapter, the only study so far available on marketed 
surplus of padi in Malaysia, is reviewed in detail.
2.1 Conceptual Framework
2.1.1 Profit Maximisation
Under perfect competition a farmer takes the price of its product 
as given. He can sell all he wants at that price and will choose an 
output level at which price equals marginal cost. If the price is less 
than the farmer's average variable cost at any output the farm will 
discontinue production. Suppose the farmer's short-run cost curves are 
as in Figure 2.1. The marginal cost curve intersects the average variable 
cost curve at the latter's minimum point, A. If the price of the product 
is below OP3, the farm will produce nothing because there is no output 
level where price exceeds average variable cost.
If the price of the product exceeds OP^ the farm will set its 
output rate at the point which price equals marginal cost (Fig 2.2). This is the 
output level that maximises profit. Thus if the price is OP^ the farmer 
will produce OX, if the price is 0P? the farmer will produce OY, etc.
The resulting supply is that shown in Figure 2.2 as OP AC.
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FIGURE 2.1
SHORT-RUN AVERAGE AND MARGINAL 
Price COST CURVES
Marginal Average
Total
Cost
Average
Variable
Cost
Output
Profit (H) is defined as the difference between total revenue, 
i.e. price (p) times quantity (q) or pq and total cost (c).
IT = pq - c (2.1)
Total cost can be stated as an explicit function of the level of output and 
the cost of fixed inputs (b).
c = <j> (q) + b (2.2)
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FIGURE 2.2
THE SUPPLY CURVE OF THE PERFECTLY
Price
COMPETITIVE FIRM
Output
By substituting the value of c into equation 2.1 profit can be expressed 
as a function of the level of output.
n = pq - $(q) - b (2.3)
To maximise profit, set derivative of II in equation 2.3 with respect to q 
equal to zero.
|| = p - 4>1 (q) =0 (2.4)
x. e. p = <f>' (q)
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The first condition of profit-maximisation requires setting the 
marginal cost, <j>(q), equal to the constant selling price of the output 
because the firm can increase its profit by expanding its output if the 
addition to its revenue of selling another unit is greater than the addition 
to its cost.
The second condition requires that:
(2.5)
In other words, the marginal cost must be increasing at the profit
maximising output. If the marginal cost is decreasing, the equality of 
price and marginal cost would give a point of minimum profit. The supply 
curve is, therefore, partly identical with the marginal cost curve. Also,
as discussed above, the supply curve will be as OP^AC (Figure 2.2).
The approach required to derive the farmer's supply curve is,
therefore, to work out the relevant section of his marginal cost curve.
The marginal cost curve of each farmer can then be aggregated to give the 
total supply curve for the industry or sector. However, such an approach 
is not practical as the number of farmers is very large and the data required 
for the exercise are not easily obtained. The approach that is usually 
used is to correlate the quantity supplied with the price of the output. 
Market statistics on transactions at different points of time are plotted 
in pairs as points on a scatter diagram and a line of "best fit" through 
the scatter is obtained by the regression technique.
Suppose that the line obtained is given by:
S a + b Pt t (2.6)
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The marginal propensity to supply with respect to price (P) is the 
coefficient of the price, that is b.
The elasticity of supply with respect to price (Z ) can be 
derived from the equation in the following way. Z is defined as:
percentage change in quantity supplied
percentage change in price
v AS ,„n ,AP i.e. Z = — . 100/— . 100 s S P
AS P 
AP * S (2.7)
The first component of the formula, AS/AP, is given by b, the 
slope of the regression line. The second element, P/S, can be written 
as P/S where the bar denotes an average value. Price elasticity of supply 
is estimated at the mean levels.
If the scatter diagram shows that the relationship is non-linear 
the techniques of using quadratic function, logarithmic function etc. can 
be made. Suppose that the supply function is a quadratic one:
S = a + bP + cP2 (2.8)
The marginal propensity to sell with respect to price is defined
as:
f *b + 2cP
= b + 2cP (2.9)
where P is the mean price.
The price elasticity of supply (Z ) is defined as:
dS P 
dP ' S
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Differentiate equation 2.8 with respect to P.
f = b + 2cp
Now substitute the value of -337 in the formula for E , the price elasticitydP s
of supply.
= (b + 2cP) . |
= (b + 2cP). 1 (2.10)
S
The bar denotes an average value giving the elasticity at the mean.
2.1.2 Utility Maximisation
There are various models that have attempted to explain the 
behaviour of farmers in subsistence and semi-subsistence agriculture and 
during economic transition in a developing rural economy. These models 
have been developed by Fisk (1962, 1964, 1971, 1975), Shand (1965), Sen (1966), 
Nakajima (1969), Stent and Webb (1975), Chandra and De Boer (1976), and 
Evenson (1976, 1977, 1978, 1981).
A central concept in some of these models is the marginal valuation 
of family labour. This concept is also important for the present study of 
the Kemubu Irrigation Project as farm family labour is involved not only in 
production of subsistence and surplus output of padi, but it also participates 
in non-padi farm and non-farm jobs.
In this section, the models by Nakajima (1969) and Fisk (1975) 
will be widely used, even though those by Sen and others are as illuminating 
and should be used in complimentary fashion.
Schultz (1964, Ch.3) strongly insisted that the economic behaviour 
of farmers, even in underdeveloped societies, is quite "rational" in that 
the actual state of most of these farms are in the neighbourhood of a
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subjective equilibrium point. Nakajima agreed with him in principle. 
However, Nakajima said that Schultz did not give a clear explanation of 
what rationality in a family farm is, or what the subjective equilibrium 
of family farms is.
Nakajima (1969) maintains that each farm-household family farm 
has its own production function. The economic behaviour of a family farm 
is "rational" when the family farm has achieved subjective equilibrium, 
i.e. when it has maximised its utility, subject to its income (money and 
kind) function. So it should be assumed that a family farm always strives 
to achieve utility maximisation.
The level of non-monetary production likely to be sustained in 
subsistence and semi-subsistence agriculture, and the likelihood of a 
large or a small amount of labour being used for cash earning activities 
(without curtailment of non-monetary production) were discussed by Fisk 
(1962). But his model does not show how much of the available labour will 
in fact be applied to cash-earning activities, nor how much such activities 
will earn.
It seems particularly important to understand the process whereby 
the subjective equilibrium is reached, for the involvement of the rural 
peasant population in economic development is mainly to be achieved through 
their enhanced participation in the advanced sector of the economy through 
wage labour or cash cropping. Knowledge of how to expedite and encourage 
this process is an important factor in development policy formulation 
(Fisk, 1977).
Both Sen (1966) and Nakajima (1969) have discussed techniques 
for analysing the factors determining the point at which subjective 
equilibrium will be achieved. Their view in each case is that equilibrium 
will be reached when the family welfare is maximised, and this will be
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achieved when the marginal utility of the family income equals the marginal 
disutility of the family labour required to produce it.
Nakajima (Figure 2.3) shows on the vertical axis the level of 
family income (M) from all sources measures the quantity of labour on the 
horizontal axis. The vertical line passing through Figure 2.3a and b on
FIGURE 2.3
FISK MODEL OF MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY AND 
MARGINAL VALUATION OF FAMILY LABOUR IN 
RELATION TO QUANTITY OF FAMILY INCOME
Fig. 2.3a
Quantity of labor
Source: Fisk, 1975, p.62.
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the right, marked AA stands for "the physiologically possible maximum of 
labour for the whole family". The curve OL.. is the production possibility 
curve for the family farm. The horizontal line M ' is the "minimum 
subsistence standard of income for the whole family". Curves and 
are indifference curves and subjective equilibrium is reached at Q where 
an indifference curve is tangent to the production possibility curve.
The indifference curves will approach the minimum subsistence line and the 
maximum labour line asymptotically. In Figure 2.3b the curve is the 
marginal productivity of labour curve for the farm, and the curve is 
what Nakajima describes as the "marginal valuation of family labour curve", 
representing the marginal increment of money income the family requires to 
make the marginal unit of family labour input just worthwhile.
Nakajima introduces the concept of "achievement standard of 
income" which he defines as "that standard of income at and above which the 
slope of indifference curves becomes nearly vertical regardless of the 
distance from the vertical axis". This standard, represented in Figures 
2.4a and b by the line MM, can be high or low depending on the stage of 
development.
Fisk extended Nakajima's model and brought about "double model".
This is shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.6, Section 2.5a and b being the subsistence 
enterprise, and Sections 2.6a and b being the monetary enterprise.
In Figure 2.5a the vertical axis measures the output (Q) of the 
subsistence enterprise in quantity only and not in terms of value. Q is 
therefore not related to M by any price (P) at this stage. The income 
curve for the subsistence enterprise is therefore:
Q = F (A,B) (2.11)
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FIGURE 2.4
NAKAJIMA CONCEPT OF ACHIEVEMENT STANDARD OF INCOME
Quantity of labor
Fig. 2.4a
Quantity of labor
Fig. 2.4b
Source: Fisk, 1975, p.65.
where A is the labour input and B is the available land. The other equation 
determining equilibrium wage rate (FA) for the subsistence enterprise is:
UA
FA=-- (2.12)
where U is defined as a level of utility.
Equilibrium is achieved at a level of family labour input to the 
subsistence enterprise equal to Ag. Similarly, the degree of land 
utilisation for the subsistence enterprise might be denoted by Bg, where 
Bg = B.
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FIGURE 2.5
FISK MODEL OF MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY AND MARGINAL VALUATION 
OF LABOUR IN RELATION TO QUANTITY OF FAMILY INCOME IN
SUBSISTENCE ENTERPRISE
Fig. 2.5a
2.5b
Quantity of labor
Source: Fisk, 1975, p.69.
Initially, in the "supplementary cash production" stage, the 
relationships between the subsistence enterprise and the monetary enterprise 
will be as follows. First the labour supply available in the monetary 
enterprise will be determined by the configurations of Figures 2.6a and b 
and will be the residual of the physically possible labour A, after deducting 
Aq, which is the amount of labour used in the non-monetary enterprise. That 
is, the possible supply of labour in the monetary enterprise is thus determined
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FIGURE 2.6
FISK MODEL OF MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY AND MARGINAL VALUATION 
OF LABOUR IN RELATION TO QUANTITY OF FAMILY INCOME IN
MONETARY ENTERPRISE
Fig. 2.6a
'ig. 2.6b
^__ L
Quantity of labor
Source: Fisk, 1975, p.70.
indirectly by the demographic characteristic of the family production unit, 
by the type and quantity of land available, by the techniques and improvements 
in use, all of which determine the shape of the subsistence production 
possibility curve OL^ in Figure 2.5a, and by the demographic and social 
characteristics of the population of the unit, which determine indifference 
curves, largely through the position of the subsistence line QqQq and the 
income aspiration QQ' in Figure 2.5a.
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Second, the other initial correlation between Figures 2.5 and 2.6 
will be that the production possibility curve for the family farm in 
Figure 2.6a will be determined partially by the land use in Figure 2.5.
The quantity and quality of land available after the needs of the subsistence 
enterprise have been satisfied and will be influenced by the varying 
proportions of the monetary enterprise.
As a general rule for any production unit with given land, the 
higher the level of subsistence production required for equilibrium in the 
subsistence enterprise, the lower and flatter will be the production 
possibility curve in the monetary enterprise, oetevus paribus . Conversely, 
a reduction in the aspiration level of the subsistence component would lead 
to a heightening and steepening of the production possibility curve in the 
monetary enterprise. This is most clearly seen in the special case where 
the subsistence crop and the monetary enterprise crop are the same (e.g. rice). 
Then, in quantitative terms there would be one production function for both 
enterprises, the subsistence enterprise taking first cut of the production 
and the surplus being sold. The monetary enterprise production possibility 
curve would then be the remaining segment of the production possibility 
curve the right of Q, as modifed by the price, P , of the crop.
Nakajima introduced competitively determined wage (W) by horizontal 
line WW in Figure 2.6b.
The equation for income in the monetary enterprise will thus be:
M = P F (A , B~) W (A - A"1) (2.13)
where A and B are the amounts of family labour and family land utilised
^*1
in the monetary enterprise, A is the total labour (from all sources) used 
on the farm component of the monetary enterprise, and where:
A* < (A - A ), and B* < (B - B ) (2.14)
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Maximising U (utility) in the monetary enterprise (M), we shall have:
and
*1pxFA -w
°A
UM w
(2.15)
(2.16)
With equation (2.15) determining the level of total labour input 
to the farm component of the monetary enterprise, and the simultaneous 
equations (2.13) and (2.16) determining M and A .
The shape of the indifference curves in Figures 2.5 and 2.6 will 
be independently determined, for all practical purposes, until substitution 
between subsistence and market consumption goods begin to take place on a 
significant scale. In the subsistence enterprise the slope of the 
indifference curve will be:
UQ
(2.17)
whereas in the monetary enterprise it will be:
V1 UM (2.18)
In these two functions the numerators are related to the extent 
that the maximum possible value of A* is A^A. However, in the absence 
of an effective local market for subsistence goods, in which the farm family 
can always operate at will, there is no necessary relationship between U
and 11,.M
This will cease to be the case when substitution between 
subsistence and market consumption goods begins to take place on a significant 
scale. In most cases an effective local market sufficient to make this 
possible will also tend to make specialization in the monetary enterprise
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worthwhile, and the subsistence component as a separate enterprise will 
tend to fade away. It is characteristic of this stage that the family 
tends to consume its own produce only when it is advantageous in money 
terms, so that the denominator in both (2.17) and (2.18) is effectively U .
2.1.3 The Relevance of the Approaches to the Current Study 
In this present study the concern is with a dynamic situation in 
which a community of farmers mostly at subsistence level receive the 
benefits of a large scale investment in irrigation and an improved padi 
technology which enables most, not only to achieve self sufficiency in rice 
production, but also to dispose of some as a surplus in the market. Under 
these influences, these farmers are in Fisk/Nakajima terms shifted 
from a subsistence stage to a subsistence and monetary enterprise stage.
The study is thus concerned with measuring the impact of this investment 
in terms of the change in the marketable and marketed surpluses of padi of 
these farmers.
It will be beyond the scope of this dissertation to be concerned with
the appropriateness of the conceptual frameworks in the two discussed above. 
Since most of the farmers in the Kemubu area and adjacent areas outside 
Kemubu are in an economic transition from a subsistence to a commercialisation 
and specialisation stage, then both conceptual frameworks will help in 
understanding their padi production behaviour.
2.2 Theoretical and Empirical Approaches
Two main approaches have been used to estimate the responsiveness 
of marketable and marketed surpluses to their determinants. The two 
approaches are namely, the indirect and direct approaches.
There are several studies in both approaches. In this study it 
is proposed that only the major studies will be reviewed. Other minor
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studies will be summarised at the end of the review of each approach.
Also, the direct approach based studies will be reviewed in greater detail 
because this study falls within that group.
2.2.1 Indirect Approach Based Studies
Normally, the statistical data needed for direct measurement of 
the impact of various independent variables on marketable or marketed 
surpluses are difficult to obtain and this gave rise to the use of an 
indirect approach. Under this approach, the impacts of individual 
determinants of the marketable or marketed surplus of a crop are approximated 
or estimated from other data which are generally available. In earlier 
studies of marketable and marketed surpluses the indirect approach was 
commonly used because of lack of suitable data.
The indirect approach was pioneered by Krishna in 1962 when 
estimating price elasticity of marketed surplus for wheat in the Indian 
Punjab. He assumed that output (Q) of wheat was determined by the relative 
price of wheat (P), that is, the price of wheat relative to the average 
price of all other sources of income, and that the home consumption of it 
was determined by P and the total income (I) of the farmers. The marketed 
surplus of wheat (M) could, therefore, be written as:
M = Q-C = Q(P) - C(P,I) (2.19)
Krishna's equation for elasticity (1962) was:
e = rb - (r-1) (g + mkh) (2.20)
where e = the elasticity of the marketed surplus with respect to p;
r = = —, the reciprocal of sale ratio;Mm |
Q = the quantity of wheat produced;
M the quantity of wheat marketed;
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g - the elasticity of consumption with respect to P;
Mm = —, the sale ratio;
k = PQ/I, the ratio of the total value of the output of wheat 
to the total income of the farmers; and 
h = the elasticity of consumption of wheat with respect to 
to tal income.
Krishna's results (Table 2.1) permit two important observations. 
First, the price elasticity of the marketed surplus for Punjabi wheat is
TABLE 2.1
PLAUSIBLE VALUES OF THE PRICE ELASTICITY 
OF THE MARKETED SURPLUS OF PUNJABI WHEAT
Value of Price Value of m (Sale Ratio)
Elasticity 0.1 0.5 0.9
Minimum Limit (g^O) 2.30 0.12 0.08
Minimum Limit (g=0) 0.50 -0.08 0.06
Maximum Limit (g^O) 5.56 0.78 0.26
Note: g is the price elasticity of the consumption of
wheat.
Source: Krishna, 1962, p.83.
always positive for the cases where g, the price elasticity of the consumption 
of wheat, is not equal to zero. It is difficult to define a "subsistence 
farmer", but if he is someone with an income elasticity of consumption of 
wheat (h) equal to 0.8 and someone who obtains 70 per cent of his total 
income from wheat then the price elasticity of his marketed surplus ranges 
from 0.1 to 2.3. Second, the price elasticity of marketed surplus is higher
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for those wheat farmers who consume more of their own produce, a finding 
that is contrary to common belief.
A modified version of Krishna's model was used by Mangahas et al 
(1966) who obtained price elasticities of marketed surplus in the 
Philippines ranging from 0.18 to 1.28 for rice and for maize, from 0.17 to 
2.58 with a bias towards the higher estimates. They observed that, in 
spite of micro—economic evidence that prices are an important incentive 
for the purchase of yield—increasing technical inputs such as fertilizers, 
insecticides and herbicides, there was no measurable short-run yield 
response to price. This cast doubt on the role of price as a development 
tool, as was also found recently by Toquero et al (1975).
The range in price elasticity of marketed surplus for rice in 
Indonesia, as estimated by Mubyarto (1965), was from 0.2 to 1.5 when the 
marketed proportion was about 0.5 and from -1.1 to 5.4 when the marketed 
proportion was about 0.1. The negative elasticity obtained by Mubyarto 
is contrary to the findings of Krishna (1962, 1963), Falcon (1964),
Beringer (1963) and Khan (1964). They maintained and with empirical 
evidence tested, that price response is positive even in subsistence 
agriculture such as is found in India and Pakistan.
The total effect of a price change on the quantity of a product 
demanded can be disaggregated into a substitution effect and an income 
effect. The net effect of an increase in the price of rice on marketed 
surplus, for example, will depend on the relative strength of the 
substitution and the income effects. If rice is the major food crop, and 
other goods largely comprise clothing, other food crops, other food items 
and household necessities purchased off the farm, substitution possibilities 
may be severely limited and the (negative) substitution effect is nearly 
zero. On the other hand, if rice represents a relatively large part of
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the total income of the farmer and home consumption is near the subsistence 
level, a strong positive income effect on home consumption would be likely. 
If this positive income effect outweighs the negative substitution effect, 
home consumption will increase and marketing's decrease with higher prices. 
Thus, the negative elasticity as found by Mubyarto indicated that there is 
no reason to exclude the possibility of an inverse relationship between 
the price of rice and the quantities marketed by peasant producers, at 
least over some range of prices.
Behrman (1968) used the indirect approach, extended the indirect 
model of Krishna (1962), and incorporated it into the Nerlovian supply 
response model (Nerlove and Bachman , 1960) to study the total and marketed 
supply responses at country level for Thai rice and three other crops namely, 
corn, cassava and kenaf. The original method by Krishna was found to be 
unsatisfactory by Behrman in four important areas. First, Krishna implicitly 
assumed that the only income which should be considered in determining the 
demand for the home consumption of foodgrains is the cash income obtained 
from the sale of foodgrains. In other words, the income in the home 
consumption function is by implication not the total net income it purports 
to show but rather the cash income from the sale of foodgrains. It would 
be more reasonable to use the total net income of the farmer as the 
determinant. Second, mathematical approximations were made in Krishna's 
model without explicit acknowledgement. Behrman's argument is not that 
approximations should not be made but rather that they should be made only 
if they simplify and not distort the original model. Third, Krishna's 
model assumes unrealistically that there is no adjustment lag in the 
price elasticity of marketed surplus. Fourth, P which is defined as a 
relative price is sometimes used as if it were an absolute price.
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The model presented by Behrman is more complicated than that 
presented by Krishna, and incorporates various refinements in respect of 
the points raised above. The Behrman model is:
e * r b1 - (r-1) [g + hk (1 + b^ ] - (r-1) h b£ (1-k) (2.21)
where e = the elasticity of marketed surplus with respect to the absolute 
price of wheat, as a function of the time that is allowed for 
adjustment;
r = the reciprocal of sale ratio of the intended quantity produced 
of foodgrains;
b^ = the price elasticity of intended quantity produced of foodgrains 
(Q^) with respect to relative price of wheat with respect to the 
aggregate price for all income sources of the producers of wheat 
other then the production of wheat; 
g = the elasticity of demand function for home consumption of the 
foodgrain with respect to the relative price of wheat with 
respect the aggregate price of all commodities other than 
wheat which are consumed by the producers of wheat; 
h = the elasticity of the foodgrain with respect to total net 
income producers of the foodgrain;
= the price elasticity of the intended quantity of goods and 
services other than (L which is produced by the producer of 
(L ; and
k = the ratio of total value q production of to the total net 
income of the production of (L .
Behrman found that the relative importance of rice production
vis-a-vis other crops tended to be more consistent with variations in planted
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areas in those regions in which rice production was relatively dominant, 
or in which rice production increased at relatively high rates throughout 
the study period. Also, the coefficients tended to be higher in those 
regions which experienced rapid population growth. Furthermore, the
implied short-run price responses were generally inelastic.
According to Krishna (1967, p.510) no one can assert that the 
price elasticity of marketed supply must be negative or positive in most 
cases. Both logically and empirically it can be positive in some regions 
and negative in others, and even in the same region it can be positive for 
aSSre8ate market supply and negative for particular sub—classes of farmers. 
Also, the elasticity will differ for different crops. Similar views were 
put forward by Mears and Barker (1968) .
It was found empirically in Indian agriculture that, if agricultural 
prices fall, the marketed surplus will rise (Mathur and Ezekiel, 1961; 
Khatkhate, 1962; Dandekar, 1964; Krishnan, 1965; Thamanajakshi, 1969;
Bardhan, 1970; Bardhan and Bardhan, 1971). Several reasons were offered 
for this. For example, farmers wish to maintain the same level of money 
income because their demand for cash is fixed (Mathur and Ezekiel, 1961).
Such an assumption would imply a very low income elasticity of 
demand for non-foodgrains amongst farmers, as well as a zero substitution 
effect (Bhagwati and Chakravarthy, 1969, p.33) - an assumption which is 
logically and empirically invalid. Other advocates (e.g. Dandekar, 1964) 
seem to have ignored the substitution effect.
Table 2.2 summarizes for the indirect approach of marketable 
surplus studies respectively, the variables used in past studies of these 
response functions, and give the signs of the estimated coefficients. The 
positive signs indicate that for an increase in the value of the determinants
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TABLE 2.2
MARKETABLE AND MARKETED SURPLUS FUNCTIONS 
USING INDIRECT APPROACH ESTIMATION
d ^
o 2No. Reference Year Place <v -h h id
> Qj +-l H S V
•H +j cd oj d a -h<u 4-J d) o d h g m S vu id u <u i—i d o ti t, d•H i—i *H O-' OJ CX U r) Cd
M cum X -h o d cd d d
pLi Pd FM W>-( P-i H pd H O'
1 Krishna 1962 India +
2 Krishna 1965 India -
3 Behrman 1966 Thailand +
4 Mubyarto 1966 Indonesia +
5 Mangahas 1966 Philippines +
there will be an increase in the level of the marketable and marketed surplus, 
while the negative signs show an inverse effect. Generally, price has a 
positive influence on the marketable and marketed surpluses.
2.2.2 Direct Approach Based Studies
In the direct approach which is relatively simple the relationship 
is usually found by regression analysis of the dependent variable, which is 
the marketable or marketed surplus, and selected independent variables.
With this approach, the long-run elasticity can be obtained with time series 
data, and short-run elasticity with cross-sectional data.
One of the earliest studies using a direct approach was by Khan 
and Chowdhury in 1962 to study the patterns of behaviour of West Pakistani 
farmers with respect to the marketing of food crops using cross-sectional 
data. The variables studied as independent variables or determinates of 
per caput marketable surplus were in per caput terms and were foodcrop
31
production, rent, cash-crop production and other income. Khan and Chowdhury 
validated their first hypothesis that the marketed surplus is the surplus 
of production, over the minimum consumption requirements, which the farmers 
then sell in the market. For their second hypothesis they concluded that 
the farmers market an amount of their output which is sufficient to satisfy 
their cash requirements, and retain the rest for home consumption or as 
saving in kind. Also, they found that the marketed surplus varied inversely 
with prices of the foodcrops and rent payment, and that the output elasticity 
of the marketed surplus at the mean was 1.60.
Other variables, such as per caput cash crop area, ratio of wheat 
output to total food output, per acre yield, per caput quantity of barter 
and per caput non-agricultural income were considered, but none appeared 
to add to the explained variation in the marketed quantity of food.
In a study of the short-run elasticity of marketed surplus for 
Northwest India at village level, Bardhan (1970) used the following simple 
model:
M = Q - C - N (2.22)
where M, Q and C are the sales, output and consumption of foodgrains 
respectively. N is the net other disposal (i.e. payments in kind minus 
receipts in kind) of foodgrains which comprised rent and wage payments in 
kind.
The model assumed the basket of consumption goods purchased by 
the farmer to be the numeraire so that the price of such goods (P^) was 
unity. It further assumed that the farmer's demand for foodgrains depended 
only on his income (I) and the price of foodgrains (P^) relative to the 
price of consumption goods purchased by the farmer (P^). The demand function 
can be written as:
C = C (1 , p2) (2.23)
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If equation (2.23) was substituted into equation (2.22) and after 
algebraic manipulation the following was obtained:
M, C (I.P )
M ' Qp 1 - —Q------“ <2-2«
where the farmer's income is:
1 " dj + L% + P4Q4
where and P were the values of production of foodgrains and other
crops respectively, P^Q, was the value of the production of milk and milk 
products, and n was the net other disposal of foodgrains as a proportion 
of the output of foodgrains.
A number of interesting points can be made about the above model 
of short-run price elasticity of marketed surplus of foodgrains (Lim, 1975, 
p.45). First, as cross-sectional data were used, the price elasticity of 
marketed surplus was approximated by the price elasticity of the marketed 
proportion of production. Second, the estimating equation was linear. A 
more general non-linear model could also be used. The criteria should be 
the goodness of fit and the ease with which calculations can be made. 
However, the form of the relationship should not make any difference as far 
as the signs of the regression coefficients are concerned.
The results of the analysis were as follows. The regression 
coefficients of production of foodgrains per adult unit of the cultivating 
population, were positive, as expected, and also statistically significant. 
The output elasticity of the marketed proportion of output for the most 
general sample was 0.79, while the corresponding output elasticity of the 
volume marketed worked out to be 1.80. Also, for the value of output 
elasticity to be greater than one, the cultivator's income elasticity of 
demand for foodgrains must be equal or less than one.
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The regression coefficients of the average price of foodgrains 
for the cultivators, were negative and statistically significant. The 
price elasticity for the most general sample was -0.57, which suggests that 
a fall in grain price due to food price regulations or imports may not have 
an adverse effect on marketed surplus, at least during the short period of 
one crop year (Bardhan, 1970, p.57).
Haessel (1975), developed a model for a closed village community. 
The total production (supply) of foodgrains (S) was allocated among 
consumption by the cultivators (C), marketings (M), and other net disposal 
to non-cultivators (T) which consisted of payments in kind for rent, wages, 
etc. Thus he had the following accounting identity:
S = C + M + T (2.25)
In a cross section, S may be considered exogeneous since it did 
not depend on current price, and to the extent that T consists of contractual 
payments it will be exogeneous too. Hence, the cultivators' short-run 
decision was to allocate S-T = Q between consumption and sales. Consumption 
was assumed to depend on the relative price of the commodity (P) and net 
income of the farmers (Y), where Y includes the income from foodgrains 
consumed and sold. Hence:
C = C (P,Y) (2.26)
Since the allocation of S-T between C and M involves only one 
decision, M must be a residual, and from equation 2.26 the following equation 
was obtained:
M = Q-C (P,Y) = M (P,Y,Q) (2.27)
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Haessel further developed the above model to a two-stage least 
squares model in order to estimate short-run and long-run elasticities of 
marketed surplus of foodgrains with respect to price.
Haessel, by applying the model of two-stage least squares to 
Bardhan’s (1970) data, reached contrary findings. He found that farmers 
were price responsive and income responsive as consumers and that higher 
prices resulted in larger quantities marketed.
The direct approach of estimating marketable surplus functions 
was also used by Toquero et al (1975) using sample survey data showing 
the disposal of rice output by the same farmers for three consecutive years 
(1972, 1973 and 1974) in two major rice-producing regions in the Philippines 
(Central and Southern Luzon). Both time-series and cross-regional 
variations in the price of rice and other consumption goods were included 
in the data.
The equilibrium quantities of marketable surplus and home 
consumption were determined by the price of rice (P) and output of rice (Q). 
The post-harvest marketable surplus supply function can be expressed as:
M = f (P,Q) (2.28)
where M is the quantity of rice sold in the market.
Corresponding to equation (2.28), two models were specified for 
estimating the market supply parameters:
(1)
(2)
2Mti - a0 + al Pti + a2 Qti + a3 Qti
<!> . = b0 + bl Pti + b2 <N> . + b3 
tl tx
+ a. N . + e .4 ti ti (2.29)
2
(F . + eti
ti
(2.30)
where Q = disposable output for the rice producer's household which is 
obtained by subtracting rent and production expenses in kind
from total rice output;
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M = quantity of rice offered for market sale;
P = price of padi received by farmers deflated by an index of 
prices paid by farmers for non-rice consumption goods;
N = number of farm household members per farm; 
e = error term; and
the subscripts t and i identify the crop year and farm respectively.
2The authors found that the coefficients of Q and Q were positive 
and all had large t-ratios. The results strongly supported the hypothesis 
that the marketable surplus increases were.more than proportional to increases 
in output when home consumption demand for rice is near a point of saturation. As 
expected, the coefficients of N were negative, showing a positive proportional 
change in home consumption with increases in family size. The coefficients 
of price were positive but not statistically significant. There was no 
evidence supporting a negative price response in market supply for a given 
output as has been argued (Mathur and Ezekiel, 1961). An increase in 
output had a strong positive impact on the size of the marketable surplus, 
and as a result, the price elasticity of the marketable surplus was clearly 
positive. The short-run total price elasticity was between 0.41 and 0.67, 
and the long-run price elasticity at a range of 0.69 to 0.95. The partial 
elasticity of output was in all cases calculated to be about 1.3.
The study by Toquero et al deserved some credit for the 
availability of results of a motivation survey conducted by the authors.
They were able to conclude that the results of the regression analysis 
were consistent with the results of the motivation survey which showed 
farmer's disposal of rice in response to changes in output and price.
Out of twenty-one farmers interviewed, nine farmers replied that they would 
sell all of the increased output, seven farmers intended to sell a part and 
retain the remainder for home consumption, and only two farmers would consume
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all of the increase in output. These responses indicated that an increase 
in output resulted in an increase in both home consumption and market sales. 
On the other hand, out of the twenty-one farmers interviewed, only one 
replied that he would increase home consumption if the price of rice were 
to increase and two farmers replied that they would decrease home consumption 
but by far the majority planned no change in home consumption in response 
to a price rise. Clearly, price has a negligible effect on the allocation 
of output to home consumption and market sale. These results confirmed 
the findings of the regression analysis. A summary of determinants of 
marketable and marketed surpluses by various studies based on direct 
approach is given in Table 2.3. The positive signs show that there will 
be a corresponding increase in marketable and marketed surpluses with a 
rise in the value of the determinants, while the negative signs show an 
inverse influence (Table 2.3). It was observed in a majority of the 
studies, the output variables.have a positive influence on the production 
of surplus. Also, as in indirect studies, the price variable has a positive 
relationship with marketable and marketed surplus. Non-farm cash income 
and family size generally have a negative influence on the surplus production
2.3 Marketed Surplus in Malaysia
There has so far been only one empirical study of determinants 
of marketed surplus in Malaysia. It deals with marketed surplus of padi. 
This was carried out by Lim (1974). The study was based on data collected 
through a field survey conducted in March-May 1973, and covered the period . 
from March 1972 to March 1973 for a sample of eighty-five padi farming 
households in Behor Mali in the state of Perils.
Lim could not use the price of padi as a determinant in the 
marketed surplus as this was fixed under the government's guaranteed minimum
TABLE 2.3
MARKETABLE AND MARKETED SURPLUS FUNCTIONS 
USING DIRECT APPROACH ESTIMATION
01O rCNo. Reference Year Place *h co3 cti Pm U
<U 6> 3
■U •H cti 0)3 <D 4J Pm 0PL U cd 1 o4-1 •H rH 3 u3 u <u O 3
O Pm !3 H
1 Khan and Chowdhury 1962 Pakistan + -
2 Krishna 1965 India +
3 Mandal and Ghash 1968 India +
4 Bardhan 1970 India + -
5 Sharma and Gupta 1970 India +
6 Bardhan and
Bardhan 1971 India +
7 Bhargava and
Rustagi 1972 India +
8 Lim 1974 Malaysia + -
9 Toquero et al 1975 Philippines + +
10 Haessel 1975 India +
11 Medani 1975 Sudan +
12 Chinn 1976 Taiwan + +
cti l mh
co 3 O
<D o 3 o 3N CM o u 3 o
•H CO rH •H O •H CM 0)
•rH cd CO 4-1 4H •H 4J o N
Q u CO CU Q, O 4J cd cu 3 •H 3
•H CU bO s CU cd > bO U C/D CM
rH 3 3 3 cd 3 nd 0 X •H cd ■Hcu 43 bO CU CO iH o 4-1 0) 4-1 4J 0) 43 01
43 U O 3 3 0) u 3 nd tH 3 CO U
cd 4-1 01 3 CJ o •H 3 CU 3 <u 2 u cti cd 0)
O H CM <ti u >-* H Pd H u u <ti u Ph PC
+ +
+
+
+
+ - + +
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price (GMP) scheme (Appendix 2). He defined marketed surplus as the volume 
marketed which was surplus of production over the minimum consumption 
requirement and postulated that output has a positive influence on marketed 
surplus. Total off-farm income was hypothesised as a factor influencing 
the marketed surplus volume. A third determinant postulated was the degree 
of concentration in the size distribution of land. He argued that larger 
farm holdings enjoyed economies of scale so that their output per adult 
unit was greater than that of smaller farms. In testing this hypothesis 
for the Behor Mali area, actual acreage planted per adult unit was used as 
a proxy for the degree of land concentration. The fourth and last 
determinant of the marketed surplus proportion postulated was net other 
disposal of padi as a proportion of total output. This variable included 
rent and wage payments in kind and religious contributions such as zakat.
The marketed surplus function adopted was:
m = f (X1$X2,X ,X4) (2.31)
where m = marketed surplus of padi as a percentage of total padi output;
X^ = total padi output per adult unit in gantangs;
X^ = income from off-farm sources per adult unit in Malaysian 
dollars;
X^ = planted padi area per adult unit in acres; and
X, = net other disposal of padi as a percentage of total padi output.
Simple linear and logarithmic linear regressions were carried out 
at first between m and each of the farm determinants separately. The 
marketed surplus proportion function was then estimated using linear multiple 
regression. Farming households were divided into four groups based on area 
of padi planted. The groups were 2.5 or less acres, 2.6 to 5.0 acres,
5.1 to 7.5 acres and greater than 7.5 acres. The analysis was also carried
out for the size groups combined for comparison.
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Lim found that the net other disposal (X,) was the most important 
determinant of the marketed surplus of padi in the area. Output per 
adult unit (X ) and the degree of concentration in size distribution of 
land (X^) also significantly affected the marketed surplus proportions of 
medium-sized farms between 2.6 and 7.5 acres. Income from off-farm 
sources per adult unit (X£) inversely affected the marketed surplus of all 
size-groups but the relationship was rather weak.
Lim suggested that the marketed surplus was best estimated with 
a quadratic function, with a positive second derivative for padi output.
This is analogous to time series case where the marginal propensity to 
consume padi decreased with increasing output. He reported that the 
marginal propensity to consume was less than one for farmers with areas 
of less than 2.5 acres of padi. The smallness of the farms generally 
together with the high degree of fragmentation and tenancy meant that most 
of these farmers produced at subsistence level, well below that at which 
structural change in tastes took place, as predicted by Engel, for the 
consumption of food such as rice.
There, however, were some notable weaknesses in Lim1s analysis. 
First, there was no economic modelling done to adequately explain the 
estimating equations used. Second, the net other disposal variable should 
not be included in the estimating equation as it is part of a production 
variable. More importantly, there is usually a high correlation between 
total output and the net other disposal variable, and between total output - 
and the degree of concentration of land causing multicollinearity biases 
in the estimated regressions. The presentation of simple regression results 
is not necessary and it could only be misleading. Hence, the finding, that 
the net other disposal variable was an important determinant of the marketed 
surplus relative to other variables is somewhat suspect given the above
weaknesses.
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Lim's study suggests two hypotheses which this present study 
will attempt to investigate further, i.e. that output and off-farm income 
(or other aspects of income) are significant determinants of marketable 
and marketed surpluses of padi.
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CHAPTER 3
MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
The aim of this chapter is to develop the methodology for this 
study. The chapter is divided into seven sections. A conceptual model 
is developed in Section 1 using the previous review of approaches used in 
studies of marketable and marketed surpluses in Chapter 2. Section 2 
outlines study hypotheses to be tested in this dissertation. Estimating 
equations and estimating technique are discussed in Section 3 and 4 
respectively. Section 5 deals with organisation of the analysis. Source 
of data is given in Section 6. Lastly, a definition of variables used is 
outlined.
3.1 Conceptual Model
The model to be used in this study is derived from a synthesis of 
conceptual models used in the direct approach as described earlier, in 
particular in the studies by Haessel (1975) and Toquero et al (1975).
By identity, the output of a subsistence crop (Q) is divided into 
the quantity consumed by the farm household (C) and the quantity sold in 
the market (M)i.e.
Q = C + M (3.1)
Thus, the farmer's short-run decision is to allocate output (Q) 
between consumption (C) and sale (M) . Consumption is assumed to depend on 
the relative price of the commodity (P), disposable income of the farmer (Y), 
farm family size (N), and tastes.
C = C(P,Y,N,taste) (3.2) 1
1 In the tradition of Krishna (1962) and Toquero et al (1975) this study
abstracts from disposal of output other then for consumption and sale, and 
uses the terms "marketable surplus", "marketed surplus", and "market sale" 
as appropriate.
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Since the allocation of Q between C and M involves only one decision, M 
is assumed to be residual. Hence by substitution of equation (3.2) into 
equation (3.1),
M = Q-C(P,Y,N,taste)
or M = M(P,Y,Q,N,taste) (3.3)
Since the price of padi is constant for all farmers in the Kemubu 
Project through the operation of a Guaranteed Minimum Price (GMP) policy, 
the relative price variable is dropped from equation (3.3). Taste is 
assumed constant over the relatively short study period. Hence the basic 
model is:
M = M(Q,Y,N) (3.4)
There are two approaches that can be taken in using the output 
variable (Q). One is to use total output, which will be referred to here 
as total padi production (TPP). The other is to utilise net padi production 
(NPP) which is total padi production minus other disposal components. Both 
approaches are adopted in this study as there are two ways of looking at the 
decision making in the marketed surplus supply of padi. One is to consider 
that TPP is the relevant quantity in relation to which the decision to sell, 
or to dispose of in other ways is made. The second, is to consider NPP as 
the quantity relevant for choice between sale and consumption, i.e. after 
commitments have been met.
Other things being the same, the marketable and marketed surpluses 
can be expected to increase with increases in TPP and in NPP. However, the 
relationship between the surpluses and TPP or NPP may not be linear because 
after a farm-family is satieted with the consumption of rice (C), the 
marketable and marketed surpluses will increase more than the proportionate 
increase in TPP or NPP, as found by Toquero et al (1975) in the Philippines
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and Krishna (1965) in India. It is, therefore, hypothesised that the 
relationship between marketable and marketed surpluses and TPP or NPP in 
the Kemubu Irrigation Project is of the second degree polynomial nature 
as shown in Figure 3.1 instead of the linear type.
FIGURE 3.1
HYPOTHETICAL CURVE OF MARKETABLE AND 
MARKETED SURPLUSES IN RELATION TO TPP OR NPP
Marketable
or
Marketed
Surpluses
TPP (or NPP)
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Positive and negative signs of the second order derivatives 
indicate that the function has minimum and maximum vertices respectively.
Disposable income is the sum of farm income and non-farm income.
Farm income in this study is the sum of net padi income and total net non— 
padi income. After preliminary tests of these income variables the total 
net non-padi income (net non—padi farm income plus total off farm income) 
was chosen for the model. Net padi income is already represented by the 
padi output variable.
The income effect on marketable and marketed surpluses is apparent 
through consumption level as implied in Equations (3.2) and (3.3). The 
relation between income and consumption, other things being held constant, 
can be summarised in a convenient form for statistical determination known 
as the Engel Curve. A portion of a typical Engel Curve is shown in 
Figure 3.2 where the quantity of good X consumed rises as income rises, e.g. 
where for example X is a normal superior good (Hirshleifer, 1980, pp.100-6). 
Rice is usually a normal superior good in areas such as the Kamubu Irrigation 
Project.
The shape of a farmer's Engel Curve for a particular good such as 
rice will depend on the nature of the good, the nature of the farmer's tastes 
and the level at which rice prices are held constant.
Engel Curves can assume different shapes (Figures 3.3 and 3.4).
In Figure 3.3, the quantity consumed increases with a rise in income, but 
at a decreasing rate. This implies that, ceterus paribus, the marketable . 
and marketed surpluses will be increasing at an increasing rate with an 
increase in income. But according to the Engel Curve in Figure 3.4, the 
quantity of rice consumed increases with income but an an increasing rate, 
correspondingly, e.g. at low average levels of output the marketable and 
marketed surpluses of padi will be increasing but at a decreasing rate in this
situation.
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FIGURE 3.2
Quantity
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ENGEL CURVE
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FIGURE 3.3
ENGEL CURVE: DECREASING RATE
Quantity of 
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FIGURE 3.4
Quantity
Rice
Consumed
ENGEL CURVE: INCREASING RATE
Money Income
Rice is regarded as a normal consumption good by padi farming 
households in the Kemubu region. Accordingly, Figure 3.3 would appear to 
best represent the relationship between consumption of rice and income for 
them. This implies that marketable and marketed surpluses will increase 
at an increasing rate with an increase in income.
Subsistence or semi subsistence farmers (e.g. in the Kemubu Scheme) 
have values, attitudes, motivations and socio-economic behaviour many of 
which are specifically affected by their condition as subsistence or semi 
subsistence producers. Most important is the fact that life is a unity - 
production, consumption, marketing, capital accumulation are all one integral 
operation. They produce food to live and they need food to be able to 
produce more. They do not make a conscious or deliberate separation between 
production and consumption. Also the farm families perceived certain bundle 
of goods which they strive to provide for their families.
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Each member of these farm families has a minimum subsistence 
standard of living which is determined by: (1) physiologic (and nutritional) 
variables; (2) economic variables, especially current and previous levels 
of economic well-being; and (3) socio-cultural variables, in a historical 
and cross cultural aspect (Wharton, 1963). Thus, there is a minimum 
standard of living per family. In this study in the Kemubu area the amount 
of rice consumed per family would form a part of this concept of minimum 
subsistence standard of living as the nutritional variables. Thus, the 
number of members in the family or operative social unit have an effect 
on marketable or marketed surpluses through its consumption (Clark and 
Turner, 1977).
This variable of family size is standardised in male adult units 
(FAMSZA) . Thus, FAMSZA is not strictly number of family members, but a 
composite variable which takes account of composition factors: age, body 
weight, etc. (Appendix 3). Thus, two families may have the same total 
number of members but a different FAMSZA due to a different age and/or body 
weight composition of the family.
The importance of irrigation in rice technology has been widely 
emphasized. It raises yields directly by creating favourable water conditions 
and enables an increase in cropping intensity with the addition of another 
crop; it also increases rice farmers’ incentives to use modern inputs such 
as modern rice varieties, chemical fertilizers and pesticides.
The importance of irrigation has been commonly demonstrated by 
comparing the performances of irrigated and rainfed rice areas, or two 
different irrigation systems (e.g. Moorti, 1971; Desai, 1973; Kumar, 1974; 
Booth, 1977; and Sadeghi, 1978; all cited in Asnawi and Shand, 1979). In the 
Kemubu Project, irrigation facilities have increased farmers' rice production 
and have created increased marketable or marketed surpluses of padi
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(Shand et al, 1982). Thus, in this study it is hypothesised that the 
provision of the Kemubu Project has increased these surpluses more for
farmers inside than those adjacent and outside the Kemubu who do not benefit 
directly from the project.
If a farmer is to react positively to price or output changes, 
he must enjoy some notable part of the change. If the rent structure 
contrives in a Ricardian way to keep the cultivator in a subsistence 
existence, then marketable and marketed surplus determinant responsiveness 
could be exhibited only by the landlord and his ability to translate this 
into output changes would depend upon whatever other power over his tenants 
he could exert (e.g. eviction of less productive tenants) otherwise some 
reasonable sharing with the cultivator of the extra revenues due to higher 
prices or output would best serve the landlord's income goals (Askari and 
Cummings, 1973).
There were three main categories of tenancy in the padi area of 
Kemubu: pure tenant, owner-operator and mixed owner tenant (Chapter 4 of 
this dissertation). As these three tenancy categories operate under 
different rental contract which could be fixed-rent tenancies or share 
tenancies, it is believed that the production and marketable and marketed 
surplus supply behaviour of farmers under these categories of tenancy will 
be different (Wilson, 1958; Selvadurai, 1969; Robertson, 1980; Fujimoto,
1980; and Shand et al, 1982). The available evidence in Malaysia indicates 
that pure tenant and mixed owner-tenant farmers have significantly higher 
yields and incomes than owner-operators (Bhati, 1971, p.79; and Huang, 1971,p.81)
3.2 Study Hypotheses
In this study the hypotheses which are proposed and tested for the
marketable and marketed surpluses of padi in the Kemubu Irrigation Project
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are that:
(i) the marketable or marketed surplus is a oositive function
of rice output. As output of padi increases the consumption 
of rice will probably rise but the incremental consumption 
is likely to be less than one. Thus, the marketable or 
marketed surplus is likely to increase as a result of an 
increase in the output of padi.
(ii) A number of padi disposal categories such as rent,
wages, cash and debt payments in kind, religious contributions, 
gifts and storage have a significant negative influence in the 
generation of marketable and marketed surplus.
(iii) The value of marketable or marketed surpluses varies directly 
with the size of the padi operational area of the farmers.
(iv) The level of non-padi farm income and of off-farm income 
have negatively influenced the supply of marketable and 
marketed surpluses of padi.
(v) Consumption of rice varies directly with farmers 1 income 
and family size.
(vi) Thus related to (v), the marketable and marketed surpluses 
are negatively related to family size measured in adult 
units in this study.
(vii) Land tenure, as an institution, has a significant effect
on the production and income level of the farmers (Cheung,.
1969; and Fujimoto, 1980). Thus, it is hypothesised that 
land tenure will have a significant negative relationship with 
the supply of marketable and marketed surpluses of padi.
The marketable and -marketed surpluses in the Kemubu Irrigation 
Project have been positively influenced by efforts to
(viii)
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intensify production through the Integrated Area Development 
and also by variations in local institutions and infrastructure 
development.
3.3 Estimating Equations
Corresponding to Equation (3.4) three models are specified for
estimating the marketable and marketed surplus functions. A quadratic form
of equation was chosen here to enable measurement of the direction of the
rate of change in the relationship of certain variables, e.g, total padi
production and total non padi income:
Marketable Surplus
(1) MX = a + b TPP + b TPP2 + bn TNPI + b. TNPV
1 2 3 4 (3.5)
+ b j. FAMSZA + e
Marketed Surplus
(2) MS = a + b TPP + b0 TPP2 + b„ TNPI + b. TNPI2
1 Z 3 4
+ b5 FAMSZA + e
(3) MS = a + b NPP + b„ NPP2 + bn TNPI + b, TNPI2
12 3 4
+ b5 FAMSZA + e
(3.6)
(3.7)
where MX is the marketable surplus in gantangs;
MS is the marketed surplus in gantangs;
TPP is total padi production on total output in gantangs;
TNPI is total non-padi income in Malaysian dollars;
FAMSZA is the number of farm household members per farm in male adult 
unit equivalents;
NPP is net padi production in gantangs; and 
e is the random error term.
3.4 Estimation Technique
Each of the estimating equations contains a single dependent
variable and was estimated by ordinary least squares regression using the
Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) on a Univac computer.
The standard error of a regression coefficient is given in parenthesis
below each coefficient. The standard error of an estimate is denoted by S.E,
-2and the adjusted coefficient of determination is denoted by R .
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Statistical tests were performed to test the following hypotheses:
3.4.1 Overall Significance of a Regression
Formally, the test of the overall significance of a regression 
implies testing the null hypothesis:
H0 : bl ~ b2 ---
against the alternative hypothesis:
H. : not all b.'s are zero.A x
If the null hypothesis is true, that is if all tfhe true parameters are zero, 
there is no linear relationship between dependent variable and the regressions. 
The test uses the F* ratio:
F* , 522/(fc-l)
Ee2/(N-k)
where Ey jjg the sum of squared deviations explained by all the regressions 
together;
k = total number of b's;
2Ee = sum of residual deviations-; and
N = sample size.
The F* is then compared with the theoretical F at chosen probability 
levels of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 with = k-1 and = N-k degrees of freedom.
If F* >F, we reject the null hypothesis, i.e. we accept that the regression 
is significant and that not all b.'s are zero. If F* <F we accept the null 
hypothesis, that is we accept that the overall regression is not significant.
3.4.2 Significance of Coefficients
For each of the predictor variables, the null hypothesis is:
Ho : bi - 0
and tested against the alternative hypothesis:
V bi *0
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In this case the t-statistic is used:
b.
t* = 1
where b.1 least squares estimate of b.; and
cr(b . ) = standard error of b ..i i
Rejection of the hypothesis at the 1 per cent level is denoted by ***, at the 
5 per cent level by **, and at the 10 per cent level by *.
3.4.3 Test of Equality Between Coefficients Obtained From Different
Samples (The Chow Test)
The null hypothesis of the significance of the difference in 
coefficients obtained from two samples is:
against the alternative hypothesis that there is a significant difference is:
The test uses the ratio:
F* = ___E______ ±_____ £____
(Ee2 + Ee2)/(n +n2-2k)
[Ee2 - (Ee2 + Ee2)]/k
where EP unexplained variations in the pooled sample;
sum total of unexplained variations of the two samples;
n sample size; and
k number of regressions.
The observed F* ratio is compared with a theoretical value of Fq q,. 
and Fq q^ with = k and = (n^h^-^k) degrees of freedom. Rejection of
the null hypothesis at the 1 per cent level is denoted by *** and at the 
5 per cent level by ** .
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3.5 Organisation of Analysis
The analysis that follows is arranged so as to explore behaviour 
under a range of varying socio-economic conditions, as follows.
3.5.1 With and Without the Kemubu Irrigation Project
The Kemubu Irrigation Project was designed to enable intensification 
of padi production of participant farmers. Our hypothesis is that those 
inside the project will give a different response to the production of padi 
and thus to differing marketable and marketed surpluses. The production 
difference was measured with production data from samples of farmers inside 
and outside the Kemubu Project who were double and single cropping padi 
respectively (Gittinger, 1979; and Shand et al, 1982).
The marketable and marketed surplus response analysis will focus 
on the Kemubu Irrigation Project as a whole and on the peripheral area 
outside the Kemubu Scheme, i.e. on samples with and without the scheme.
The analysis of each area will then be in terms of sub-groupings in each 
area, i.e. according to land tenancy categories, net padi operational area 
size groups, total farm operational area size groups and by locations 
(districts) as shown in Figure 3.5.
3.5.2 Tenancy
Various views have been presented to explain the behaviour of 
farmers with different types of tenancy in terms of padi production and 
marketing response (Cheung, 1969; and Roumasset ,1976) in the Kemubu area, 
sharecropping is very prevalent (Selvadurai, 1969; Shand et al, 1982; Bray and 
Robertson, 1980; Fujimoto, 1981; Tsubochi, 1979; and Tan, n.d.). By 
incorporating land tenancy in this study it is hoped to add to the knowledge 
of the performance of the various tenancy groups in generating a surplus 
for the market. These are subdivided here into the customary three major 
categories of pure tenant, owner-operator and mixed owner-tenant.
FIGURE 3.5
STRUCTURE OF ANALYSIS
Data
Inside and 
■> Outside 
Kemubu
Pure Tenant
Tenancy > Owner-Operator 
* Mixed Owner Tenant
< 1 Acre
1.1-2 A,cfes
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> 4 Ac^es
> < 1 Acre 
•>1,1-2 Acres 
■>2.1-3 Acres
> 3,1-4 Acres
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Total Farm 
Operational Area
Kota Bharu 
Bachok 
Pasir Mas 
Pasir Puteh
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3.5.3 Net Padi Operational Area
In the literature there is much controversy as to the efficiency 
and economies of scale over the range of farm sizes in less developed countries. 
In this study operational padi area is used as a variable in the analysis of 
the marketable and marketed surpluses of padi. It is important to note 
here that, with few exceptions, the operational area of the padi farm in 
the Kemubu area was small with an average in 1979/80 main season of 2.3 
acres and of a smaller 2.0 acres in the off-season (Shand et al, 1982).
Most of the padi farms operated were less than five acres. Within this 
range, five sub-groups were distinguished. Less than 1 acre, 1.1-2 acres,
2.1-3 acres, 3.1-4 acres and greater than 4 acres.
3.5.4 Total Farm Operational Area
It was reported in 1967-68 and 1982 that some 40 per cent of 
cultivated land in the Kemubu area was under crops other than padi, which 
indicates a considerable degree of diversification. Thus, about 45 per 
cent of farmers (1979/80) had padi and other farming enterprises such as 
rubber, tobacco, coconuts, orchard crops and livestock which contributed 
to their farm earnings. It is hypothesised here that non-padi income 
(non-padi farm and/or off-farm income) or the labour utilised in non-padi 
enterprises, may have an effect on the production of surplus padi. Thus, 
farm enterprise diversification (as well as income diversification) may 
explain some variations in the marketable and marketed surplus response.
Five sub-groups of total farm operational area were distinguished as for 
padi: less than 1 acre, 1.1-2 acres, 2.1-3 acres, 3.1-4 acres and more than 
4 acres.
3.5.5 Location (Districts)
There were three administrative districts inside the Kemubu 
Irrigation Project area: Kota Bharu, Bachok and Pasir Puteh (Figure 4.1).
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Outside the project there were four Kota Bharu, Bachok, Pasir Mas and Pasir 
Puteh. It was hypothesised that differences between the districts in such 
aspects as local production conditions, infrastructure and institutions 
could influence performance of marketable and marketed surplus production. 
Accordingly, a breakdown by districts was included in the analysis.
3.6 Data and Variables
The data used for estimation of marketable and marketed surplus 
models were kindly provided by Dr Richard T. Shand of the Department of 
Economics, Research School of Pacific Studies, the Australian National 
University.
These formed the basis for a more comprehensive assessment of the
impact of the Kemubu Irrigation Project carried out by a team of researchers
from the Universiti Pertanian Malaysia for the sponsoring agencies, the
2World Bank and Malaysian Government. Since full details of sampling, data 
collection, procedures and other aspects of the study can be found in 
Shand et al (1982), it is proposed here to give only a brief summary 
description of the data source.
Data were collected for two cropping seasons in 1979/80 (off and
main or monsoon) from a sample of 546 farms inside the Kemubu Irrigation
Project, and for one season (main or monsoon) from 316 farms located outside,
but adjacent to the perimeter of the Kemubu Scheme area. The sample of
546 farms inside Kemubu was stratified geographically according to farm
population distribution with sub-districts {muk'Lms), by random selection of
villages (kampungs) within muk'Lms, and of farmers within selected villages
and muk'Lms, but with some clustering of respondents by villages (three per
selected villages). The sample outside the Kemubu Scheme was included to
2 Shand, R.T., Mohd Arieff, H. and Mohamad, A.R. 1982. A Socio-Economic
Study of the Impact of the Kemubu Irrigation Project in Kelantan, Malaysia,
Universiti Pertanian Malaysia, Serdang, Malaysia.
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enable a comparison between those who enjoyed the benefits within the scheme 
and those outside the scheme who had not. The latter was in effect a 
control sample which could be compared with a sample taken before the scheme 
in 1967/68 in an earlier (baseline) socio-economic study.
Data collection was done in a two week field survey using formal 
questionnaires in interviews by thirty students selected from Universiti 
Pertanian Malaysia. The students were all from Kelantan, since familiarity 
with the Kelantanese dialect was recognised as a necessity for effective 
interviewing.
3.7 Definition of Variables
Variables used in the models are briefly discussed below.
3.7.1 Marketed Surplus (MS)
Marketed surplus is the total quantity of padi in gantangs sold in 
the market from both main and off-season crops in 1979/80 by farmers inside 
the Kemubu Irrigation Project, and from the main season by farmers who were 
outside the scheme. These quantities were reported directly by farmers 
during the survey.
3.7.2 Marketable Surplus (MX)
The marketable surplus of padi is the sum of the marketed surplus 
and other disposal categories of padi measured in gantccngs (other than farm 
and household consumption) which were transferred in kind for purposes 
including rent, wages and religious contribution. Rent was the main category.
3.7.3 Total Padi Production (TPP)
Total padi production is the total gross output obtained in gantangs 
by the farmers after harvest. It is the sum of main and off-season output
3 Selvadurai, S., Ani, A. and Nik Hassani, M. 1969. Socio-Economic Study 
of Padi Farms in the Kemubu Area of Kelantan, 1968, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives, Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.
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for the farmers inside the Kemubu Irrigation Project, and of the main season 
output for those outside.
3.7.4 Net Padi Production (NPP)
Net padi production is the difference between total padi production 
and other padi disposal (in kind) which comprised rent, wages, religious 
contributions, storage and other uses. This variable was measured in gan tangs
3.7.5 Total Non-Padi Income (TNPI)
Total non-padi income comprises total off-farm income and total 
net non-padi farm income measured in Malaysian dollars. Sources that 
contributed to non-padi farm income were net income from land rented out, 
sales of rubber, coconut, tobacco, fruit and livestock and other minor sources
3.7.6 Family Size (FAMSZA)
Some 90 per cent of surveyed farm household had a membership of 
less than 8 and about 60 per cent were in the range of 3 to 6. Average 
family size was 5.1 inside and 5.4 outside the Kemubu Irrigation Scheme in 
1979/80 (Shand et al, 1982).
The family size variable for the present study was further modified 
to five values in adult male equivalents (Appendix 3).
3.7.7 Tenancy
To account for the existence and importance of tenancy in the 
marketable and marketed surplus response models, dummy variables were used 
to represent the three forms of tenancy, that is pure tenant, owner-operator 
and mixed owner tenant.
3.7.8 Kemubu Irrigation Project(KI)
A locational dummy variable to represent the irrigation project was 
introduced in the total sample analysis to enable measurements of the effects 
of the irrigation project and associated institutional factors on production
of padi.
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3.7.9 Location (Districts)
District dummy variables served a similar purpose as the "project" 
variable in Section 3.7.8 to detect and measure variations within each sample 
area both inside and outside Kemubu. The three districts inside the Kemubu 
Irrigation Project were Kota Bharu, Bachok and Pasir Puteh, and those outside 
included Kota Bharu, Bachok, Pasir Mas and Pasir Puteh (Figure 4.1).
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CHAPTER 4
THE KEMUBU IRRIGATION PROJECT
This chapter provides background information on the Kemubu 
Irrigation Project, relating particularly to the theme of this study. 
Discussion draws heavily upon Shand, R.T., Mohd. Arieff Hussein and Mohd. 
Abdul Rahman (1982); Selvadurai, S., Ani bin Arope and Nik Hassani bin 
Mohammad (1969); Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority 
(1977); World Bank (1967, 1973, 1975, 1976, 1981a) and various publications 
of the Kemubu Agricultural Development Authority (KADA).
4.1 Introduction
The Kemubu Irrigation Project is located in the state of Kelantan 
in the northeast of Peninsular Malaysia, about 650 kilometers from Kuala 
Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia (Figure 1.2). It is about 6° north 
latitude and occupies part of the alluvial Kelantan Plain of around
173,000 acres, and is intersected by several small rivers. The project 
area with 47,000 acres of padi land, is about 27 kilometers wide paralleling 
the east coast along the South China Sea. A range of hills forms the 
southern boundary and the Kelantan River, which has a drainage area of
5,000 square miles, delineates the northwestern boundary (Dobby, 1951).
The project area currently produces about half of Kelantan’s rice output. 
Kota Bharu, the capital of Kelantan is about 10 kilometers north of the 
project area.
4.2 Kemubu Irrigation Project
Preliminary technical studies of the Kemubu Project Proposal 
commenced in 1961 and by 1965, the engineering requirements had been fully
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determined. The construction of the Kemubu Irrigation Project started in 
1969 and was completed in 1972 (Figure 4.1). Total project costs amounted
FIGURE 4.1
Location of the Kemubu Irrigation Area, 
Kelantan
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to US$23.4 million of which US$10.0 million were financed through a World 
Bank loan. The scheme was placed under the administration of the Kemubu 
Agricultural Development Authority (KADA), which also oversees a number of 
small adjoining irrigation schemes, namely, Salor, Pasir Mas, Lemal and 
Alor Pasir. The Kemubu Scheme proper comprises 142,080 areas and covers 
the district of Kota Bharu and parts of Bachok and Pasir Puteh District.
The organisation and operation of Kemubu as an irrigation scheme permits 
double cropped wet rice cultivation and also offers the potential off 
season farming of other crops. The first dry season cropping within the 
Kemubu Project took place in 1972, which meant that this study's field 
work occurred near the end of the ninth year of double cropping.
The total population of the project area was 145,000 in 1970, 
with an average density of 1,067 persons per square mile of agricultural 
land. About 75 per cent of the population were engaged in padi cultivation. 
So with an average family size of 5.1 persons, there were roughly 21,324 
families in padi cultivation in 1970.
4.3 Agricultural Land Use Pattern
The Kemubu Irrigation Project area forms part of the Kelantan 
Plain, which has undergone a long history of settlement (Zaharah, 1970), 
with a spatial pattern of dispersed settlements and a relatively varied 
pattern of land use, based on wet rice, rubber, coconuts and mixed 
horticulture (kampung) cultivation. Edaphic factors and variations in 
terrain have given rise to different human responses. Low-lying areas 
have been colonised and reclaimed for padi farming, while the interspersing 
higher grounds provide suitable sites for the farmers' houses in association 
with the traditional kampung cultivation (Dobby, 1951, p.240). Where soils, 
drainage and terrain are suitable, pure stands of rubber and coconuts have 
been established (Arnott, 1957). Padi is the chief crop, but its area has 
been stagnant since the 1950's (Dobby, 1951).
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A 1967/68 study reported a total area of 86,000 acres within the 
Kemubu Scheme of which 95 per cent were under agriculture. Of the total 
cultivated area, 49,000 acres were under padi, of which about 30,000 acres 
were in Kota Bharu, and 10,000 acres were in each of Bachok and Pasir Puteh 
Districts respectively. Of the rest, 22 per cent was under rubber and 
15 per cent was under mixed horticulture.
4.4 The Padi Farmer
Padi farmers in the Kemubu Irrigation Project are predominantly 
Malays, comprising 98-99 per cent of the farm operators. Farm families 
consisted of 3 to 6 persons in 1979/80 with a mean of 5.2 persons within 
the Kemubu Scheme and 5.4 persons outside the scheme.
About 34 per cent of farmers in the scheme and 39 per cent outside 
the scheme worked part or full time on other farms. Also, 41 per cent of 
households had off-farm work inside the scheme and 46 per cent outside for 
those outside the scheme in 1979/80.
Due to the higher concentration of roads inside the scheme, access 
to markets is made easier inside the Kemubu Irrigation Project than 
outside. Social amenities available to the farmers are still comparatively 
fewer. For example, only 3 per cent inside the scheme have piped water 
and 53 per cent electricity.
4.5 Farm Holdings
Inside Kemubu, the average total farm area was 3.2 acres in main 
season in 1979/80. The operational area was 2.6 acres, which was roughly 
the same as in the off-season. Outside the scheme, in 1979/80, the average 
area was larger, at 4.3 acres per farm and operational area size was 3.3 acres. 1
1 Operational area is defined as the total farm area being cultivated and 
worked on by a farmer.
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Constant sub-division of land over generations has resulted in 
the creation of diminutive land parcels. Average operational padi area 
in 1979/80 inside Kemubu was 2.3 acres in the main season, but was a 
smaller 2.0 acres in the off-season.
Ninety-two per cent of farms inside the Kemubu were double 
cropped with padi in 1979/80. Of total padi land actually planted with 
the crop in the main season, 89 per cent was also planted with padi in the 
off-season giving a cropping intensity of 189 per cent. However, some 
padi areas were not planted with padi in the main season. If this is 
taken into account in the total padi area, then only 79 per cent of the 
area was double cropped and the cropping intensity was only 179 per cent.
Both sub-division and unrestricted land transfer have contributed 
to fragmentation of farms. In 1979/80 there was an average of 2.2 lots 
per farm outside Kemubu and a higher 2.8 inside.
The degree of crop diversification in 1979/80 was substantial, 
and 45 per cent of farmers had one or more crops other than padi. Over 
50 per cent had other crops outside the project. This was evident 
particularly in rubber growing, where the proportion of farmers growing 
this crop had grown from 8 to 18 per cent inside, and from 8 to 21 per cent 
outside the project from 1967/68 to 1979/80.
4.6 Land Ownership and Padi Land Tenure Pattern
The pattern of distribution of land ownership in Kemubu is very 
dissected with roughly 80 per cent of farmers owning less than 
3 acres, the minimal amount of padi land considered necessary for an income 
close to the poverty line. Only 20 per cent had holdings larger than 
3 acres. Multiple ownership of land (two or more owners) involves 29 per
cent of all agricultural lots in Kemubu (Voon, et al, 1979).
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The most striking development in tenure patterns in the Kemubu 
Project, since the beginning of double cropping has been the decline in 
the proportion of pure tenants in the farm population together with a 
decline in the proportion of land which they operate. The decline has 
not, as in Muda's case (Gibbons et al, 1981), favoured the growth of the 
pure owner-operator class, but rather has led to the expansion of the 
mixed owner-tenant class of operators and their share of total operational 
pad! land. Despite this difference, however, it is worth noting that the 
single most important trend discernible in both irrigation schemes 
has been the reduction in numbers of pure tenants, the poorest tenure 
category (Tables 4.1 and 4.2).
TABLE 4.1
PROPORTIONS OF OPERATIONAL PADI FARMERS BY 
TYPE OF TENURE IN KEMUBU, 1967/68 AND 1979/80
Type of Tenure
% Farmers in Sample ^
1967/68
Kemubu
1979/80
Inside
Kemubu
Outside
Owner Operator 58 55 50
Tenant 20 14 12
Mixed Owner-Operator/Tenant 22 31 38
Sources: (1) Selvadurai, S. et al (1969, p.58).
(2) Shand, R.T. et al (1982, p.81).
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TABLE 4.2
TOTAL OPERATIONAL PADI AREA BY TENURE 
CATEGORY IN KEMUBU, 1967/68 AND 1979/80
% Total Operational Padi Area
Type of Tenure 1967/68
Kemubu
1979/80 (2)
Inside Kemubu Outside Kemubu
Owner Operator 50 48 47
Tenan t 21 13 8
Mixed Owner-Operator/Tenant 29 38 45
Note: a Main season only. The pattern was little different in the off­
season other than a slightly greater area proportion in the mixed 
tenure category.
Sources: (1) Selvadurai, S. et al (1969, p.58).
(2) Shand, R. T. et al (1982, p.81).
In 1967/68 there were considerable differences between tenure 
groups in average padi operational area per farm (Table 4.3). In 1979/80, 
the average for the mixed tenure category had changed little and was the 
largest of the groups both inside and outside Kemubu. There had been a 
considerable increase in the average for the owner-operator outside the 
Kemubu. Conversely, the average area per farm for the pure tenant had 
di-mini shed substantially outside Kemubu, and to a lesser extent inside the 
project, from 2.4 acres in 1967/68 to 1.7 and 2.1 (main season) acres 
respectively in 1979/80.
In 1967/68, rental payment was typically made in kind, and only 
11 per cent reported cash rental payments. This pattern remained true for 
1979/80, with neutral payments being made after harvest as before. Fixed 
rents, in both cash and kind were still uncommon in Kelantan in 1979/80
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TABLE 4.3
AVERAGE PADI OPERATIONAL AREA PER FARM BY TENURE 
CATEGORY, 1967/68 AND 1979/80, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE KEMUBU
Average Padi Operation Area Per Farm(Acres)
1979/80
Type of Tenure 1967/68,n 
Kemubu Inside Kemubu Outside Kemubu
Off Main Main
Owner Operator 1.9 1. 7 2.0 2.7
Tenant 2.4 1.8 2.1 1.7
Mixed Owner-Operator/Tenant 2.9 2.5 2.8 2.8
Sources: (1) Selvadurai, S. et al (1969, p.59) •
(2) Shand, R.T. et al (1982, p.82).
although apparently on the increase (Huang, 1973 , p.1243). Payments in kind
were divided almost equally among owner farmers and share tenants as found
by Shand et al (1982) and Horri (1981, p.98). With a few exceptions,
share cropping agreements were on a 50:50 basis between owner and tenant.
4.7 Labour Utilisation
In 1979/80, in the main season outside the project, the average
labour requirements per farm was 92 man days. Inside the project, however,
the average total labour input was 146 man days (Table 4.4).
Most of the labour (85 per cent) was supplied by the household 
in 1979/80. Most of the farmers' own labour was used for transplanting 
and harvesting. There was a greater contribution from family members in 
nursery work, and overall the contribution of family members grew in relative 
importance largely at the expense of hired workers in the Kemubu Project 
owing to the dominant influence of the second crop introduced by the project.
TABLE 4.4
AVERAGE ANNUAL LABOUR REQUIREMENTS PER FARM FOR PADI 
BY TASK INSIDE AND OUTSIDE KEMUBU IN 1979/80
Location Unit Nursery FieldPreparation Transplanting
Fertilizer 
and Pests Harvesting Others Total
Inside Man Days 21.0 13.2 43.4 2.5 65.6 0.5 146.2
% 14 9 30 2 45 neg 100
Outside Man Days 16.1 7.8 29.7 1.4 36.5 0.4 91.9
% 18 8 32 2 40 neg 100
Source: Shand et al (1982, p.163).
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There was a strong inverse relationship between a farm's padi area 
and average labour inputs per acre inside Kemubu in 1979/80. Those with 
one acre or less averaged 68 man days per acre against less than 23 per 
acre amongst those with 4 acres or more.
The pattern of labour inputs by tenure type inside Kemubu revealed 
owner-operators as the most labour intensive group for padi, both on a per 
farm and per acre basis. Pure tenants were least intensive on a per farm 
basis, though they were more intensive on a per acre basis. Tenants were 
also least labour intensive outside the scheme.
In terms of total employment in padi in 1979/80 outside the project, 
farm households utilised about 25 per cent of total available employment 
time on farm and 29 per cent inside the project (Shand, 1982, p.198).
Even with a second crop this figure makes it very clear that the farm family 
remained very much underemployed in so far as on-farm work was concerned.
4.8 Padi Production and Disposal
In 1979/80, the average yield in the main season in the single 
crop area outside the project was 0.6 tons per acre (239 gantangs) which 
showed that in the absence of irrigation, yield changed little from the 
1967/68 situation of 0.5 tons (Table 4.5). Inside the project, yield in 
both off and main seasons averaged one ton per acre in 1979/80, indicating 
a doubling of yield in the main season and a similar yield performance in 
the off season.
The average output per farm outside Kemubu in 1979/80 was 1.2 tons 
and inside Kemubu it was 2.0 and 2.3 tons in the off and main seasons 
respectively.
In yield terms, there was a strong inverse relationship with size 
of padi area in the smaller area range both in the off and main seasons.
Farms with smaller padi areas, of 0.5 acres or less, recorded average yields
TABLE 4.5
AVERAGE ANNUAL PADI PRODUCTION AND YIELDS PER FARM AND 
PER ACRE BEFORE KEMUBU IN 1967/68 AND INSIDE AND 
OUTSIDE KEMUBU IN 1979/80
Year and 
Location Season
Average Padi 
Area Per 
Farm 
(acres)
Farm With 
Double 
Padi Crops 
(%)
Padi Area 
With Double 
Crop 
(%)
Average 
Output Per 
Farm
(qantanq)(tons)
Per Acre 
Per Year 
(tons)
Average Yield 
Off
Season
(tons)
Main
Season
(tons)
1967/68(1)
Pre-Kemubu Main 2.2 4 3 476 1.2 0.5 0.5
1979/80(2)
Inside
Kemubu Off 2.0 92 79 819 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0
Main
Year
2.2 911
1730
2.3
4.3
Outside
Kemubu Main 2.0 14 9 478 1.2 0.6 — 0.6
Sources: (1) Selvadurai, et al (1969, p.94).
(2) Shand, et al (1982, p.200).
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of around 2 tons per acre in both seasons, roughly double the sample averages. 
Those with padi areas of between one half and one acre were also higher than 
the average, but thereafter, yields were around the average for the whole 
sample. These statistics support the findings of much agricultural 
development literature which shows that, in developing countries, small farms 
are cultivated more intensively and, hence have higher yields (e.g. Bachman 
and Christenson, 1967, pp.244-7; and Berry and Cline, 1979, p.126).
In 1979/80, the average yield of padi outside Kemubu by district 
showed that Bachok had a higher yield than the average, while Pasir Mas and 
Pasir Puteh had lower than average yields (Table 4.6). Inside Kemubu the 
average yield for Bachok in the off-season was much lower than the average 
for the whole sample.
TABLE 4.6
AVERAGE YIELD OF SAMPLE FARMERS BY DISTRICT 
INSIDE AND OUTSIDE KEMUBU,1979/80
Outside Kemubu Inside Kemubu
Main
(tons/acre)
Main Off-
tons/acre
Season
Kota Bharu 0.60 1.1 1.1
Bachok 0. 70 0.9 0.6
Pasir Mas 0.46 - -
Pasir Puteh 0.34 0.9 1.0
Average 0.60 1.0 1.0
Source: Shand et al (1982, pp.205-6).
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Average padi production per farm inside Kemubu in 1979/80 for 
mixed owner-tenants was highest at 5.2 tons compared to owner-operators 
(3.3 tons) and pure tenants (2.1 tons). The average yield for mixed 
owner-tenant was also the highest (2.3 tons/acre) compared with pure tenants 
and owner—operators at 2.1 and 1.7 tons per acre respectively.
Outside Kemubu in 1979/80, pure tenants had the smallest area 
but recorded the highest yields at 0.6 tons per acre and owner—operators 
had a relatively large average area but a slightly lower average yield at 
0.5 tons per acre.
The pattern of padi disposal inside the project in 1979/80 showed 
a dramatic break from that in 1967/68 and that outside the project in 
1979/80 (Table 4.7). In 1967/68, only 15 per cent of sample farmers 
recorded sales of padi and this had changed little by 1979/80 in the single 
crop outside the project (14 per cent with sales). Inside the project 
area, however, 60 per cent made sales in the off season and 62 per cent in 
the main season.
In 1967/68 domestic consumption was 69 per cent of total output, 
and in 1979/80 the proportion was reduced to 38 per cent. Sales increased 
from 5 to 32 per cent while for other disposal categories the proportions 
remained about the same (Table 4.8).
Those who sold padi inside Kemubu in 1979/80 averaged one ton in 
each season. The average retained for domestic consumption also rose, 
from 0.8 to 1.6 tons per farm.
The average quantity of rice retained from production per farm 
in the double cropped area of Kemubu in 1979/80 was 0.9 tons, almost double 
the 0.5 tons per farm retained outside Kemubu. In terms of per capita 
quantities retained for consumption and other purposes, the average was 
214 kgs inside as against 133 kgs outside Kemubu.
TABLE 4.7
PROPORTIONS OF SAMPLE FARMERS WITH OPERATIONAL PADI AREAS& 
REPORTING CATEGORIES OF PADI DISPOSAL, BEFORE KEMUBU 
IN 1967/68, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE KEMUBU IN 1979/80
(Percentages)
Location Year Season Sales Wages Rent Zakat DomesticConsumption Other Storage
Operational
Households
Before Kemubu 1967/68 Main 15 4 37 51 97 4 n. a.
Inside Kemubu 1979/80 Off 60 10 32 72 89 6 23
Main 62 10 36 77 95 9 22
Outside Kemubu 1979/80 Main 14 2 24 52 94 3 24
Note: a Excludes landlords and includes owner operators, tenants and mixed owner-operator/tenants.
Source: Shand, et al (1982, p.219).
TABLE 4.8
PROPORTIONS OF TOTAL PADI OUTPUT BY CATEGORY OF DISPOSAL 
BY ALL OPERATING FARMERS AND BY SEASONS BEFORE KEMUBU 
IN 1967/68, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE KEMUBU, 1979/80
(Percentages)
Location Year Season Sales Wages Rent Zakat DomesticConsumption Other Storage
Before Kemubu 1967/68 Main 5 1 17 6 69 1 n.a.
Inside Kemubu 1979/80 Off 32 2 14 8 38 1 4
Main 32 2 13 7 37 1 4
Year 32 2 14 8 38 1 4
Outside Kemubu 1979/80 Main 11 neg. 12 7 68 1 4
Source: Shand, et al (1982, p.223).
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The proportions of sample households self-sufficient in padi 
rose from 31 per cent in 1967/68 to 52 per cent in the single crop area 
outside Kemubu in 1979/80, but with the project, the proportion rose to 
89 per cent.
Amongst those with padi sales inside Kemubu about 80 per cent 
sold to middlemen owing to easy accessibility or convenience, ease of 
borrowing money, and related indebtedness.
4.8.1 Padi Disposal by Tenure Type
Patterns of padi disposal by operational tenure categories show 
that outside Kemubu small quantities were sold and only by owner—operators 
and mixed owner—operators/tenants (Table 4.9). Rent absorbed substantial 
quantities for the two tenancy categories and a little was contributed by 
each as zakcrt, but most was retained for domestic consumption.
Inside the project, almost as much padi was sold, on average, as 
was retained for consumption. About the same quantity was retained for 
consumption in each tenure category as was the case outside the scheme in 
the main season. Thus the additional output in the season was mostly 
either sold, paid out as additional rent or was contributed as zakat. 
Roughly the same quantity was retained in the off season, thereby almost 
doubling consumption, the rest was disposed of in the same pattern as in 
the main season.
4.8.2 Padi Disposal by Padi Operational Area-Size Group
Outside Kemubu, in 1979/80, the main category of padi disposal,
domestic consumption, showed a clear and strong direct relationship between 
padi area and consumption levels (Table 4.10). Average retained for 
consumption per farm rose from 0.3 tons per household in the size group or 
less, rising to 0.9 tons per household in households with more than five 
acres of padi , a trebling of the quantity retained. There was also the
TABLE 4.9
DISTRIBUTION OF PADI BY CATEGORIES OF DISPOSAL WITHIN OPERATIONAL 
TENURE CATEGORIES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE KEMUBU, 1979/80
(Tons)
Year/
Season Sales Wages Rent Zakat
Domestic
Use Other Storage Total
A. Outside Kemubu 1979/80
Owner-Operator Main 0.1 neg. - 0.1 0.7 neg. 0.1 orH
Tenant neg. neg. 0.4 0.1 0.6 neg. neg. 1.1
Owner-Operator/Tenant 0.2 neg. 0.2 0.1 0.8 neg. neg. 1.2
B. Inside Kemubu 1979/80
Owner-Operator Off 0.6 neg.' - 0.1 0.7 neg. 0.1 1.6
Main 0. 7 neg. - 0.2 00o neg. 0.1 1.9
Tenant Off 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.6 neg. 0.1 oCN
Main 0.5 0.1 00o 0.1 0.7 neg. 0.2 2.3
Owner-Operator/Tenant Off 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.2 00o neg. 0.1 2.5
S Main 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.2 OOo neg. 0.1 2.6
Source: Shand, et al (1982, p.235).
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TABLE 4.10
DISTRIBUTION OF PADI PRODUCTION IN MAIN SEASON BY CATEGORIES 
OF DISPOSAL WITHIN PADI OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS, 
OUTSIDE KEMUBU, 1979/80
Operational Padi Area 
Size Group 
(acres)
Sales
(tons)
Wages
(tons)
Rent
(tons)
Zakat
(tons)
Domestic
Use
(tons)
Other
(tons)
Storage
(tons)
Total
(tons)
< 0.5 - - 0.1 neg. 0.3 - neg. 0.4
0.6 - 1.0 neg. - 0.1 neg. 0.6 neg. neg. 0.8
1.1 - 2.0 neg. neg. 0.1 0.1 0.7 neg. neg. 1.0
2.1 - 3.0 0.2 neg. 0.1 0.1 0.8 neg. neg. 1.3
3.1 - 4.0 0.3 - 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.1 1.6
4.1 - 5.0 0.3 - 0.3 0.1 0.9 neg. neg. 1.6
> 5.0 0.3 - 0.2 0.1 0.9 - 0.1 1.6
All Farms 0.1 neg. 0.1 0.1 0.7 neg. neg. 1.1
Source: Shand, et al (1982, p.228).
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same direct relation between sales and padi area but on a much smaller 
scale. No sales were made by farmers with 0.5 acres or less, and they 
were negligible for farms with 0.6 to 2 acres of padi. They then rose 
to a maximum of 0.3 tons per farm for farms with 4 acres or more. Other 
categories of disposal were minor and showed no definite trends according 
to size of padi operational area.
Inside the Kemubu Project, the patterns were more definite in 
relation to size groups (Table 4.11). Quantities retained for home 
consumption rose consistently with size up to 5 acres beyond which there 
was a reduction, suggesting that the level of consumption per household 
of 1.2 tons may have reached saturation level so far as household needs 
were concerned. Padi sales showed an even stronger and more consistent 
positive relationship with padi operational area. Even the smallest size 
group of 0.5 acres or less recorded sales (average of 0.2 tons in both 
seasons) and annual sales rose from 0.4 tons in this group to 4.5 tons in 
the largest group.
Other disposal categories became of some significance especially 
in larger area size groups, and all showed a tendency to increase with size. 
Padi paid as rent was the third most important item, rising to a maximum 
of 1.3 tons on average per year for the size group over 5 acres. Wages 
were of significance only in size group of 3 acres and over, but absorbed 
0.2 tons per year on average in each of these groups. -Zakat contributions 
increased with size as could be expected and amounts stored also increased 
up to a maximum of 0.5 tons per year for the largest area group.
4.8.3 Padi Disposal by District
There were variations in the disposal patterns amongst locations 
in the single crop areas outside Kemubu and double crop areas inside Kemubu
in 1979/80.
TABLE 4.11
DISTRIBUTION OF PADI PRODUCTION IN OFF AND MAIN SEASON BY CATEGORIES 
OF DISPOSAL WITHIN PADI OPERATIONAL SIZE GROUPS, INSIDE KEMUBU, 1979/80
(Tons)
Operational Padi 
Area Size Group 
(acres)
Sales Wages Rent Zakat DomesticUse Other Storage Total
Off Main Off Main Off Main Off Main Off Main Off Main Off Main Off Main
I 0.5 0.2 0.2 neg. neg. 0.2 0.1 neg. neg. 0.5 0.5 neg . neg. neg. neg. 0.9 1.0
0.6 I 1.0 0.3 0.3 neg. neg. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.6 neg . neg. 0.1 neg. 1.1 1.2
1.1 1 2.0 0.5 0.5 neg. neg. 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.7 neg • neg. 0.1 0.1 1.6 1.7
2.1 1 3.0 0.8 0.8 neg. neg. 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.9 neg . neg. 0.1 0.1 2.2 2.5
3.1 - 4.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.9 neg • neg. 0.1 0.2 2.7 3.1
4.0 - 5.0 1.2 1.5 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.2 0.1 neg. 0.2 0.3 3.4 4.0
! 5.0 2.1 2.4 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.8 1.5 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 4.7 5.7
All Farms 0. 7 0. 7 neg. neg. 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.8 neg.- neg. 0.1 0.1 2.0 2.3
Source: Shand, et al (1982, p.230).
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Outside Kemubu in 1979/80, Kota Bharu District showed the lowest 
proportion of farmers with sales of padi and the lowest proportion of 
output as sales (Table 4.12). Pasir Puteh District showed the highest 
proportion of farmers paying out padi as rent.
Inside the Kemubu Project in 1979/80, in terms of proportions 
of sample farmers with sales, Kota Bharu District showed the highest 
proportions in both seasons (Table 4.12). Bachok showed the lowest 
proportions in off season and Pasir Puteh was lower than the all farmer 
sample average in both seasons. Furthermore, Kota Bharu also showed 
above average proportion of padi sales in both seasons, whilst those of 
Pasir Puteh were both below the average. This clearly suggests that, 
in terms of commercialisation, Kota Bharu made relatively greater progress 
than other districts, and by 1979/80 had a larger marketable proportion 
in total output than the other two districts.
The pattern of domestic use of padi for consumption showed a 
relatively low proportion (69 per cent) of Bachok farmers utilizing the 
crop this way, but this was mostly explained by the number of farmers who 
did not grow the crop in the off season. Zakat contributions were lower 
for the same reason. Proportions of output used for consumption, showed 
the lowest levels in Kota Bharu in both seasons. Wages recorded their 
highest proportion in Pasir Puteh, perhaps because tenancy was lowest 
there and more wage labour was employed by owner-operators as a result.
4.9 Levels and Sources of Household Incomes
Average gross padi income per farm inside Kemubu in 1979/80 was 
M$l,884 which was more than three times the average outside the project in 
that year. After subtracting all cash and kind expenses, net returns to 
households input of labour, capital and management average M$l,220 per farm 
inside Kemubu. Average net returns per farm from crops other than padi
TABLE 4.12
PROPORTIONS OF REPORTING FARMERS AND PROPORTIONS OF PRODUCTION BY CATEGORIES 
OF PADI DISPOSAL WITHIN DISTRICTS, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE KEMUBU, 1979/80
Location Season
Sales Wages Rent Zakat Domestic Use Other Storage
% % 
Farmers Out- 
Report- put 
ing
%
Farmers
Report­
ing
%
Out­
put
%
Farmers
Report­
ing
%
Out­
put
%
Farmers
Report­
ing
%
Out­
put
%
Farmers
Report­
ing
%
Out­
put
%
Farmers
Report­
ing
%
Out­
put
%
Farmers
Report­
ing
%
Out­
put
A. Inside Kemubu
Kota Off 67 36 11 3 39 14 77 8 96 36 5 1 17 2
Bharu Main 68 36 11 3 40 14 80 8 98 34 7 1 13 1
Bachok Off 49 46 3 neg. 30 14 53 7 69 40 6 2 20 6
Main 61 26 3 neg. 36 14 73 6 92 44 8 1 30 8
Pasir Off 53 27 15 3 26 12 76 7 94 42 8 1 38 7
Puteh Main 52 31 14 3 26 12 74 7 93 37 13 1 33 6
Inside Off 60 32 10 2 32 14 72 8 89 38 6 1 23 4
Kemub u Main 62 32 10 2 36 13 77 7 95 37 9 1 22 4
B. Outside Kemubu
Ko ta Main 8 6 2 1 12 20 45 7 96 65 5 1 27 3
Bharu
Bachok Main 31 18 6 1 16 6 88 9 98 60 6 2 33 9
Pasir Main 13 9 - - 25 11 44 6 98 72 _ 19 6
Puteh
Pasir Main 13 10 - - 8 6 45 6 97 77 1 neg. 19 1
Outside
Kemubu Main 14 11 2 neg. 24 12 52 7 94 68 3 1 24 4
Note: neg . = negligible (less than 0.5 per cent).
Source: Shand, et al (1982, p.226). CO
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and from livestock were less than half the level outside Kemubu in 1979/80. 
This was principally because of the much higher contribution from tobacco 
and rubber in the single crop area.
Off-farm income plays a major part in supplementing household 
farm income both inside and outside the Kemubu Project in 1979/80. Some 
60 per cent of farmers earned off-farm income in 1967/68. By 1979/80, 
this had increased to 67 per cent outside the project, but had not changed 
inside Kemubu. In 1967/68, the average off-farm earnings per farm, 
adjusted to 1980 prices was M$1,001. In 1979/80, this had risen to
M$l,815 outside the project and to M$l,623 inside Kemubu. In 1967/68, 
two—thirds of average off-farm income was earned by the farm operator and 
one—third by family members. In 1979/80, this had changed substantially, 
with much greater contribution by family members (42 per cent inside and 
50 per cent outside the project). It seems likely that this greater 
involvement of family members and the increased off-farm earnings was an 
expression of greater economic necessity "to supplement limited on-farm 
income.
4.10 Conclusion
The Kemubu Project has contributed to increased padi production 
and marketed surplus. One main feature of this project was that the 
proportions of padi sold rose from 5 per cent in 1967/68 to 32 per cent 
in 1979/80 inside Kemubu, thus demonstrating a shift away from a primary 
focus on subsistence towards a greater marketed orientation of padi 
production. It is hoped this background chapter will supplement the 
analysis of the results obtained in the next two chapters and summary and 
conclusion in the final chapter of this study.
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CHAPTER 5
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MARKETABLE AND 
MARKETED SURPLUSES
This chapter presents estimates and analysis of marketable and 
marketed surpluses. The analysis is given first at aggregate level and 
second, according to a number of sub-groupings of farmers, viz. by major 
tenure categories, by padi operational area size groups, by total farm 
operational area size groups and by location (districts).
In the following chapter, the elasticities of marketable and 
marketed surpluses, which were estimated from the results obtained in this 
chapter, will be discussed.
5.1 Aggregate Analysis
5.1.1 Marketable Surplus
Partial regression coefficients of total padi production (TPP,
TPPSQ), total non-padi income (TNPI, TNPISQ) and family size (FAMSZA)
showed expected signs and were significant at least at the 10 per cent
level in equations 1.1 to 1.3 (Table 5.1). The adjusted coefficients of 
-2determination (R ) were high and ranged from 0.87 to 0.92.
Regression equation 1.1 which used the entire (pooled) sample 
of farmers inside and outside the Kemubu Irrigation Project showed that 
nine coefficients excluding dummy variables for Bachok district and for 
pure tenants were statistically significant, at least at the 5 per cent 
level. The positive coefficient of TPPSQ indicated that higher output 
levels of padi contributed increasingly (though the coefficient was small) 
to the surplus, which was appealing logically, partly because the marginal 
propensity to consume (MPC), of padi decreased with increasing output of padi.
TABLE 5.1
ESTIMATES OF MARKETABLE AND MARKETED SURPLUS REGRESSIONS FOR INSIDE AND OUTSIDE 
THE KEMUBU IRRIGATION PROJECT AND ALL SAMPLE FARMS
Equation Sample DependentVariable Constant TPP TPPSQ TNPI TNPISQ FAMSZA KI
D1 D2
(Kota (Bachok) 
Bharu)
D3
(Pasir
Mas)
Tenant Owner-Operator S.E.
Sampl
Size
(n)
i.i All MX 17.607 *** 0. 727 0.000008* ***-0.044 * **0.000003 ***-32.647 -44.550* ***111.577 -18.494 60.797* -21.959
kkk-120.522 290.729 750 0.89
(0.028) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (5.654) (30.567) (27.860)(32.376) (43.585) (35.185) (24.044)
1.2 Inside MX 18.939 ***0.780 -0.000002 ***-0.058 **0.000003 ***-45.208 _ 126.073 -11.001 - -46.115 ***-180.772 334.837 479 0.87
Kemubu (0.037) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (8.140) (37.173)(44.332) (50.270) (35.163)
1.3 Outside MX -9.114 ***0.268 •kick0.000016 -0.008 **0.000016 -5.889* _ 17.059 17.481 5.245 kkk56.672 -31.128 111.083 268 0.92
Kemubu (0.029) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (3.802) (21.679)(24.144) (21.419) (23.008) (15.185)
1.4 All MS -142.185 ***0.406 0.000012 -0.025* **0.000002 ***-25.242 -12.637 ***119.847 neg. ***100.298 kkk-91.182 ***126.091 283.991 750 0.75
(0.027) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (5.524) (29.823) (22.352) (39.384) (34.370) (23.474)
1.5 Inside MS -203.693 ***0.466 0.000002 ***-0.042 0.000004* ***-36.087 ***139.952 12.094 _ **103.169 ***184.993 331.791 479 0.71
Kemubu (0.037) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (8.065) (36.835)(43.928) (49.813) (34.842)
1.6 Outside MS -15.444 0.022 ***0.000114 -0.006 0.000005 kk-5.575 ***10.943 54.634 **38.588 12.899 15.612 101.301 268 0. 77
Kemubu (0.027) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (3.467) (19.769 (22.018) (19.533) (20.982) (13.847)
NPP NPPSQ TNPI TNPISQ FAMSZA KI D1 D2(Kota (Bachok)
D3
(Pasir Tenant
Owner-
Operator S.E.
Sample j2 Size R
Bharu) Mas) (n)
1.7 All MS -42.887 0.631* 0.000006 ***-0.034 0.000002 ***-30.958 -28.321 116.927* -8.748 **73.366 -55.998* -32.584* 257.022 750 0.79
(0.034) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (5.012) (26.586) (24.615)(28.610) (38.867) (31.433) (20.713)
1.8 Inside MS -59.099 0.712* -0.000012 ***-0.046 **0.000003 ***-43.524 _ ***135.223 neg. _ -73.243 **-61.838 295.603 479 0.77
Kemubu (0.044) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (7.201) (27.244) (44.829) (30.113)
1.9 Outside MS 42.777 ***-0.279 ***0.000052 -0.005* 0.000006* -6.188 - 10.758 45.526* ***36.445 1.647 -1.039 75.669 268 0.87
Kemubu (0.035) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (2.586) (14.770 (16.469) (14.552) (15.781 (10.224)
Notes: S.E. Standard errors of the regression equations.
Figures within parentheses are standard errors of the regression coefficients. 
Neg. Negligible.
* Significant at the 10 per cent level.
** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
Significant at the 1 per cent level. 00
The coefficients of TNP1 and TNPISQ were negative and positive 
respectively (Table 5.1). This indicated that the farmers decreased their 
marketable or marketed surpluses of padi with an increase in their TNPI and 
at an increasing rate. This showed the effect of competition for labour 
resources (as discussed in Fisk's model, 1975). Farmers preferred to 
secure income from non—padi sources (e.g. off farm) rather than through an 
increase in their marketable or marketed surpluses of padi.
The coefficient of FAMSZA was negative and significant at the 
1 per cent level. The result indicated that with an additional family 
member there was bound to be a reduction in the marketable surplus through 
consumption, as expected.
The coefficient of the dummy variable (KI) which represented 
inclusion (with irrigation) or exclusion (without irrigation) from the 
Kemubu Irrigation Project, had a negative sign and was significant at the 
10 per cent level. This "wrong" sign was probably due to the fact that 
the other variables, particularly the output variables and other dummy 
variables, had largely explained the production effects of being inside 
or outside Kemubu as realised in marketable surplus of padi. The district 
dummy variables were in relation to the excluded district Pasir Puteh.
They showed superiority for Kota Bharu in particular inside the project 
while Bachok performed relatively poorly. Outside Kemubu, Kota Bharu, 
Bachok and Pasir Mas all performed relatively better than Pasir Puteh in 
producing a surplus.
The coefficients for dummy variables representing pure tenants 
and owner-operators inside Kemubu were negative in relation to the mixed 
owner tenant category excluded, i.e. the mixed owner tenant category was 
relatively superior in producing a marketable surplus. This was not
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surprising as mixed owner tenants recorded a larger average padi area and 
higher yields and thus recorded higher padi output.
Inside Kemubu, the coefficient of TPP was relatively large and 
dominated the pooled coefficient as compared to outside Kemubu which was 
of only 0.268. The coefficient of TPPSQ outside Kemubu was significant 
because marketed surplus was at a low level there and this resulted in a 
significant coefficient in the pooled sample.
The coefficient of TNPI was significant for both inside and 
outside Kemubu, but the coefficient was much larger inside and this 
influenced the pooled coefficient. For farms inside and outside Kemubu 
had significant positive TNPISQ coefficient showing increasing but small 
effect. The inside coefficient, being larger, influenced the pooled 
coefficient.
The KI dummy variable as was described above has its effect 
minimised by other variables. In equations 1.2 and 1.3 the constants 
reflected the difference of ’with1 and ’without' irrigation too by the 
relatively higher constant inside Kemubu.
Without irrigation outside Kemubu there were no significant 
differences between districts but with irrigation Kota Bharu district 
showed relative superiority in production of marketable surplus.
Among tenure groups as shown by dummy variables, pure tenants 
were significantly superior in the production of marketable surplus.
This was probably because of their need to make money for rent. Inside 
Kemubu, owner-operator category showed significant poorer marketable 
surplus compared to pure tenant and mixed owner tenant groups. This was 
probably due to their having no rent to pay,
Anyway, it was only this owner-operator variable that was significant in 
the pooled sample.
The coefficients of FAMSZA were negative and significant both 
inside and outside Kemubu. Outside Kemubu the coefficient was small, 
probably as marketable surplus was also small. Inside Kemubu, the 
coefficient was much larger as there was much greater marketable surplus 
and this dominated the pooled sample.
Tests of equality between coefficients obtained from samples 
inside and outside (Chow Test) was made to test whether samples from inside 
and outside Kemubu differ.'*' The Chow Test showed that they were different 
at the 1 per cent level (Table 5.2).
TABLE 5.2
TEST OF EQUALITY BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS (CHOW TEST) 
OBTAINED FROM SAMPLES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE 
KEMUBU IRRIGATION PROJECT FOR MARKETABLE AND 
MARKETED SURPLUSES 1
Dependent Variables Using TPP or NPP F-Values
Marketable Surplus TPP *12,726 = 7-189
Marketed Surplus TPP / c V;hi,726 - 6'490
Marketed Surplus NPP *11,727 = 8-846
Note: *** Significant at the 1 per cent level.
1 If the difference is only in the intercept, then the change in technology 
is a neutral one. If slope coefficients are different, then technology 
change is not neutral and the sample cannot be pooled. Here, Chow Test 
cannot tell which is (are) different. Thus, in subsequent analysis, the 
results of pooled sample estimates will also be presented.
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The marginal propensities to sell with respect to production 
(6MX/5TPP) were higher for farms inside Kemubu (0.778) than for those 
outside (0.436) (Table 5.3). This finding was in agreement with the
TABLE 5.3
MARGINAL PROPENSITIES OF MARKETABLE AND MARKETED 
SURPLUSES WITH RESPECT TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA 
AT AGGREGATE LEVEL 
(Based on Equations in Table 5.1)
Dependent Variable
Marginal Propensities w.r.t.
TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Marketable Surplus All 0. 748 -0.036 -32.647
Inside Kemubu 0.778 -0.047 -45.208
Outside Kemubu 0.436 -0.005 -5.889
Marketed Surplus(TPP) All 0.473 -0.030 -25.242
Inside Kemubu 0.474 -0.030 -36.087
Outside Kemubu ns ns -5.575
Marketed Surplus(NPP) All 0.642 -0.028 -30.958
Inside Kemubu 0.683 -0.037 -43.524
Outside Kemubu 0.127 -0.0003 -6.188
Note: ns Non-significant at the 10 per cent level.
general belief that the marketable surplus of padi rose with increases in 
production, in this instance as a result of provision of irrigation 
infrastructure, improved padi technology and institutional assistance for 
the Kemubu area.
The regression coefficients of FAMSZA were both negative and were 
in absolute terms higher (-45.208) for farms inside than for outside Kemubu 
(-5.889). The effect of an increase in family size was to reduce marketable 
surplus much more inside than outside Kemubu. This was presumably because
the level of pad! consumption was considerably higher inside the project 
as discussed by Shand, et al (Chapter 9 and especially p.255) showed the 
average quantity of rice equivalent retained for consumption was 214 kgs 
inside as against 120 kgs outside the project in 1979/80.
The reduction in sales with respect to increases to total non 
padi income (SMX/STNPI), was nine times greater in absolute terms inside 
Kemubu (—0.047) than it was outside (—0.005). The coefficients are, 
however, small in both cases, indicating that, although significant the 
inverse relation caused only a minor reduction in the surplus in both areas 
The larger coefficient inside Kemubu may probably mean that non padi income 
sources were more seriously competitive than outside the scheme, possibly 
because of greater competitive demands for labour with the addition of the 
second padi crop.
5.1.2 Marketed Surplus (Using TPP)
All regression coefficients in equation 1.4 in Table 5.1 for 
pooled sample were statistically significant at least at the 5 per cent 
level except for the dummy variables representing irrigation (location), 
i.e. inside or outside the Kemubu Irrigation Project (KI), and dummy 
variable for Bachok District (D2). The signs of coefficients for TPP,
TNPI and FAMSZA were consistent with a priori expectation. The lack of 
significance for the KI dummy variable was probably explained by a 
collinearity with TPP and other independent variables.
The coefficient of TPP inside Kemubu was significant while outsid 
Kemubu it was not. The coefficient inside Kemubu dominated the effect in 
the pooled (entire) sample. The coefficient of TPPSQ was significant 
outside Kemubu because of low output and this contributed to the net 
significant effect in the pooled sample. The marginal propensity to sell
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with respect to TPP was 0.473 (Table 5.3). Thus, for forms inside Kemubu, 
with an increase of one gantang in TPP there would be a rise of 0.473 
gantang for marketed surplus. This rise was lower than for marketable 
surplus (0.778) where rent, wages, religious contribution (zakat) and 
storage categories were included. The marginal propensity to sell of 
marketed surplus with respect to TPP was higher for farms inside Kemubu 
(0.473) than those outside (zero). Thus, with the irrigation project 
output was a relatively more important variable inside than outside Kemubu 
in the generation of a marketed surplus. Also for variable TPP outside 
Kemubu, the non-significance could be due to the low mean of 523 gantangs 
per farm production in a range of zero and 4,500 gantangs and because such 
a large proportion of farmers had zero padi sales.
The coefficient of TNPI was significant for inside Kemubu and 
insignificant for the outside. The coefficient of TNPI in pooled sample 
was significant showing the dominance of TNPI influence inside Kemubu.
The results indicated that inside Kemubu there was a relatively stronger 
competition of labour resources in padi production and non padi employment 
than areas outside Kemubu where there was only a single padi crop. Thus, 
farmers outside Kemubu relied very much on TNPI (a mean of M$2,064 per 
farm family) while padi cultivation and production was a part of farming 
which catered mainly for household consumption and not for the market where 
the marketed surplus had a mean of only 55 gantccngs.
In both inside and outside Kemubu the coefficients of FAMSZA were 
both significant and negative, but inside Kemubu the coefficient was greater 
than that of outside. Thus with irrigation facilities inside Kemubu the 
FAMSZA effect showed that farmers inside the project were able to consume
more rice.
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Inside Kemubu, the coefficient of Kota Bharu District dummy 
variable (Dl) was positive and significant, while outside the project those 
of Bachok (D2) and Pasir Mas (D3) District were positive and significant 
vis-a-vis Pasir Puteh District. This finding of superiority in padi disposal 
is in agreement with that of Share1, et al (1982) which showed the relatively 
higher single crop productivity of padi production in the two districts.
It is thought that there are some differences between districts in soil 
types,topography, etc.
The coefficients of dummy variables for pure tenants and owner- 
operators were positive and significant inside Kemubu but non-significant 
outside the project. Although it was expected that mixed owner tenants 
would normally perform better than the other two tenancy groups (Shand, et al 
1982), it did happen here due to the rent, wage and zakat components still 
in the marketable surplus of padi.
Generally, there were many fewer significant variables for farms 
outside Kemubu. The exclusion of rent, zakat etc. from marketed surplus 
(vis-a-vis marketable surplus) greatly reduced explanatory power of 
marketed surplus function. Also, because marketed surplus was so small and 
relatively few farmers have a marketed surplus, not even TPP was significant, 
though FAMSZA and locational (district) effect were.
5.1.3 Marketed Surplus (Using NPP)
The coefficients of NPP in both inside and outside Kemubu were 
significant at the 1 per cent level (Table 5.1). Though the coefficient 
of NPP inside the project was positive, it was negative for the outside.
The negative sign may have been associated with the low levels of NPP 
variable (an average of 390 gantangs) and because most of it was absorbed in 
domestic consumption. However, it is difficult to explain why it should be 
negative. Notably, however, this function had a greater explanatory power 
than the one using TPP as was shown by a higher R for marketed surplus 
functions using NPP. This was probably due to the relatively fixed
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commitments having been taken out of TPP (i,e, NPP), however, the 
relationship is easily explicable (in terms of sign) only for the sample 
inside the project.
The coefficients of NPPSQ was significant outside Kemubu but not 
inside the project. For low levels of padi production outside Kemubu the 
NPSSQ was logically positive and significant as expected. The positive 
NPPSQ coefficient was able to transform the negative coefficient of NPP 
into a positive value of marginal propensity to sell with respect to NPP.
The marginal propensity was low outside Kemubu (0,127) and it was over 
five times this value inside Kemubu (0.683) (Table 5.3). Thus, it clearly 
demonstrated the major input of the irrigation project on widening the 
scope for sale of a padi surplus as perceived by farmers inside Kemubu.
The coefficients of TNPI were negative and significant in both 
inside and outside the Kemubu Project. As in marketable and marketed 
surplus (TPP) this result indicated that there was a competition of labour 
between the padi production sector and non padi employment. The competition 
was greater (more negative) inside Kemubu as marginal value of labour was 
affected especially in peak labour demand in padi production in competition 
with other non padi employment especially in off-farm.
The coefficients of TNPISQ were positive and significant for both 
inside and outside Kemubu with a smaller value of propensities relative to 
the value of NPP coefficients. Though significant, the effect (in terms 
of size of coefficient) on the relationship of non padi income with 
marketed surplus was minor over the range of incomes considered.
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Family size had a negative significant effect on the production 
of marketed surplus. The coefficient of FAMSZA was very much greater 
for inside than outside Kemubu.
The coefficient of dummy variable for Kota Bharu (Dl) District 
inside Kemubu was positive and significant at the 1 per cent level, so, 
with irrigation this district was superior in performance in production 
of marketed surplus than Pasir Puteh. Clearly, irrigation assisted Kota 
Bharu more than others as compared to outside Kemubu where Bachok (D2) and 
Pasir Mas (D3) Districts were superior. Outside Kemubu, Kota Bharu's 
coefficient was also positive but not significant.
Inside Kemubu, mixed owner tenants were performing better than 
pure tenants and owner-operators as shown by the negative and significant 
dummy variables for pure tenants and owner-operators. Outside Kemubu, 
the owner-operator dummy variable coefficient was significant at least at 
the 5 per cent level but negative, so the mixed tenure group was superior 
in generation of marketed surplus. The latter was also superior to 
owner-operators but not significantly so.
Chow Tests for equality between coefficients obtained from sample 
farms inside and outside the Kemubu Irrigation Project showed that the 
coefficients were significantly different at the 1 per cent level (Table 5.2).
This result showed that the behaviour of farmers in the production 
of marketable and marketed surpluses of padi differed with the introduction 
of the Kemubu Irrigation Project.
5.2 Tenancy Groups
5.2.1 Marketable Surplus
In regression equations 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 for single padi crop 
farmers outside the Kemubu Project, only TPP was consistently positive and
TABLE 5.4
ESTIMATES OF MARKETABLE SURPLUS REGRESSIONS FOR OUTSIDE AND INSIDE 
THE KEMUBU IRRIGATION PROJECT AND POOLED SAMPLES BY TENANCY GROUPS
D1 D2 D3 Sample -2Equation Sample Tenancy Constant TPP TPPSQ TNPI TNPISQ FAMSZA (Kota (Bachok) (Pasir S.E. Size R
Bharu) Mas) (n)
4.1 Outside Tenant -63.402 **0.317 0.000148* 0.022 0.000002 -8.696 90.546* 32.638 64.111 101.467 32 0. 77
(0.162) (0.000) (0.054) (0.000) (11.338) (57.572) (65.225) (67.962)
4.2 ■■ Owner- 14.116 0.069* ***0.000218 **-0.016 ***0.000002 **-7.936 32.089 ***104.182 28.015 97.838 135 0.86
Operator (0.046) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (4.586) (26.206) (30.435) (24.685)
4.3 - Mixed -3.248 ***0.405 ***-0.000130 -0.003 0.000001 -1.551 -75.969 **-97.886 **-82.904 109.701 101 0.96
Tenant (0.043) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (6.736) (39.753) (44.825) (39.452)
4.4 Inside Tenant 35.976 0.773*** -0.000007 **-0.112 0.000001* **-39.781 131.849 -75.189 _ 368.606 64 0.86
(0.099) (0.000) (0.063) (0.000) (23.762) (117.919) (129.197)
4.5 " Owner- -85.651 ***0.687 0.000007 ***-0.061 0.000004 It it it-46.217 ***194.225 7.176 _ 353.452 256 0.80
Operator (0.058) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (11.779) (53.281) (64.322)
4.6 - Mixed -166.524 0.961*** -0.000002** ***-0.039 neg. -49.370*** 17.574 -41.332 _ 269.798 157 0.93
Tenant (0.062) (0.000) (0.013) (12.016) (54.263) (64.805)
4.7 Pooled Tenant -84.521 ***0.747 -0.000002 -0.049 0.000004 **-28.082 171.117*** _ 107.562 309.753 96 0.88
(0.064) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (16.034) (65.922) (150.349)
4.8 » Owner- -51.581 ***0.605 ***0.000020 ***-0.048 ***0.000003 ***-33.139 ***160.035 4.818 **117.760 301.752 391 0.83
Operator (0.038) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (8.066) (39.330) (45.427) (58.553)
4.9 » Mixed -55.101 ***0.815 0.000002 **-0.034 0.000001 -32.947*** 11.088 -63.956* 240.524 261 0.94
Tenant (0.036) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (8.306) (35.563) (43.562)
Notes: S.E. Standard errors of the regression equations.
Figures within parentheses are standard errors of the regression coefficients. 
Neg. Negligible.
* Significant at the 10 per cent level.
** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level.
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significant, at least at the 10 per cent level, for all three tenancy groups 
(Table 5.4). The TPP marginal propensity of marketable surplus was higher 
in pure tenant category (0.474) than in owner-operator (0.259) and mixed 
owner tenant (0.267) groups (Table 5.5). This was due to the higher amounts
TABLE 5.5
MARGINAL PROPENSITIES OF MARKETABLE SURPLUS WITH RESPECT 
TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY TENANCY GROUPS 
(Based on Equations in Table 5.4)
Sample Farms Tenancy
Marginal Propensities ■u£
TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu Pure Tenant 0.474 ns ns
Owner-Operator 
Mixed Owner-
0.259 -0.0008 ns
Operator 0.267 ns -10.331
Inside Kemubu Pure Tenant 0. 750 -0.086 ns
Owner-Operator 
Mixed Owner-
0. 707 -0.047 -42.308
Operator 0.908 -0.039 -55.864
Notes: a Sales were negligible.
ns Non-significant at the 10 per cent level.
of marketable surplus in this group. There was a mean of 233 gantangs of 
528 gantangs of TPP, i.e. 44 per cent in the pure tenant group as compared 
to lower 25 per cent for owner-operators and 41 per cent for mixed owner 
tenant (41 per cent) groups. In the pure tenant group the influence of 
rent payments was a major factor but wage, storage and zakat categories also 
had a role in affecting the behaviour of the pure tenants in producing
marketable surplus.
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The coefficients of TNPI and FAMSZA were negative and significant 
only for the owner-operator group. In this tenancy group presumably there 
was a competition of labour resources between rice production and non padi 
employment. Also, the owner—operators did not hire non-family labour to 
work on their padi farms, (Shand, et al, 1982, p.235) thus non padi work, 
generally, would affect negatively the production of marketable surplus of 
padi.
In pure tenant group in equation 4.1 (Table 5.4) the coefficient 
of dummy variable of Kota Bharu District (Dl) was positive and significant 
at the 10 per cent level in relation to other district dummy variables.
So the effect of location (district) was better for Kota Bharu District (Dl) 
relatively over dummy variables for Bachok (D2), Pasir Mas (D3) and Pasir 
Puteh (D4). The coefficient of dummy variable for Bachok (D2) for owner- 
operator in equation 4.2 was positive and significant at the 1 per cent 
level. Relatively dummy variable for Bachok (D2) had a better locational 
effect on the owner-operator group. In mixed owner tenant group in 
equation 4.3 the coefficient of dummy variables for districts of Bachok (D2) 
and Pasir Mas (D3) were negative and significant at the 5 per cent level in 
relation to Pasir Puteh.
For farms inside the Kemubu Project, the coefficients of regression 
equations of the three main variables: TPP, TNPI and FAMSZA, of pure tenant, 
owner-operator and mixed owner tenant groups had the expected signs and were 
significant at least at the 10 per cent level as in equations 4.4, 4.5 and
4.6 (Table 5.4). Total padi production was the most important variable in 
the production of a marketable surplus. The TPP marginal propensity of 
marketable surplus showed that the mixed owner tenant group (0.908) was more 
responsive than that of pure tenant (0.750) and owner-operator (0.707) 
groups (Table 5.5).
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The coefficients of TNPI were negative and significant in all 
the three tenancy groups inside Kemubu. This result indicated that 
farmers concentrated more on earning TNPI than earning cash from padi 
surplus sales beyond a certain level. The coefficient of TNPI was highest 
in pure tenant group and lowest in the mixed owner tenant. Thus, in
mixed owner tenant category which had the highest net padi income it 
would have the smallest competition for the available farm family labour 
for non padi jobs as compared to pure tenant and owner—operator groups.
The inverse relationship of family size and production of 
marketable surplus was observed for the three tenancy categories in 
equations 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 in Table 5.4. The high value of the coefficients 
of FAMSZA in the three equations indicated that farm households inside the 
Kemubu area were able to provide a high level of rice consumption for each 
household member. For example, in the owner-operator group for a rise 
of 1 adult male equivalent in FAMSZA there would be a decrease of 46.217 
gantangs of padi (75 kgs of rice equivalent) of marketable surplus which 
went mainly to consumption.
In equations 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 the coefficients of dummy variables 
were non-significant vis-a-vis Pasir Puteh District except that of Kota Bharu 
District (and positive) for the owner-operator categories (equation 4.5).
In tests of equality between coefficients obtained from farm 
samples inside and outside the Kemubu area for each tenure sub-group there 
was no significant difference between the two pure tenant groups. There 
were significant differences at the 1 per cent level between owner-operator 
groups and between the two mixed owner tenant groups (Table 5.6). The 
results indicated that the variables affecting the pure tenants in producing 
a marketable surplus did not change with the introduction of the Kemubu 
Project as with the owner-operator and mixed owner tenant groups, e.g, the 
terms of share cropping.
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TABLE 5.6
TEST OF EQUALITY BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS (CHOW TEST) OBTAINED 
FROM SAMPLES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE KEMUBU IRRIGATION 
PROJECT BY TENURE CATEGORIES
Tenure
Categories Dependent Variables
Using TPP or 
NPP F-Values
Pure Tenant Marketable Surplus TPP F =8,79 0.752
Marketed Surplus TPP F8,80 0.360
Marketed Surplus NPP F 17,79 0.682
Owner-Operator Marketable Surplus TPP F9,373
3.340***
IB*
Marketed Surplus TPP F =9,373 4.157
Marketed Surplus NPP F =9,375
4.739*"
Mixed Owner Marketable Surplus TPP F8,242 = 
F8,243 =
6.573***
Tenant Marketed Surplus TPP 4.816***
Marketed Surplus NPP F =7,241 9.303
Note: *** Significant at the 1 per cent level.
There was a greater increase in the TPP marginal propensity to 
sell for mixed owner tenant group as one observed it for samples outside 
(0.27) to sample inside (0.908) the Kemubu area (Table 5.5). Also, in the 
other tenancy groups the TPP marginal propensities were greater inside 
Kemubu than outside. With the introduction of the Kemubu Project the 
responsiveness of each tenancy group clearly increased in terms of marketable 
surplus.
In comparing the performance of TNPI in affecting the marketable 
surplus inside and outside Kemubu only in the owner-operator group outside 
Kemubu was significant, while inside Kemubu, TNPI in all the tenancy groups 
had a significant and negative influence on production of marketable surplus.
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The same result occurred for FAMSZA between tenancy groups inside and 
outside Kemubu. The values of coefficients of FAMSZA were higher inside 
Kemubu indicating that farmers were able to provide a higher level of rice 
consumption for an additional member of a family, compared to those outside 
Kemubu.
In Chow Tests of equality of coefficients of tenancy groups within 
Kemubu it was found that only the owner—operator and mixed tenant groups 
were different at the 1 per cent level and tenant and mixed owner tenant 
group together differed significantly from the owner-operator group at the 
5 per cent level (Table 5.7). Outside Kemubu, the tenancy groups were all 
different significantly. Thus differences between tenancy groups were 
narrowed or reduced by the Kemubu Project in producing a marketable surplus 
of padi.
Generally, the explanatory power of the marketable surplus function 
was better for all the tenancy groups inside Kemubu than outside. From a 
policy point of view, in producing marketable surplus the area inside 
Kemubu will relatively respond far better than outside by mixed owner 
tenants most (0.961) and owner-operators and pure tenants somewhat less.
Also, large family sizes substantially reduce marketable surplus of padi 
for all tenancy groups inside Kemubu. Outside Kemubu, there was too little 
marketable surplus for a significant effect by family sizes.
5.2.2 Marketed Surplus (Using TPP)
For the pure tenant group outside Kemubu, the coefficient of 
determination was very low (-0.08), as shown in regression equation 8.1 
(Table 5.8) and there was no significant coefficient at the 10 per cent level. 
This was due to the negligible amount of padi sold in the market and 
virtually nobody had a marketed surplus.
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TABLE 5.7
TEST OF EQUALITY BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS OBTAINED FROM 
DIFFERENT SUB-SAMPLES (CHOW TEST) FOR MARKETABLE SURPLUS
No. Sample Different Sub-Samples F-Values
1 Outside Kemubu Tenant Group and Owner-Operator 
Group
F9,149 = 5,246
2 11 Tenant Group and Mixed Owner F9.115 * 2"064** ***
Tenant Group
3 11 Owner-Operator Group and Mixed F9,218 = 5,740
Owner Tenant Group
4 Inside Kemubu Tenant Group and Owner-Operator 
Group
F8,304 = 1,252
5 11 Tenant Group and Mixed Owner F8,206 = 1,373
Tenant Group
6 11 Owner-Operator Group and Mixed F7,396 = 7,542
Owner Tenant Group
7 It Tenant and Owner-Operator Groups F10,462= 1,639
Together and Mixed Owner Tenant 
Group
8 It Tenant and Mixed Owner Tenant F10,462= 1,903
Groups Together and Owner- 
Operator Group
9 Pooled Tenant Group and Owner-Operator 
Group
F9,470 = 1,623
10 11 Tenant Group and Mixed Owner F9,341 = 1-835
Tenant Group
11 It Owner-Operator Group and Mixed F9,635 = 9-200“
Owner Tenant Group
12 11 Tenant and Owner-Operator Groups F12,731= 3,264
Together and Mixed Owner Tenant
Group
13 11 Tenant and Mixed Owner Tenant F12 731= 3-505~"
Groups Together and Owner- 
Operator Group
Notes: ** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level.
TABLE 5.8
ESTIMATES OF MARKETED SURPLUS (USING TPP) REGRESSIONS FOR OUTSIDE AND INSIDE 
THE KEMUBU IRRIGATION PROJECT AND POOLED SAMPLES BY TENANCY GROUPS
D1 D2 D3 Sample 2Equation Sample Tenancy Constant TPP TPPSQ TNPI TNPISQ FAMSZA (Kota (Bachok) (Pasir S.E. Size RZ
Bharu) Mas) (n)
8.1 Outside Tenant -23.786 0.050 0.000011 0.028 -0.000006 -5.395 25.697 8.644 30.630 58.022 32 -0.08
(0.092) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (6.483) (32.922) (37.298) (38.922)
8.2 - Owner- 18.363 ***-0.110 0.000203*** -0.008* 0.000001* -3.586 15.491 ***68.710 30.306 81.087 135 0.79
Operator (0.039) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (3.801) (21.719) (25.224) (20.459)
8. 3 - Mixed 20.160 0.075* ***0.000095 -0.006 0.000003 -10.331* -26.130 neg. 22.710 118.771 101 0.81
Tenant (0.046) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (7.241) (31.265) (30.771)
8.4 Inside Tenant 18.699 **0.168 ***0.000031 -0.038 0.000004 neg. -52.132 -93.266 295.006 64 0. 71
(0.079) (0.000) (0.050) (0.000) (94.174) (102.865)
8.5 - Owner- -90.499 ***0.503 0.000011 ***-0.059 ***0.000005 ***-42.308 214.123*** 17.585 317.301 256 0.75
Operator (0.052) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (10.575) (47.832) (57.743)
8.6 - Mixed -158.127 ***0.538 -0.000016 -0.011 0.000003 ***-55.864 77.288* neg. 326.611 157 0. 70
Tenant (0.077) (0.000) (0.039) (0.000) (14.579) (55.308)
8.7 Pooled Tenant -20.428 ***0.153 ***0.000034 -0.031 0.000002 neg. -12.347 -47.243 neg. 241.637 96 0.74
(0.049) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (59.725) (67.858)
8.8 - Owner- -64.565 ***0.430 ***0.000023 ***-0.039 ***0.000003 ***-29.045 **170.313 -9.624 128.790*** 272.458 391 0.77
Operator (0.034) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (7.282) (35.511) (41.017) (52.869)
8.9 1 Mixed- -90.503 * **0.407 0.000006 neg. -0.000001 it is it-34.287 73.707* -14.884 101.834* 281.567 261 0.77
Tenant (0.044) (0.000) (0.000) (9.692) (48.804) (57.243) (67.530)
Notes: S.E. Standard errors of the regression equations.
Figures within parentheses are standard errors of the regression coefficients.
Neg. Negligible.
Significant at 
Significant at 
Significant at
the 10 per cent level 
the 5 per cent level, 
the 1 per cent level.
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In owner-operator and mixed owner tenant categories the adjusted
-2coefficient of determination (R ) were quite high.
The coefficient of TPP in the owner-operator group was negative 
and significant at the 1 per cent level but the overall TPP marginal 
propensity to sell was positive at 0.149 due to the positive TPPSQ 
(equation 8.2, Table 5.8). The coefficient of TNPI was negative as expected 
and significant at the 10 per cent level but of low value. The FAMSZA 
coefficient was non—significant. The coefficients for dummy variables 
for Bachok (D2) and Pasir Mas (D3) Districts were positive and significant 
at least at the 10 per cent level in relation to Pasir Puteh District.
The mixed owner tenant group outside Kemubu (in regression 
equations 8.3 in Table 5.8), showed the only positive and significant 
coefficient of TPP (at the 10 per cent level). Its marginal propensity 
to sell with respect to TPP was 0.158 which is not significantly larger 
then that of the owner-operator group for which the marginal propensity 
was also positive. For the mixed owner tenant group the TNPI is a non­
significant variable but FAMSZA is significant at the 10 per cent level and 
negative as expected. In relation to the dummy variable of Pasir Puteh 
the other dummy variables for the districts were not significant.
In equations 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 (Table 5.8), the coefficients of 
TPP were positive and significant for the three tenancy groups.
For the pure tenant group inside Kemubu there was an increase
-2in the adjusted coefficient of determination (R ) from -0.08 to 0.71 with 
the provision of irrigation, but that TPP was the only significant variable.
In the owner-operator group inside Kemubu, the coefficients of 
TPP, TNPI, FAMSZA and dummy variable for Kota Bharu District (Dl) were as 
expected and significant at the 1 per cent level (equation 8.5). With a
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value of 0.535 (Table 5.9) for its marginal propensity to sell, TPP is an 
important variable in affecting the marketable surplus. Also, the TNPI 
marginal propensity to sell was significant at -0.042 and was the only 
tenure group for which an increase would reduce the marketed surplus in 
a minor way through labour competition with other non padi activities.
The level of per capita consumption of rice was high in the owner-operator 
group so the negative coefficient for family size was high at -42.308, 
equivalent to about 69 kgs rice, which was the sacrifice in marketed 
surplus with an increase in one male adult equivalent in the farm family.
TABLE 5.9
MARGINAL PROPENSITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS WITH 
RESPECT TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY TENANCY GROUPS 
(Based on Equations in Table 5.8)
Sample Farms
Marginal Propensities w.r.t.
Tenancy
TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu Pure Tenant ns ns ns
Owner-Operator 0.149 -0.0004 ns
Mixed Owner-Operator 0.158 ns -10.331
Inside Kemubu Pure Tenant 0.270 ns ns
Owner-Operator 0.535 -0.042 -42.308
Mixed Owner Tenant 0.472 ns -55.864
Notes: a Sales were negligible.
ns Non-significant at the 10 per cent level.
In the mixed owner tenant group (equation 8.6, Table 5.8) the 
coefficient of TPP was positive and significant at the 1 per cent level, 
and TPP marginal propensity to sell at 0.472 was only a little lower than 
that of the owner-operator group. The coefficient of TNPI was non-significant
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while that of FAMSZA was negative as expected and significant at the 1 per 
cent level. Also, the coefficient of Kota Bharu dummy variable (Dl) was 
positive and significant at the 10 per cent level indicating as for mixed 
owner tenants that the institutional and infrastructures were conducive for 
the mixed owner tenant group in Kota Bharu relative to Pasir Puteh (D4) and 
Bachok (D2) Districts in influencing the marketed surplus production.
The Chow Test of equality between coefficients obtained from 
tenure groups inside Kemubu showed that all groups were statistically 
different from each other (Table 5.10), while for outside Kemubu the tenure 
groups were different except between pure tenant and mixed owner tenant 
groups. Thus, the Kemubu Project made little change to the relationship
between the tenure groups in the production of marketed surplus.
The pure tenants inside and outside Kemubu were not different by 
Chow Test in producing marketed surplus (Table 5.6). The differences 
between the two owner-operator groups inside and outside Kemubu and also 
those of the two mixed owner tenant groups were statistically different 
at the 1 per cent level. The similar performances of pure tenants inside 
and outside Kemubu was presumably due to the relatively low level of 
marketed surplus recorded for both groups. Most likely the dominant 
behaviour of pure tenants was their ability to be able to produce mostly 
for their subsistence needs only.
In comparing the tenure groups inside and outside Kemubu there 
is an increase in the explanatory power and variety of the variables 
explaining marketed surplus inside Kemubu (Table 5.8). The TPP marginal 
propensity to sell inside Kemubu was greater than outside for each tenure 
group (Table 5.9), and in each case, with the project, this was the major 
positive explanatory variable for marketed surplus with greatest response 
from owner-operators and mixed owner tenant farmers.
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TABLE 5.10
TEST OF EQUALITY BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS OBTAINED FROM 
DIFFERENT SUB-SAMPLES (CHOW TEST) FOR MARKETED SURPLUS USING TPP
No. Sample Different Sub-Samples F-Values
1 Outside Kemubu
2 "
3
4
5 Inside Kemubu
6 i
7
8 Pooled
9
10 "
Tenant Group and Owner-Operator 
Group
Tenant Group and Mixed Owner 
Tenant Group
Owner-Operator and Mixed Owner 
Tenant Group
Tenant and Mixed Owner Tenant 
Groups Together and Owner- 
Operator Group
Tenant Group and Owner-Operator 
Group
Tenant Group and Mixed Owner 
Tenant Group
Owner-Operator Group and Mixed 
Owner Tenant Group
Tenant Group and Owner-Operator 
Group
Tenant Group and Mixed Owner 
Tenant Group
Owner-Operator Group and Mixed 
Owner Tenant Group
F8,149 = 2,354 
F8,116 = 1,015 
F9,219 = 3,763 
Fll,250= 3-048
F7,305 =93.171
F7,207 = 3.89*
F7,398 = 8.27*
F8,470 =12.139
F8,342 = 3.866
F9,635 = 7.787
***
Note: *** Significant at the 1 per cent level.
Comparing TPP marginal propensities for the pure tenants inside 
Kemubu in the production of marketable surplus (Table 5.5) and marketed 
surplus (Table 5.9), the values were of 0.750 and 0.270 respectively and 
thus the former included a large proportion of rent. For outside Kemubu 
the marketed surplus was zero so for the marketable surplus the coefficient 
of 0.474 mostly represented rent. Some contrast between marketable and 
marketed surplus coefficients could be seen for the mixed owner tenant
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group but it was less pronounced, and the change for owner-operators was 
not great (inside Kemubu) since no rent was paid. So the difference in 
the TPP marginal propensity to sell indicated that the other disposal 
category which consists of rent, wages, zakat and storage did strongly 
influence the determination of the padi surplus. Survey data could not 
show whether the rent, wages, zakat and storage actually did eventually be 
marketed or consumed by the farmers.
5.2.3 Marketed Surplus (Using NPP)
Outside Kemubu, in the pure tenant group (equation 11.1,
-2Table 5.11), the adjusted coefficient of determination (R ) was close to 
zero, at 0.09. In the equation, there were no significant coefficient 
for explaining the variation in marketed surplus. This was due to 
negligible sales made by this group.
In the owner-operator group, the coefficient of NPP was negative 
and significant at the 1 per cent level, but the NPP marginal propensity to 
sell was positive, at 0.063 (equation 11.2, Table 5.11). This showed the 
advantage of using a quadratic model over a linear one. In this case a
linear model would have given a negative NPP marginal propensity to sell.
The coefficient of TNPI was negative as expected and significant 
at the 5 per cent level. The result indicated that there was a competition 
for farm family labour between padi production and non padi work. The 
coefficient was negative and significant at the 5 per cent level, indicating 
that family size did affect the amount sold as a result of consumption.
The coefficients of dummy variables for Kota Bharu (Dl), Bachok (D2) and 
Pasir Mas (D3) Districts were all positive and significant in relation to 
Pasir Puteh District.
In mixed owner tenant group outside Kemubu, (equation EL.3,
Table 5.11), the coefficient of NPP and NPPSQ were negative and positive
TABLE 5 J.1
ESTIMATES OF MARKETED SURPLUS (USING NPP) REGRESSIONS FOR OUTSIDE AND INSIDE 
THE KEMUBU IRRIGATION PROJECT AND POOLED SAMPLES BY TENANCY GROUPS
D1 D2 D3 Sample -2Equation Sample Tenancy Constant NPP NPPSQ TNPI TNPISQ FAMSZA (Kota (Bachok) (Pasir S.E. Size R
Bharu) Mas) (n)
n.i Outside Tenant -34.354 0.048 0.000114 0.026 -0.000005 -6.209 37.813 18.244 42.539 53.365 32 0.09
(0.157) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (5.956) (30.922) (34.509) (35.934)
11.2 - Owner- 47.125 ***-0.343 ***0.000565 kk-0.010 0.000001 **-6.778 31.204* ***82.727 ***46.125 76.827 135 0.81
Operator (0.053) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (3.620) (20.613) (23.432) (19.395)
11.3 " Mixed 72.571 ***-0.214 •kirk0.000493 -0.001 -0.000003 -5.845 -50.650* -34.402 -9.073 75.353 101 0.92
Tenant (0.056) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (4.628) (27.421) (31.156) (27.284)
11.4 Inside Tenant 79.379 0.425*** 0.000095 **-0.082 0.000008* -21.134 35.503 -95.007 274.606 64 0.75
(0.106) (0.000) (0.047) (0.000) (17.789) (87.160) (96.151)
11.5 " Owner- -101.576 ***0.662 neg. ***-0.050 0.000003* ***-48.632 ***207.485 16.514 320.820 256 0. 74
Operator (0.026) (0.020) (0.000) (10.740) (48.102) (58.122)
11.6 - Mixed -149.208 0.924*** ***-0.000052 -0.031 0.000001 ***-52.425 37.849 -33.172 243.291 157 0.84
Tenant (0.075) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (10.875) (50.143) (58.524)
11.7 Pooled Tenant -15.417 ***0.402 0.000030** -0.041* 0.000004 -14.027 69.221 -36.403 26.047 230.475 96 0.76
(0.074) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (12.199) (61.119) (69.149) (117.412)
11.8 - Owner- -63.512 0.557*** 0.000021** ***-0.038 0.000003*** ***-34.309 169.715*** 6.519 125.918** 277.288 391 0. 76
Operator (0.044) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (7.433) (36.149) (41.736) (53.640)
11.9 - Mixed -87.983 0.737*** -0.000007 ***-0.023 neg. -32.438*** 34.054 -47.957 33.485 219.832 261 0.86Tenant (0.049) (0.000) (0.007) (7.567) (37.915) (44.759) (51.374)
Notes: S.E. Standard errors of the regression equations.
Figures within parentheses are standard errors of the regression coefficients. 
Neg. Negligible.
* Significant at the 10 per cent level.
** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level.
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respectively and significant at the 1 per cent level. The NPP marginal 
propensity to sell was 0.449 (Table 5.12) which was the only sizeable 
values among the three tenure groups outside Kemubu. This was probably
TABLE 5.12
MARGINAL PROPENSITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS WITH RESPECT 
TO NPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY TENANCY GROUPS 
(Based on Equations in Table 5.11)
Sample Farms
Marginal Propensities w.r.t.
lenancy
NPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu Pure Tenant3 ns ns ns
Owner-Operator 0.063 -0.0006 -6.778
Mixed Owner-Operator 0.449 ns ns
Inside Kemubu Pure Tenant 0.724 ns ns
Owner-Operator 0.662 -0.040 -48.632
Mixed Owner-Operator 0.793 -0.028 -52.425
Notes: a Sales were negligible.
ns Non-significant at the 10 per cent level.
due to the larger padi area and higher padi production of this mixed 
tenure group. The coefficients of TNPI and FAMSZA though of expected 
negative signs were non-significant. The coefficient of dummy variable 
for Kota Bharu District (Dl) was negative and significant at the 10 per 
cent level vis-a-vis Pasir Puteh District.
For sample farms inside Kemubu in regression equation 11.4 
(Table 5.11), for the pure tenant group the coefficient of NPP was positive 
and significant at the 1 per cent level, and the NPP marginal propensity to 
sell was 0.724, which is relatively higher than in marketed surplus using 
TPP (0.270) in Table 5.8. The result indicated that raising the NPP would
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lead to a higher level of sales then increasing TPP where most part will go 
to the rent, zakat and wage categories. The coefficients of TNPI and 
TNPISQ were significant at least at the 10 per cent level indicating that 
rice consumption increases with rises in TNPI. The coefficient of FAMSZA 
was not significant and so were that of the dummy variables for the districts 
of Kota Bharu (Dl) and Bachok (D2), in relation to Pasir Puteh District.
Inside Kemubu in the owner-operator group (equation 11.5,
Table 5.11), the coefficient of NPP was positive and significant at the 
1 per cent level. The marginal propensity to sell with respect to NPP 
was 0.662 indicating about 66.2 per cent of NPP would go into marketed 
surplus with an increase of 100 per cent NPP. The coefficients of TNPI
and FAMSZA are negative as expected and significant at the 1 per cent level. 
The coefficient of dummy variable for Kota Bharu District was positive and 
significant at the 1 per cent level in relation to Pasir Puteh District.
In the mixed owner tenant group inside Kemubu (equation 11.6,
Table 5.11), the coefficients of NPP and NPPSQ were positive and negative 
respectively and significant at the 1 per cent level. The NPP marginal 
propensity to sell was high at 0.793. This high value was likely due to 
the high level of production of padi by farmers in this mixed owner tenant 
group. Relative to the other tenure groups the mixed owner tenant group 
had the highest NPP marginal propensity to sell which seemed to corroborate 
other data. The coefficient of TNPI was non-significant and the result 
could indicate that the level of TNPI, or the involvement of these farmers 
in non padi work was not great enough to influence or detract from marketed 
surplus. The coefficient of FAMSZA was negative and high at -52.425 and 
significant at the 1 per cent level. The result indicated that with an 
increase in family size (FAMSZA) there would be a reduction of about 85 kgs
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of rice which would go into consumption. The dummy variables for Kota Bharu 
(Dl) and Bachok (D2) Districts were not significant in relation to Pasir 
Puteh District. It is presumed that the situation was due to the higher 
preponderance of mixed owner tenants in Pasir Puteh District.
In a test of equality between coefficients obtained from sample 
farms it was found that owner-operator and mixed owner tenant groups inside 
were significantly different from those outside at the 1 per cent level 
(Table 5.6). Also, in a Chow Test of equality between coefficients of 
tenure groups within each individual sample of farms inside and outside the 
Kemubu area it was observed that the mixed owner tenant group was 
significantly different from pure tenant and owner-operator groups inside 
Kemubu, and the mixed group was different from pure tenant group outside 
the project (Table 5.13).
The marginal propensities to sell with respect to output for 
marketable and marketed surpluses were different for the three tenure groups 
due mostly to the amount paid in kind for rent (except in owner-operator 
group), wages, zakat and storage. Using TPP the marginal propensity to 
sell for marketed surplus was 0.472 for mixed owner tenant group but it was 
higher at 0.793 by using NPP. This was expected since TPP contains mostly 
rent and so marginal propensity to sell off marketed surplus would be less 
when this component was removed (NPP). Using NPP as the production 
variable to explain marketed surplus is relatively more useful than using 
TPP. This is because the other disposal component category in TPP varies 
little as it is exchanged in a more or less fixed amount. Within this 
other disposal category in TPP, NPP better explains the behaviour of
marketed surplus.
TABLE 5.13
TEST OF EQUALITY BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS OBTAINED FROM 
DIFFERENT SUB-GROUPS (CHOW TEST) FOR MARKETED SURPLUS USING NPP
No. Sample Different Sub-Samples F-Values
1 Outside Kemubu Tenant Group and Owner-Operator 
Group
F8,149 = 1-161
2 II Tenant Group and Mixed Owner F8,115 = 2-393
Tenant Group
3 II Owner-Operator Group and Mixed F8,218 = 1-676
Owner Tenant Group
4 II Tenant and Owner-Operator Fll,250= 1-375
Groups Together and Mixed
Owner Tenant Group
5 II Owner-Operator and Mixed Owner F11,250= 0-852
• | Tenant Groups and Tenant Group
6 Inside Kemubu Tenant Group and Owner-Operator 
Group
F7,305 = 1-282
7 II Tenant Group and Mixed Owner F7,205 = 3-481
Tenant Group
8 II Owner-Operator Group and Mixed F7,398 = 2-196
Owner Tenant Group
9 II Tenant and Owner-Operator
Groups Together and Mixed
F9,461 = 1-810
Owner Tenant Group
10 Pooled Tenant Group and Owner-Operator F8,469 = 1-266
Group
11 II Tenant Group and Mixed Owner F8,341 = 4-223
Tenant Group
12 11 Owner-Operator Group and Mixed F8,635 = 2-832
Owner Tenant Group
13 11 Tenant and Owner-Operator F12,731= 2-216
Groups Together and Mixed
Owner Tenant Group
Notes: Significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Significant at the 1 per cent level.
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5.3 Net Operational Padl Area
5.3.1 Marketable Surplus
For the single padi crop sample outside the Kemubu Irrigation 
Project (equations 14.1 to 14 .5 in Table 5.14), only TPP was significant 
at the 10 per cent level or better at least for all size groups (except 
for the < 1 acre group which can be disregarded for lack of sales of padi). 
Notably, the coefficient for TPP increased with size of padi operational 
area (0.141 to 0.554). Also, neither FAMSZA nor TNPI had a significant 
influence in any size group.
Farmers inside Kemubu show considerably more significant variables 
than outside the project (equations 14.6 to 14.10 in Table 5.14). Non padi 
income (and it quadratic term, TNPISQ), FAMSZA and dummy variables for 
Kota Bharu District and owner-operator group were significant as well as 
TPP and TPPSQ for all or most of the size groups.
Coefficients for TPP were high for all size groups except 2.1-3 
acres. The quadratic term of TPP (TPPSQ) was significant and positive 
for two of the small size groups indicating that marketable surplus was 
rising at an increasing rate for them. In the two larger size groups, 
this term was negative (and significant in one group), indicating the 
increasing rate of increase of the smaller size groups was reversed in the 
larger groups. For TNPI, the quadratic term in all but the largest group 
was positive and significant, indicating that there was a positive rate of 
increase in the negative coefficient for the variable.
The influence of FAMSZA was negative and significant at varying 
levels in all area size groups and coefficients were large indicating this 
variable excerted a strong influence in the level of marketable surplus in
all groups.
TABLE 5.14
ESTIMATES OF MARKETABLE SURPLUS REGRESSIONS FOR OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE KEMUBU 
IRRIGATION PROJECT AND POOLED SAMPLES BY PADI OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
Equation Sample Acreage Constant TPP TPPSQ TNPI TNPISQ FAMSZA
D1
(Kota
D2
(Bachok)
D3
(Pasir „ Owner-Tenant _Operator S.E.
Sample
Size R2
Bharu) Mas) (n)
14.1 Outside < 1 38.358 0.010 0.000208* 0.008 -0.000001 -2.916 26.576 neg. neg. ** **63.846 -51.638 81.400 69 0.59
(0.089) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (5.108) (21.009) (34.882) (25.152)
14.2 ■■ 1.1-2 -65.052 * *0.141 kkk0.000214 0.006 -0.000001 -5.766 **84.931 66.463* 62.255* ***93.129 -19.493 95.933 90 0.83
(0.068) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (5.696) (37.729) (39.005)(38.067) (31.775) (24.251)
14.3 - 2.1-3 -24.652 0.173* 0.000263* 0.003 0.000001 -7.499 31.117 24.751 42.178 67.796* -44.173* 95.705 49 0.93
(0.106) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (9.214) (56.426) (51.879)(47.108) (46.846) (33.285)
14.4 - 3.1-4 -27.428 0.203 0.000169 -0.0253 0.000002 -10.233 118.873 101.425 99.650 neg. -7.007 117.005 28 0.93
(0.106) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (14.238) (91.102) (82.837)(82.414) (51.548)
14-5 - > 4 -100.444 0.554* 0.000121* 0.032 -0.000002 neg. - ***537.725 22.288 - **137.288 14.519 -31.900 119.379 31 0.98
(0.109) (0.000) (0.053) (0.000) (162.106) (147.721)(69.797)(132.398) (65.769)
14.6 Inside < 1 -45.172 0.606* *** *** 0.000067 -0.044 0.000006* ***-40.602 56.298* -74.619 - **135.110 31.053 158.008 103 0.91
(0.067) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (9.893) (40.987) (55.918) (61.432) (42.534)
14.7 - 1.1-2 -111.744 ***0.793 irk0.000031 -0.057 0.000009* kkk-46.679 100.884* 33.092 - -8.655 -141.895* 276.780 161 0. 79
(0.151) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (12.281) (52.310) (66.747) (69.963) (52.612)
14.8 » 2.1-3 169.810 **0.483 *** kkk0.000069 -0.104 0.000007* -33.131* 169.060* 35.881 - neg. -133.451 392.389 111 0.77
(0.138) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (20.268) (95.596) (100.238) (76.991)
14.9 .. 3.1-4 115.188 0.990*
kk kkk-0.000056 -0.179 ***0.000011 **-42.512 88.672 neg. - -231.457*-387.929* 346.608 57 0.86
(0.154) (0.000) (0.051) (0.000) (23.089) (97.882) (147.344 ) 0 06.309)
14.10 .. > 4 -25.618
k kk0.838 -0.000006 -0.049 -0.000005 kk-76.827 **390.983 30.119 - **-158.391 -334.137) 488.449 45 0.84
(0.233) (0.000) (0.119) (0.000) (38.311)(223.072) (226.562) (309.070 (163.909)
14.11 Pooled < i 33.513 ***0.415 *** kk0.000117 0.023 0.000002
***-24.261 50.949 -16.128 18.471 38.112 -22.324 150.968 172 0.89
(0.046) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (6.466) (29.861) (44.263)(50.395) (41.681) (29.515)
14.12 •• 1.1-2 -22.795 ***0.543 ***0.000099 -0.019 0.000001 ***-33.782 **91.929 10.227 94.699* 38.620 -87.330* 239.708 253 0.84
(0.072) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (8.356) (40.145) (47.668)(64.205) (47.685) (35.546)
14.13 1 2.1-3 49.003 ***0.509 kkk ***0.000066 -0.067 0.000004 **-27.695 **166.481 55.171 141.663 27.850 -93.640 336.036 161 0.83
(0.083) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (15.228) (73.238) (75.600X113.912) (87.844) (58.796)
14.14 .. 3.1-4 172.369 0.881*
kk kkk-0.000037 -0.145 0.000008* ***-43.067 104.270 -24.169 86.815 - * kkk-192.543 -287.541 332.006 85 0.89
(0.096) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (18.006) (94.150) (100.395X150.915) (132.720) (75.615)
14.15 n > 4 238.796
***0.694 0.000009 -0.024 -0.000007 kkk-63.748 **316.809 -78.169 -•35.679 --168.054 -216.618* 398.252 76 0.92
(0.116) (0.000) (0.070) (0.000) (25.114)(160.799) (159.284)062.582) (206.516)004.511)
Notes: S.E. Standard errors of the regression equations.
Figures within parentheses are standard errors of the regression coefficients. 
Neg. Negligible.
* Significant at the 10 per cent level.
** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
Significant at the 1 per cent level.
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The coefficients for Kota Bharu District dummy variables (Dl) 
were mostly significant and all positive and the size of the coefficients 
indicated that this district performed substantially better with respect 
to marketable surpluses in all size groups than in Pasir Puteh. No such 
findings were true for Bachok.
Except for the smallest size group, the negative coefficients 
of the tenure dummy variables and particularly the significant ones for 
owner—operators indicated the excluded category of mixed owner tenants 
performed relatively well and above the other two tenure groups inside the 
project in most area size groups.
The marginal propensities to sell with respect to TPP showed a 
very definite positive relationship with size groups of padi operational 
area outside Kemubu (Table 5.15). The range was from 0.355 (1.1-2 acres)
TABLE 5.15
MARGINAL PROPENSITIES OF MARKETABLE SURPLUS WITH RESPECT 
TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY NET PADI OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS 
(Based on Equations in Table 5.14)
Sample Farms Size Groups (acres)
Marginal Propensities w.r.t.
TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu < la ns ns ns
1.1-2 0.355 ns ns
2.1-3 0.489 ns ns
3.1-4 0.437 ns ns
> 4 0.748 ns ns
Inside Kemubu < 1 0.730 -0.020 -40.602
1.1-2 0.875 -0.030 -46.679
2.1-3 0. 742 -0.086 -33.131
3.1-4 0. 742 -0.142 -42.512
> 4 0.797 ns -76.827
Notes: a
ns
Absence of padi sales.
Non-significant at the 10 per cent level.
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to 0.748 (> 4 acres). Inside Kemubu, this relationship was not apparent 
and in fact the marginal propensity varied only within a narrow range of 
from 0.73 to 0.875. This range was comparable only to the size group 
with more than 4 acres outside Kemubu.
Outside Kemubu, the TNPI marginal propensities of marketed surplus 
were non-significant. Inside Kemubu, the propensities were negative and 
significant and decreased with increases in padi area size groups. 
Presumably, inside Kemubu there was a competition for family labour 
resources between production of marketed surpluses of padi (for cash) and 
non padi work. Thus, as the padi operational area sizes increase the 
level of marketed surplus were progressively and negatively affected by 
TNPI. This significant result indicates the importance of TNPI in 
influencing the production of marketed surplus of padi inside Kemubu.
Also, if labour saving technologies could be introduced in the padi 
production inside Kemubu they would free some labour for non padi work.
The Chow Test of equality between coefficients for different 
net padi operational area size groups (Table 5.16) show that outside Kemubu, 
the only significant and consistent differences between size groups were 
those between the > 4 acre group and others (except the < 1 acre group). 
Inside Kemubu, this pattern was extended. There were no significant 
differences between the largest groups (3.1-4 and over 4 acres) and none 
between the smallest (< 1 to 2.1-3 acres) but differences between all 
groups in the smaller and both groups in the larger were all significant. 
Thus, in behaviour, with respect to the marketable surplus, it appears that, 
with the irrigation project, there was a definite split into two (small and 
large) broad size groups.
The Chow Tests for each size group inside and outside the Kemubu 
Project showed that there were significant differences in the < 1 and 1.1—2
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TABLE 5.16
TEST OF EQUALITY BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS OBTAINED FROM DIFFERENT 
NET PADI OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS (CHOW TEST),
FOR MARKETABLE SURPLUS OF PADI
Size Group 
(acres) 1.1-2 2.1-3 3.1-4 > 4
Outside Kemubu
< 1 ns k ns ns
1.1-2 ns ns *
2.1-3 k *
3.1-4 *
Inside Kemubu
< 1 ns ns k *
1.1-2 ns * *
2.1-3 k *
3.1-4 ns
Pooled Sample
< 1 ns ns * A
1.1-2 ns "k ns
2.1-3 * ns
3.1-4 ns
Notes: * Significant at the 5 per cent level,
ns Non-significant.
acre size groups at the 1 per cent level (Table 5.17). This appears to be 
consistent with the fact that it was in these two size groups that the 
largest changes occurred with respect to a marketable surplus, for, as 
mentioned earlier in the single crop padi area, the surplus was negligible 
in these two groups.
5.3.2 Marketed Surplus (Using TPP)
Outside Kemubu, TPP was the only variable that significantly 
affected marketed surplus in all size groups (Table 5.18). The regression
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TABLE 5.17
TEST OF EQUALITY BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS (CHOW TEST) OBTAINED 
FROM SAMPLES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE KEMUBU IRRIGATION 
PROJECT BY PADI OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
Padi Operational 
Area Size Groups 
(acres)
Dependent
Variables
Using TPP 
or NPP F-Values
< 1 Marketable Surplus TPP Fll,153 4*859,L
1.1-2 F1n = 2.739 ° '
11,230
2.1-3 Fll,140 = °* 700
3.1-4 F„ ,, = 1.66011,66
> 4 hi,56 = °'98°
< 1 Marketed Surplus TPP hi, 153 = 5-908^
1.1-2 Bl = 3.77411,230
2.1-3 F,, , , J = 1.87V11,140
3.1-4 F,,! „ = 0.87511,66
> 4 hi,56 = °-507
< 1 Marketed Surplus NPP Fll, 151 = 5'254j.a^
1.1-2 F10,232 = 2,813
2.1-3 F10.142 = 0,850
3.1-4 FiWM = 1.97111,65
> 4 F =0 49310,56 J
Notes: ** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level.
coefficients, however, were negative in all but the smallest and largest 
size groups. The quadratic terms for TPP were all positive and significant 
indicating a counterbalancing influence on declining marketed surplus. 
Comparison of the TPP coefficient with those for marketable surplus by size
TABLE 5.18
ESTIMATES OF MARKETED SURPLUS (USING TPP) REGRESSIONS FOR OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE KEMUBU 
IRRIGATION PROJECT AND POOLED SAMPLES BY PADI OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
Equation Sample Acreage Constant TPP TPPSQ TNPI TNPISQ FAMSZA
D1
(Kota
D2
(Bachok)
D3
(Pasir Tenant Owner- S.E.
Sample
Size R2
Bharu) Mas) Operator (n)
18.1 Outside < i -14.123 **0.078 **-0.000049 0.004 -0.000006 -2.616 7.941 -4.348 neg. 12.676 10.086 34.941 69 -0.01
(0.039) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (2.198) (9.263) (21.050) (15.776) (11.585)
18.2 ** ***1.1-2 21.890 -0.070 0.000126 -0.006 0.000004 -6.358 23.333 34.614 16.785 -6.744 6.346 54.477 90 0.60
(0.039) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (3.234) (21.424) (22.149)(21.617) (18.043) (13.771)
18. 3 ** ***2.1-3 -6.521 -0.177 0.000299 0.012 -0.000003 -2.037 -35.510 36.881 20.995 -4.402 neg. 85.933 49 0.89
(0.094) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (8.912) (47.202) (46.319)(41.484) (38.440)
18.4 ** **3.1-4 113.487 -0.274 -0.000231 -0.055 0.000005 -4.288 -51.545 105.159 113.485 neg. neg. 132.137 28 0.79
(0.119) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (15.423)(100.622) (92.932)(91.977)
18.5 " > 4 69.043 0.140 0.000083* 0.017 -0.000001 -30.891 ■-189.925 165.353 neg -41.903 13.594 130.911 31 0.90
(0.115) (0.000) (0.047) (0.000) (23.568)(193.687) (184.344) (146.997) (63.511)*** *** ***18.6 Inside < 1 -•272.795 0.291 0.000078 -0.073 0.000008 -29.753 156.678 110.607 - 147.501 293.104 181.139 103 0. 78
(0.077) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (11.342) (46.987) (64.104) (70.426) (48.761)
18.7 •360.721 ** * *** *1.1-2 - 0.620 -0.000029 -0.086 0.000016 -14.279 70.196 58.912 - -103.197 143.166 277.314 161 0.57
(0.151) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (12.305) (52.411) (66.875) (70.097) (52.713)
18.8 -67.535 *** * ** **2.1-3 0.442 neg. -0.056 0.000007 -51.307 179.113 -47.030 - -245.686 205.418 369.878 111 0.54(0.045) (0.039) (0.000) (19.035) (87.323) (93.939) (115.789) (78.115)* **18.9 3.1-4 70.956 0.482 -0.000013 -0.053 0.000002 -48.701 91.097 -65.856 - -425.463 82.464 352.372 57 0.67(0.164) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (23.482)(113.309) (136.764) (149.799)(108.083)
18.10 " > A -■837.965 0.526* 0.000003 0.102 -0.000019 -33.662 572.733 165.234 - 116.695 kk398.173 513.758 45 0.67(0.245) (0.000) (0.125) (0.000) (40.297)(234.631) (238.301) (325.084) (172.402)
< i -94.757 * ** *** ** *18.11 Pooled 0.135 0.000114 0.033 0.000003 -19.342 107.871 92.130 69.415 15.734 140.825 166.417 172 0. 73(0.051) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (7.128) (32.916) (48.793)(55.551) (45.946) (32.536)
18.12 " 1.1-2 -•146.524 ***0.263 0.000083* -0.020 0.000002 -9.689 54.398 14.304 64.033 -69.604* ***106.701 240.394 253 0.66(0.072) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (8.380) (40.260) (47.804)(64.389) (47.822) (35.648)
18.13 - 2.1-3 -■141.731 ***0.447 neg. -0.012 0.000001 -43.300* ***189.811 -18.747 155.314* **-171.183 ***168.145 326.864 161 0.65(0.031) (0.024) (0.000) (14.527) (69.371) (72.640X106. 700) (85.435) (57.053)
18.14 " 3.1-4 51.401 0.436 -0.000002 -0.055* 0.000002 -34.860* 74.932 -72.623 57.929 • ***-428. 777 42.929 309.027 85 0. 74(0.093) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (17.280) (90.355) (96.349X144.832) (127.371) (72.569)
18.15 - >4 •235.623 0.348* 0.000020 0.032 -0.000011 -36.558* ***460.964 54.144 170.922 30.912 ***255.968 402.949 76 0. 82(0.117) (0.000) (0.071) (0.000) (25.410)(162.695) (161.162X164,499) (208,951X105.743)
Notes: S.E. Standard errors of the regression equations.
Figures within parentheses are standard errors of the regression coefficients. 
Neg. Negligible.
* Significant at the 10 per cent level.
** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level.
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group discussed above suggests that it was rental payments that created the 
positive relation with size groups. Without rent (and wages and zakat) the 
stronger influence of consumption needs apparently led to negative 
coefficients. Despite the negative TPP coefficients, the marginal 
propensities to sell were all positive across size groups though values 
were very low (Table 5.19). Outside the Kemubu Project, all groups had 
coefficients that were significantly different at the 1 per cent level from 
each other, except for the two largest (Table 5.20).
TABLE 5.19
MARGINAL PROPENSITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS WITH RESPECT 
TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY NET PADI OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS 
(Based on Equations in Table 5.18)
Sample Farms Size Groups (acres)
Marginal Propensities w.r.t.
TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu < 1 a 0.048 ns ns
1.1-2 0.056 ns -6.358
2.1-3 0.182 ns ns
3.1-4 0.046 -0.036 ns
> 4 ns ns -30.891
Inside Kemubu < 1 0.435 -0.054 -29.753
1.1-2 0.543 -0.038 -14.279
2.1-3 0.442 -0.037 -51.307
3.1-4 0.424 ns -48.701
> 4 0.547 ns ns
a Absence of padi sales.
ns Non-significant at the 10 per cent level.
Notes:
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TABLE 5.20
TEST OF EQUALITY BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS OBTAINED FROM 
DIFFERENT NET PADI OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS 
(CHOW TEST), FOR MARKETED SURPLUS OF PADI (USING TPP)
Size Group 
(acres) 1.1-2 2.1-3 3.1-4 > 4
Outside Kemubu
< 1 * k * *
1.1-2 * k k
2.1-3 k k
3.1-4 ns
Inside Kemubu
< 1 ns ns
1.1-2 ns ns k
2.1-3 ns ns
3.1-4 ns
Pooled Sample
< 1 ns k k
1.1-2 k * ns
2.1-3 ns ns
3.1-4 ns
Notes: ns Non-significant.
* Significant at the 5 per cent level.
Inside Kemubu, the coefficients for TPP were positive and significant 
at the 5 per cent level for all size groups and coefficient values were 
generally high (Table 5.19). The quadratic term was positive for smaller 
size groups showing accelerating surpluses and negative for larger, showing 
decelerating (though more significant) charges. The output marginal 
propensities to sell overall were much higher than outside, ranging from
0.424 to 0.547.
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Total non-padi income and its quadratic term were significant 
variables for marketable surplus in all padi area size group of less than 
4 acres as shown by the significant coefficients at a minimum level of 10 per 
cent (Table 5.19). Reasons for this could be that farmers with padi areas 
of up to 4 acres depend on non padi activities relatively more as sources 
of cash income and there is competition for labour. With 4 or more acres 
of padi, they depend less on non padi activities for cash income so there 
is relatively little competition in resource allocation.
Inside Kemubu, there were fewer significant differences between 
size groups than outside (Table 5.20). There were, for example, no such 
differences between the three smallest groups (3 acres or less). There 
were, however, some significant differences between the smallest and largest 
groups.
Chow Tests for sample farms inside and outside Kemubu in each size 
group showed all small groups (3 acres or less) were significantly different 
(Table 5.17). F-values showed a general tendency to decline with increasing
size of operational padi area. This trend was a little more definitive 
than for the marketable surplus discussed above.
5.3.3 Marketed Surplus (Using NPP)
For sample farms outside Kemubu, generally, the coefficients of
NPP are negative and significant except in the < 1 acre and > 4 acre size
groups (Table 5.21). The results for equation 21.1 (< 1 acre) can be
disregarded since there was no marketed surplus for this size category
-2(Shand, et al, 1982) and also the coefficient of determination (R ) was very 
low (-0.01). The coefficients of NPPSQ for equations 21.2 to 21.15 were 
positive and significant at the 1 per cent level which offset the negative 
effect of NPP. This provided positive NPP marginal propensities to sell 
but of low value (Table 5.22).
TABLE 5.21
ESTIMATES OF MARKETED SURPLUS (USING NPP) REGRESSIONS FOR OUTSIDE AND INSIDE 
THE KEMUBU IRRIGATION PROJECT AND POOLED SAMPLES BY PADI OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
Equation Sample Acreage Cons tan
21.1 Outside < i -18.280
21.2 - 1.1-2 10.659
21 .3 - 2.1-3 50.552
21.4 •• 3.1-4 109.140
21.5 •• > 4 74.074
21.6 Inside < i --111.231
21.7 " 1.1-2 -10.542
21 .8 •• 2.1-3 66.060
21 .9 - 3.1-4 134.406
21 .10 - > 4 18.087
21 .11 Pooled < i -11.549
21 .12 » 1.1-2 8.062
21 .13 2.1-3 -17.658
21 .14 - 3.1-4 106.729
21 .15 | > 4 159.948
D1 D2 D3
NPP NPPSQ TNPI TNPISQ FAMSZA (Kota (Bachok) (Pasir
Bharu)Mas)
Tenant Owner-Operator S.E.
Sample ~ 
Size R 
(n)
**0.163
(0.077)
"kit is
-0.200
(0.065)
***-0.309
-0.000181*
(0.000)
kkk0.000373
(0.000)
kkk0.000564
(0.104) (0.000)
***-0.428
(0.159)
-0.091
(0.158)
kkk0.433
(0.104)***0.541
(0.173)
0.392*
(0.248)
kkk0.847
(0.123) (0.000)
**0.559
(0.237)
0.163*
(0.060)
0.321*
(0.082)
0.419*
(0.139)
0.797*
(0.084)
0.4*6* 
(0.129)
0.003
(0.005)
-0.000001
(0.000) -2.601 7.111(2.219) (12.071) -8.097 -4.398 16.156 10.378(22.373)(15.033) (15.598) (11.832) 34.869
0.000652
(0.000)
0.000495*
(0.000)
0.000130*
(0.000)
0.000084
(0.000)
0.000095
(0.000)
***-0.000066
(0.036) (0.000) (17.691) (81.371) (87.884)
kkk-0.117 **0.000006
(102.575)
***-50.867
(0.041) (0.000) (18.317)
109.
(89.
0.000024
(0.000)
0.000231*
(O.OO0)
0.000172*
(0.000)
0.000091* 
(0.000)
-0.000058*
(0.000)
0.000035*
(0.000)
0.017
(0.167)**-0.026
(0.012)
-0.020
(0.014)
-0.038*
-0.000011
(0.000)
0.000003
(0.000)
0.000002
(0.000)
0.000002*
**-65.123
(0.021) (0.000)
-0.097*
(0.031)
0.014
(0.057)
0.000004
(0.000)
-0.000010
(0.000)
485
(34.708 (204
-20.938* 
(5.779)
-28.559* 
(7.738
-33.531* 
(13.028)
* **-44.778 
(14.651)***-61.480
,802 
,299) ** 375 
588) ***70.944
(26.769)
78.259*
(30.524)
,940*174
(61
114.
(77.
428 
(21.803)(132
.466)
.762
,144)
924*
115)
-48.884 - -274.572*-194.136*
(105.478) (119.814) (88.495)
85.255 - -120.404 -124.446
(210.025 (277.092)(151.295)
7.064 40.005 16.398 51.373*
(39.583)(44.781) (37.131) (26.224)
neg. 58.436 -10.759 -38.688
(52.634) (43.835) (32.823)
42.386 140.806 -64.590 neg.
(65.934X100.457) (71.811)
-44.122 60.852*-260.573 -123.351*
(82.055)(120.364)(108.147) (63.372)
17.592 neg. -115.222 -60.518
(135.194) (177.909) (87.286)
276.396
450.596
134.825
221.168
291.174
262.649
346.563
69 -0.01
-0.003 neg. -6.185 51.277 58.394 43.687 neg. -1.392 56.563 90 0.57
(0.003) ***0.000001
(3.339) (22.184) (23.255)(22.510) (12.805)
neg. -3.007 -14.552 19.813 21.900 neg. -32.091* 68.588 49 0.93(0.000) (6.521) (38.917 (35.907)(33.022) (21.625)
-0.041* 0.000003 -12.515 -1.857 77.440 106.083* neg. 11.369 114.810 28 0.84(0.027) (0.000) (14.001) (91.019) (80.137)(80.918) (50.331)
0.029 -0.000002 -12.621 -402.290* 64.019 -70.985* neg. -22.436 92.272 31 0.95(0.039) (0.000) (15.360)(142.481) (125.615)(48.105) (45.850)***-0.054 isisis0.000006 -35.842* kk86.156 13.494 **128.081 118.549* 148.326 103 0.86(0.017) (0.000) (9.327) (38.724) (52.956) (57.706) (38.984)**-0.064 isie0.000011 kick-39.827 88.185* 11.074 -41.590 -78.661* 261.706 161 0.62(0.032) (0.000) (11.719) (49.294) (62.238) (66.015) (50.294)
-0.058* 0.000004 -40.154* 186.186* 25.149 ■109.789 neg 341.444 111 0.60
57 0.80
45 0.75
172 0.83
253 0.71
161 0.71
85 0.81
76 0.87
Notes: S.E. Standard errors of the regression equations.
Figures within parentheses are standard errors of the regression coefficients. 
Neg. Negligible.
* Significant at the 10 per cent level.
** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
Significant at the 1 per cent level.
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TABLE 5.22
MARGINAL PROPENSITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS WITH RESPECT 
TO NPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY NET PADI OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS 
(Based on Equations in Table 5.21)
Sample Farms Size Groups (acres)
Marginal
NPP
Propensities
TNPI
w.r.t.
FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu < 1 a 0.077 ns ns
1.1-2 0.084 ns -6.185
2.1-3 0.201 ns ns
3.1-4 0.210 -0.029 ns
> 4 ns ns ns
Inside Kemubu < 1 0.613 -0.030 -35.842
1.1-2 0. 702 -0.031 -39.827
2.1-3 0.645 -0.047 -40.154
3.1-4 0.649 -0.097 -50.867
> 4 0.675 ns -65.123
Notes: a Negligible sales.
ns Non-significant at the 10 per cent level.
The explanatory power of the variables increases as shown by rising
-2R with size groups outside the project. Also, apart from NPP, there was 
a lack of other consistently significant variables in the equations 21.1 to
21.5 (Table 5.21). In Chow Test for the size groups outside Kemubu there 
were significant differences between all but the largest 2 groups (like 
marketed surplus using TPP)(Table 5.23). In another Chow Test (Table 5.17) 
the significant differences were only for < 1 and 1.1-2 acre size groups 
which is a similar result as for marketed surplus using TPP.
Inside Kemubu (equations 21.6 to 21.10 in Table 5.21) the 
coefficients of NPP were generally positive and significant at the 10 per 
cent level or better. Also, the values of the coefficients were relatively
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TABLE 5.23
TEST OF EQUALITY BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS OBTAINED FROM 
DIFFERENT NET PADI OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS 
(CHOW TEST) FOR MARKETED SURPLUS OF PADI (USING NPP)
Size Group 
(acres) 1.1-2 2.1-3 3.1-4 > 4
Outside Kemubu
< 1 A * * *
1.1-2 * * •k
2.1-3 ns A
3.1-4 ns
Inside Kemubu
< 1 ns ns k k
1.1-2 ns A k
2.1-3 ns ns
3.1-4 ns
Pooled Sample
< 1 ns ns v\ k
1.1-2 ns A k
2.1-3 k ns
3.1-4 *
Notes: ns Non-significant.
* Significant at the 5 per cent level.
higher than outside Kemubu. The coefficients of NPPSQ were positive except 
in 3.1-4 acre size group.
Other consistently significant variables were TNPI, TNPISQ, FAMSZA 
and D1 which was an improvement over those farms outside Kemubu. The 
coefficients of TNPI were negative and significant at least at the 10 per 
cent level except in the more than 4 acre size group.
The coefficients of FAMSZA were negative as expected and significant 
at least at the 5 per cent level. Also, the coefficient values were
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relatively larger than for those farm groups outside Kemubu. The results 
indicated that farms inside Kemubu were able to provide a higher consumption 
level of rice with an additional family member due to their higher padi 
production.
Generally, the coefficients of the dummy variable for Kota Bharu 
District (Dl) were positive and significant compared to the other districts.
So in the various padi farm size groups the advantages of being in Kota
Bharu District were distinct.
. . —2The adjusted coefficients of determination (R ) were variable but 
higher, ranging from 0.60 to 0.86, than for farm groups outside Kemubu.
In Table 5.23 the test of equality between coefficients obtained 
from different net padi operational area size groups inside Kemubu, showed 
significant differences only between the smallest two and largest two size 
groups. Thus, it indicates with Kemubu Project, a difference of small and 
large farms was evolved as against differences amongst all in the single 
crop area.
In the Chow Test between coefficients of farms inside and outside 
Kemubu (Table 5.17) there was significant difference between groups inside 
and outside Kemubu only for < 1 and 1.1-2 acre size groups as with marketable 
and marketed surpluses using TPP. The differences were probably due to the 
change from negligible marketable or marketed surplus for the smallest two 
size groups outside Kemubu to sizeable ones within.
The NPP marginal propensities to sell for farms inside Kemubu were 
high and showed little variation by size groups (0.424 to 0.547), while 
outside Kemubu the propensities were relatively low (0.046 to 0.182)(Table 5.22).
The TNPI marginal propensities to sell for farms outside Kemubu 
were non—significant while inside Kemubu most were negative and significant
TABLE 5,24
ESTIMATES OF MARKETABLE SURPLUS REGRESSIONS FOR OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE KEMUBU 
IRRIGATION PROJECT AND POOLED SAMPLES BY TOTAL FARM OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
Equation Sample Acreage Constant TPP TPPSQ TNPI TNPISQ FAMSZA
D1
(Kota
Bharu)
D2 D3
(Bachok) (Paslr 
Mas)
Tenant Owner-Operator S.E.
Sample
Size
(n)
R2
24.1 Outside < i 40.052 -0.020 0.000224 0.009 -0.000002 -54.937 37.028 -147.891 -12.721 74.819 -25.535 89.310 51 0.58
(0.114) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (6.437) (35.484) (55.308)(41.771) (44.230) (33.536)
24.2 " 1.1-2 -3.430 -0.025 ***0.000323 0.018 -0.000001 -5.100 65.446* 82.681* 67.481* 47.894 ***-86.738 92.771 57 0.77
(0.101) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (6.661) (41.570) (46.015)(45.100) (37.438) (32.946)
24.3 1 2.1-3 -84.322 ***0.356 kkk *0.000127 -0.065 0.000013 5.039 29.314 32.259 32.325 kk107.573 7.902 86.999 37 0.90
(0.117) (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (11.033) (53.293) (49.352)(45.984) (48.988) (36.089)
24.4 " 3.1-4 -60.462 0. 319 0.000133 -0.025 0.000004 -7.671 176.819* 95.826 62.715 -107.159 -22.325 106.658 31 0. 75
(79.295) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (11.745)(105.676) (81.675)(79.295)(116.953) (45.192)
24.5 " > 4 -68.368 0.552* kkk *0.000101 0.027 -0.000003 -16. 754*--107.431 kk-162.011 -58.916 110.609 6.195 124.499 68 0.96
(0.065) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (11.285) (92.916) (67.935)(47.868 (109.015) (32.527)
24.6 Inside < i -136.507 kkk0.594 0.000075* -0.033* -0.000003* kkk-27.865 63.901* 67.411 133.827* 38.456 151.559 79 0.92
(0.073) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (11.259) (43.273) (82.021) (66.290) (48.243)
24.7 » 1.1-2 31.668 "kick0.620 0.000076* -0.071* **0.000012 ***-45.667 **105.825 22.358 neg. - ***-139.844 288.740 153 0. 76(0.158) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (13.279) (54.835) (71.710) (50.312)
24.8 » 2.1-3 212.310 0.451* ***0.000072 0.029 -0.000040 **-37.255 **189.315 -33.451 neg. - kk-145.879 398.065 98 0. 76
(0.127) (0.000) (0.105) (0.000) (21.966)(101.740) (109.929) (84.574)
24.9 - 3.1-4 -130.398 1.083* ** *** -0.000072 -0.130 **0.000007 kkk-62.926 265.931* 92.480 -125.395 --235.856* 351.137 69 0.87(0.161) (0.000) (0.046) (0.000) (23.794)(114.903) (135.807) (159.945) (98.880)
24.10 - > 4 137.354 ***0.807 -0.000008 -0.053 0.000002 * **-63.092 163.943 -86.208 -63.289 --218.006* 386.003 76 0.89(0.117) (0.000) (0.054) (0.000) (21.178)(128.069) (133.224) (203.637) (95.353)
24.11 Pooled < 1 -24.019 0.373* 0.000130* -0.016 0.000001 ***-17.772 kk63.288 14.996 neg. 59.799 14.352 147.923 130 0.90(0.049) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (7.096) (29.604) (55.399) (45.392) (33.420)
24-12 - 1.1-2 75.260 0.441* * ** **0.000134 -0.051 • 0.000009 kkk-33.402 **87.970 16.014 48.707 18.200 **-11.978 259.113 210 0.80(0.095) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (9.844) (44.710) (56.282)(90.042) (53.923) (43.520)
24-13 - 2.1-3 143.160 ***0.483 0.000067* -0.044 -0.000010 kk-29.891 **140.913 -21.381 34.471 36.262 - **122.448 348.631 137 0.81(0.082) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) (17.515) (79.803) (84.199X128.184) (99.240) (67.642)
24.14 3.1-4 -26.005 0.914 kk kkk-0.000042 -0.105 0.000005* kk-34.986 **218.329 29.662 171.505 --179.375*- 235.697* 322.293 101 0.89(0.103) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (17.082) (94.860) (101.452)(146,553) (133.456) (70.757)
24.15 - > 4 90.623 0.777* -0.000003 -0.021 -0.000004 -55.951* 141.027* -109.245* 18.463 -40.969 -105.708* 308.499(0.063) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (13.284) (86.834) (84.581)(88.129)(129.738) (53.941)
Notes: S.E. Standard errors of the regression equations.
Figures within parentheses are standard errors of the regression coefficients. 
Neg. Negligible.
* Significant at the 10 per cent level.
** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
Significant at the 1 per cent level.
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(Table 5.22). The results tend to indicate that TNPX was competitive with 
the income derived from the double cropping of padi inside Kemubu.
For farms inside Kemubu the FAMSZA marginal propensities to sell 
were generally negative and significant, but outside Kemubu they were not 
significant. The probable reason for outside Kemubu was that there was 
little or none to sell and most was consumed, so family size did not 
significantly affect the amount sold. At higher NPP levels inside where 
marketed surplus was substantial, an additional family member was competitive 
with marketed surplus.
5.4 Total Farm Operational Area
In the analysis of marketable and marketed surpluses of padi 
according to total farm operational area size groups it is hoped to study 
the independent factors and their degree of influence in generating the 
surpluses. The ability to produce surplus rice is obviously affected by 
environmental and economic needs of the total farm.
5.4.1 Marketable Surplus
In equations 24.1 to 24.5 (Table 5.24) for farms outside Kemubu 
the coefficients of TPP were of positive signs and significant at least at 
the 5 per cent level except in the two small size groups which had negligible 
surplus (Shand, et al, 1982). The positive coefficients ranged from 0.32 to 
0.55. The coefficients of TPPSQ were significant and positive in four out 
of the five total farm operational area size groups. Thus, the TPPSQ tend 
to add to the effect of TPP in increasing marketable surplus with increases 
of TPP.
The regression coefficients of TNPI were significant in two of the 
three largest size groups. This pattern was different from those in net 
padi operational area where the TNPI coefficients were not significant 
(Table 5.24). Thus, the TNPI was a significant factor in affecting marketable
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surplus in the total farm environment outside Kemubu. This result indicated 
that there was a competitive allocation of labour resources on the farms 
between production of marketable surplus of padi and non padi employment. 
Other non padi activities included off farm and non padi farm. In the 
analysis here, it is not possible to determine the degree of influence of 
other non padi crops and income (in terms of crop diversification) and off 
farm activities separately.
The coefficients of FAMSZA were small and negative but not 
significant. The consumption of rice by farm family did not affect the 
marketable surplus because of low levels of padi production.
In tests of equality between coefficients obtained from different 
total farm operational area size groups (Table 5.25) < 1 acre size group 
differs from almost all size groups but not so for other size groups. This 
was due to the negligible marketable surplus in that size group.
TABLE 5.25
TEST OF EQUALITY BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS OBTAINED FROM
DIFFERENT TOTAL FARM OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
(CHOW TEST) FOR MARKETABLE SURPLUS OF PADI
Size Group 
(acres) 1.1-2 2.1-3 3.1-4 > 4
Outside Kemubu 
< 1 A k ns k
1.1-2 ns ns k
2.1-3 ns ns
3.1-4 ns
Inside Kemubu 
< 1 ns ns k ns
1.1-2 ns A ns
2.1-3 A ns
3.1-4 ns
Pooled Sample
< 1 k ns k l!
1.1-2 ns k k
2.1-3 A A
3.1-4 ns
Notes: ns Non-significant.
* Significant at the 5 per cent level.
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In Chow Tests of equality between coefficients obtained from 
inside and outside Kemubu, the significant difference was only for more 
than 4 acre size group. The difference was not similar to the difference 
in net padi operational area (Table 5.26).
TABLE 5.26
TEST OF EQUALITY BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS (CHOW TEST) OBTAINED 
FROM SAMPLES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE KEMUBU IRRIGATION 
PROJECT BY TOTAL FARM OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
Farm Operational 
Area Size Groups 
(acres)
Dependent Variables Using TPP or NPP F--Values
< 1 Marketable Surplus TPP Fll,109 = 3.642
1.1-2 Fll,190 = 1.336
2.1-3 F11,115 = 0.742
3.1-4 F11,79 = 1. 768
> 4 F11,123
2.025 ^
< 1 Marketed Surplus TPP Fll,109 = 4.729
1.1-2 Fll,191 = 1.968
2.1-3 F11,114 = 1.338
3.1-4 F11,81 = 1.851
> 4 F11,125 = 1.438
< 1 Marketed Surplus NPP Fll,109 =
***3.481
1.1-2 Fll,189 = 1.237
2.1-3 Fll,116 = 0.576
3.1-4 Fll,80 = 2.594*
> 4 F11,124 1.884
***
Notes: Significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Significant at the 1 per cent level.
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The TPP marginal propensities (Table 5.27) to sell were non­
significant for the two smallest size groups but were quite high for the 
rest (0.47 - 0.70). As other variables were non-significant generally, 
the increase in TPP by various technological means would significantly 
increase the marketable surplus of padi outside Kemubu.
TABLE 5.27
MARGINAL PROPENSITIES OF MARKETABLE SURPLUS WITH RESPECT 
TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY TOTAL FARM OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
(Based on Equations in Table 5.24)
Sample Farms Size Groups (acres)
Marginal Propensities w. r.t.
TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu < 1 ns ns ns
1.1-2 ns ns ns
2.1-3 0.473 -0.029 ns
3.1-4 0.474 ns ns
> 4 0.699 -0.015 -16.754
Inside Kemubu < 1 0. 730 -0.021 -27.865
1.1-2 0.817 -0.033 -45.667
2.1-3 0.705 ns -37.255
3.1-4 0.790 -0.106 -62.926
> 4 0.762 ns -63.092
Note: ns Non-significant at the 10 per cent level.
Inside Kemubu, (equations 24.6 to 24.10, Table 5.24) the coefficients 
of TPP were positive and high for all except for 2,1-3 acres size group.
The coefficients of TPPSQ were positive for small size area groups and 
negative for the larger ones. The increase of TPP would increase the 
marketable surplus at an increasing rate for smaller size farms but at a 
decreasing rate for the larger size farms.
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The coefficients of TNPI and TNPISQ were significant and negative 
and positive respectively in three of the five size groups (Table 5.24).
Compared to farms outside Kemubu, the TNPI affected the production of 
marketable surplus through the competitiveness of activities of double crop 
padi production and other non padi jobs.
The coefficients of the dummy variable for Kota Bharu District (Dl) 
were positive and significant for four of five size groups indicating that 
the location of Kota Bharu District was better than Bachok (D2) and 
Pasir Puteh.
The coefficients of dummy variable for owner-operator group were 
negative and significant mostly, and mixed owner tenant groups were found 
to be a better (positive) dummy variable in affecting the marketable surplus.
The TPP marginal propensities to sell were generally high across 
the total farm area size groups (0.705 to 0.817) while outside Kemubu the 
marginal propensities were lower (Table 5.27). The TNPI marginal 
propensities to sell were negative and significant in three of five size 
groups. There was no trend in the significance of the propensities, but 
they were mostly negative inside Kemubu than outside.
5.4.2 Marketed Surplus (Using TPP)
Outside Kemubu (equation 28.1 to 28.5, Table 5.28) the coefficients 
of TPP were significant in large total farm area size groups only. Little 
else was consistently significant except that the dummy variable for owner- 
operators was positive.
The Chow Tests for groups inside and outside Kemubu showed the 
< 1 and 1.1—2 acre size groups were significantly different. This pattern 
followed that of net padi operational area. The difference presumably due 
to the negligible marketed surplus from the two smallest area size groups 
outside Kemubu, whilst outside Kemubu these two groups did have marketed surplus.
TABLE 5.28
ESTIMATES OF MARKETED SURPLUS (USING TPP) REGRESSIONS FOR OUTSIDE AND INSIDE 
THE KEMUBU IRRIGATION PROJECT AND POOLED SAMPLES BY TOTAL FARM OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
Equation Sample Acreage Constant TPP TPPSQ TNPI TNPISQ FAMSZA
D1
(Kota
Bharu)
D2
(Bachok)
D3
(Pasir
Mas)
Tenant Owner-Operator S.E.
Sample
Size
(n)
R2
28-1 Outside < i -22.933 kk0.089 -0.000058 0.008 -0.000001 -3.660 19.666* neg. -3.835 23.934 19.370* 39.838 51 0.02
(0.049) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (2.865) (14.494) (19.213) (14.784)
28-2 " 1.1-2 13.556 -0.044 0.000088* 0.001 neg. -5.526* 25.017 22.892 15.684 -5.299 -3.604 55.04 57 0.15
(0.058) (0.000) (0.004) (3.951) (24.639) (27.260)(26.477) (22.124) (19.319)
28-3 | 2.1-3 -75.295 0.042 0.000100* 0.012 -0.000004 5.423 -7.191 24.983 18.183 27.613 35.526* 63.096 37 0.73
(0.085) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000) (8.002) (38.651) (35.793)(33.350) (35.528) (26.174)
28-A - 3.1-4 -55.014 **0.293 -0.000096 -0.050* 0.000003* -2.986 79.879 100.330* 75.591*-143.137 neg. 81.766 31 0.41
(0.157) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (9.832) (76.986) (60.215)(57.248) (86.580)
28.5 - > 4 -144.112 *** 0. 293 0.000063* 0.030 -0.000003 -12.447 -99.564 -35.068 30.386 17.647 58.403* 153.714 68 0.84
(0.080) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (13.934 (114.720) (83.876)(59.101)(134.596) (40.160)
28.6 Inside < i -273.165 0.311* ***0.000074 ***-0.064 **0.000007 kk-34.881 120.974* 44.232 197.991* ***306.845 182.265 79 0.79
(0.088) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (13.540) (52.040) (98.639) (79.720) (58.018)
28.7 - 1.1-2 -305.162 ***0.470 neg. ***-0.104 ***0.000020 -4.966 63.727 78.411 -121.812* 150.2*4* 287.144 153 0.51(0.044) (0.038) (0.000) (13.219) (54.252) (71.380) (70.843) (57.402)
28.8 - 2.1-3 -33.208 0.409* 0.000005 0.088 -0.000038* -51.449 kk158.073 -79.102 **-269.841 **180.451 351.433 98 0.52(0.113) (0.000) (0.093) (0.000) (19.748) (89.827) (97.536) (119.838) (83.047)
28-9 » 3.1-4 -98.057 0.570* -0.000023 -0.047 0.000002 ***-65.743 157.768 neg. _ **-334.753 108.801 358.814 69 0.68(0.149) (0.000) (0.046) (0.000) (24.303) (93.754) (162.774) (98.584)
28.10 1 > 4 -388.283 0.488* neg. neg. 0.000001 kk-59.509 360.760* 58.173 _ 251.192 422.291* 415.855 76 0. 74(0.036) (0.000) (22.231)(136.016) (141.625) (204.483)(101.230)
28.11 Pooled < 1 -85.579 0.124* ***0.000115 -0.030* 0.000003 kkk-22.480 ***103.449 62.065 19.776 37.906 160.292* 170.815 130 0. 73(0.058) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (8.251) (36.860) (65.856)(67.303) (52.645) (39.214)
28.12 - 1.1-2 -135.811 0.269* 0.000068* kk-0.055 0.000009* -6.352 61.041 35.527 44.732 -93.506* 99.762 259.273 210 0.54(0.095) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (9.849) (44.737) (56.317)(90.098) (53.957) (43.547)
28.13 » 2.1-3 -20.844 0.390* 0.000006 0.029 -0.000017 -38.279* 123.723* -50.333 80.543 ■-185.216* **118.987 313.564 137 0.62(0.074) (0.000) (0.068) (0.000) (15.753) (71.776) (75. 730)(115.290) (89.258) (60.838)
28-14 •• 3.1-4 -15.946 0.418* 0.000008 -0.050* 0.000002 kk-30.693 102.789 -30.245 87.346 - ***-370.250 14.665 330.699 101 0. 72(0.106) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (17.527) (97.334) (104.099)(150.375)(136.937) (72.603)
28.15 « > 4 -193.559 0.419 0.000008 -0.012 0.000001 -45.925 304.959* 26.835 151.886* 77.306 260.463* 333.192 144 0.83(0.068) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (14.347) (93.785 (91.351)(95.183)(140.122) (58.259)
Notes: S.E. Standard errors of the regression equations.
Figures within parentheses are standard errors of the regression coefficients. 
Neg. Negligible.
* Significant at the 10 per cent level.
** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
Significant at the 1 per cent level.
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Outside Kemubu, the smallest size groups differ from the largest 
significantly as shown by Chow Tests (Table 5.29). In terms of marketed 
surplus production the smaller farm size groups had very small surplus as 
compared to the larger farms.
TABLE 5.29
TEST OF EQUALITY BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS OBTAINED FROM 
DIFFERENT TOTAL FARM OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS 
(CHOW TEST), FOR MARKETED SURPLUS OF PADI (USING TPP)
Size Group 
(acres) 1.1-2 2.1-3 3.1-4 > 4
Outside Kemubu
< 1 ns k ns k11-2 ns k k
2.1-3 ns ns
3.1-4 ns
Inside Kemubu
< 1 ns * k ns
1.1-2 ns k *
2.1-3 ns ns
3.1-4 ns
Pooled Sample
< 1 ns * * *
1.1-2 ns ns k
2.1-3 ns ns
3.1-4 ns
Notes: ns Non-significant.
Significant at the 5 per cent level.
The TPP marginal propensities to sell were non-significant in
1.1-2 and 2.1-3 acre size groups (Table 5.30) and in the rest were significant 
but low coefficients (0.052 to 0.385). The TNPI and FAMSZA marginal 
propensities to sell were generally non-significant.
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TABLE 5.30
MARGINAL PROPENSITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS WITH RESPECT 
TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY TOTAL FARM OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
(Based on Equations in Table 5.28)
Sample Farms Size Groups (acres)
Marginal Propensities w.r.t.
TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu < 1 0.052 ns ns
1.1-2 ns ns -5.526
2.1-3 ns ns ns
3.1-4 0.181 0.036 ns
> 4 0.385 ns ns
Inside Kemubu < 1 0.445 -0.037 -34.881
1.1-2 0.470 -0.040 ns
2.1-3 0.427 ns -51.449
3.1-4 0.476 ns -65.743
> 4 0.488 ns -59.509
Note: ns Non-significant at the 10 per cent level.
Inside Kemubu, the regression coefficients of TPP were positive 
and significant in all area size groups at the 1 per cent level (equations
28.6 to 28.10, Table 5.28). The coefficients were around 0.4 - 0.5 and 
they mostly increased with a rise in total farm size groups. The
coefficients of TNPI were negative and significant for the two smallest 
size groups only. The coefficients of FAMSZA were negative and significant 
generally across the size groups. The dummy variable's coefficient of 
Kota Bharu District (Dl) was significant and positive indicating that Kota 
Bharu District was a better district in relation to other districts in 
production of marketed surplus. The coefficient of dummy variable for pure 
tenants was mostly negative and significant and that of owner-operator was 
positive and significant vis-a-vis mixed owner tenant group.
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In Chow Tests between coefficients obtained from different size 
groups inside Kemubu (Table 5.29) the < 1 and 1.1-2 acre size group 
differed significantly with the largest two groups. This indicated that 
there were two main size groups of small and large farm sizes. In another 
Chow Test for inside and outside the Kemubu Project for each size group 
it was found that the 2 smallest size groups differed significantly 
(Table 5.26). This was presumably due to the absence of marketed surplus 
outside Kemubu for the two size groups as compared to the ones inside which 
did have marketed surplus.
Generally, the marginal propensities to sell with respect to TPP 
inside Kemubu were all roughly the same and were much greater then those 
outside Kemubu (Table 5.30). The TNPI marginal propensities to sell were 
significant for the smallest two size groups. The marginal propensities 
to sell with respect to FAMSZA increased negatively in absolute value as 
total farm area rose.
5.4.3 Marketed Surplus (Using NPP)
Outside the Kemubu Project the regression equations for < 1 and
1.1-2 acre size groups are omitted as there was little or no marketed surplus
(Table 5.31). This can also be seen by the low values of adjusted
_2coefficients of determination (R ) at 0.05 and 0.14. In the other 
remaining equations the coefficients were mostly negative and non—significant. 
Generally, there were few significant variables in the equations.
The marginal propensities to sell with respect to NPP and TNPI 
were virtually all non-significant (Table 5.32).
Chow Tests between coefficients inside and outside the Kemubu 
Project for size groups of < 1 and 3.1—4 acre showed significant differences 
(Table 5.26). In other Chow Tests (Table 5.33) for sample farm groups
TABLE 5.31
ESTIMATES OF MARKETED SURPLUS (USING NPP) REGRESSIONS FOR OUTSIDE AND INSIDE 
THE KEMUBU IRRIGATION PROJECT AND POOLED SAMPLES BY TOTAL FARM OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
Equation Sample Acreage Constant NPP NPPSQ TNPI TNPISQ FAMSZA
D1
(Kota
Bharu)
D2
(Bachok)
D3
(Pasir
Mas)
Tenant Owner-Operator S.E.
Sample
Size
(n)
R2
** **31.1 Outside < i -30.648 0.227 -0.000266 71.282 -0.000001 -38.051 17.648 -13.052 -13.798 27.900 22.904 39.203 51 0.05
(0.098) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (2.871) (15.480) (25.344)(19.257) (19.237) (14.966)* *** *31.2 1.1-2 1.852 -0.163 0.000297 0.009 -0.000001 -5.993 48.082 49.655 A3.812 -3.096 -18.803 55.352 57 0.14
(0.113) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (4.018) (26.063) (29.752)(29.150) (22.A33) (19.487)
31.3 | 2.1-3 -52.440 -0.051 0.000329* neg. -0.000001 5.012 4.635 21.043 19.A21 39.25A 23.746 66.201 37 0.70
(0.134) (0.000) (0.000) (8.019) (40.144) (36.375)(33.626) (37.800) (26.982)*** **31.A 3.1-A -42.669 0.291 -0.000082 -0.043 0.000002 -4.914 95.836 110.189 69.352 -1A2.731 neg. 85.237 31 0.36
(0.257) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.169) (79.335) (62.870)(59.718) (91.520)***31.5 > 4 7.600 -0.049 0.000465 0.015 -0.000001 -11.377 --168.407 -87.099 -13.751 92.713 22.645 89.072 68 0.95
(0.088) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (7.952) (65.794) (48.663)04.168) (78.031) (23.185)** •kkk ** **31-6 Inside < 1 •-153.938 0.262 0.000227 -0.038 0.000004 -23.718 79.803 49.115 - 1A5.556 144.031 134.130 79 0.89(0.111) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (10.028) (38.523) (72.982) (58.252) (43.638)** ** **31-7 1.1-2 45.037 0.389 0.000136 -0.077 0.000013 -32.925 95.229 19.130 - -A5.775 -70.568 269.500 153 0.60(0.181) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (12.542) (51.115) (66.203) (67.017) (52.778)
31.8 " 2.1-3 68.968 0.458* 0.000053 0.024 -0.000024 -38.765* 157.180* -53.950 - -121.409 neg. 349.189 98 0.53(0.228) (0.000) (0.091) (0.000) (19.121) (87.727) (96.638) (105.999)***31.9 3.1-A -43.218 0.941 -0.000081 -0.099 0.000005 -66.537 220.872 38.829 - -190.699 --120.878 280.503 69 0.80(0.123) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (19.092) (90.060) (105.247) (128.936) (74.684)***31-10 > | 82.278 0.636 0.000004 -0.030 0.000001 -64.492 241.922 -35.761 - neg. -14.665 354.169 76 0.81(0.136) (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (19.108)(116.541) (121.325) (82.100)
31.11 Pooled < i -47.062 0.027 0.000316 -0.017 0.000001 -15.295 73.629 45.113 12.58A 47.023 89.842 121.630 130 0.87(0.063) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (5.896) (26.348) (46.778)(47.757) (37.350) (28.246)** *** ** **31.12 11 1.1-2 62.406 0.117 0.000213 -0.050 0.000008 -25.370 80.469 15.378 30.605 -31.969 -58.355 238.054 210 0.61(0.117) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (9.001) (41.046) (51.326)(81.222) (49.840) (39.491)
31.13 1 2.1-3 43.429 0.446 0.000061 -0.019 -0.000007 -31.054* 126.707* -35.042 55.522 -64.256 -11.341 303.020 137 0.64(0.140) (0.000) (0.066) (0.000) (15.044) (68.346) (73.366X111.688) (85.838) (58.957)* ** *** * ** •k31.1A 3.1-A -60.766 0.837 -0.000060 -0.079 0.000003 -35.876 194.601 13.940 :L47.116 - 241.732 -128.572 268.851 101 0.82(0.092) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (14.263) (78.638) (83. 996X116.5A3) (111.863) (57.615)***31.15 " > 4 34.258 0.639 0.000005 -0.013 -0.000004 -55.804 213.196 -50.852 36.523 -30.635 20.337 278.779 144 0.88(0.076) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (12.018) (78.265) (76.101)(77.220)(117.392) (47.958)
Notes: S.E. Standard errors of the regression equations.
Figures within parentheses are standard errors of the regression coefficients. 
Neg. Negligible.
* Significant at the 10 per cent level.
** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level.
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TABLE 5.32
MARGINAL PROPENSITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS WITH RESPECT
TO NPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY TOTAL FARM OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
(Based on Equations in Table 5.31)
P i -n Size Groups
SrlTDp I 0 rATTTlS r
Marginal Propensities w.r.t.
(acres) NPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu < 1 0.093 ns -38.051
1.1-2 0.057 ns -5.993
2.1-3 ns ns ns
3.1-4 ns -0.033 ns
> 4 ns ns -11.377
Inside Kemubu < 1 0.575 -0.023 -23.718
1.1-2 0.636 -0.035 -32.925
2.1-3 0.593 ns -38.765
3.1-4 0.715 -0.082 -66.537
> 4 0.652 ns -64.492
Note: ns Non-significant at the 10 per cent level.
TABLE 5.33
TEST OF EQUALITY BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS OBTAINED FROM DIFFERENT
TOTAL FARM OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS (CHOW TEST)
FOR MARKETED SURPLUS OF PADI (USING NPP)
Size Group 1.1-2 2.1-3 3.1-4 > 4(acres)
Outside Kemubu
< 1 ns * *
1.1-2 ns * *
2.1-3 ns ns
3.1-4 *
Inside Kemubu
< 1 ns ns * *
1.1-2 ns * ns
2.1-3 ns ns
3.1-4 ns
Pooled Sample
< 1 ns * * n
1.1-2 ns •k *
2.1-3 ns ns
3.1-4 *
Notes: ns Non-significant.
* Significant at the 5 per cent level.
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inside Kemubu it was observed that the smallest farm group (< 1 acre) was 
significantly different from the largest (> 4 acres).
Inside Kemubu, in regression equations 31.6 to 31.10 (Table 5.31), 
the coefficients of NPP were all positive and significant at least at the 
5 per cent level. The values of the coefficients increased as the farm 
size rose. Three coefficients of NPPSQ were also significant. For the 
< 1 and 1.1—2 acre size groups the coefficients were positive indicating 
that for the smaller size groups the rate of increase of marketed surplus 
rose with increases in NPP.
The coefficients of TNPI were significant in three of the five 
size groups and were negative as expected. Thus, in most farm size 
categories of farms the TNPI acted inversely to the supply of marketed 
surplus. As total farm operational area size groups increased a competition 
for labour resources was apparent as shown by increasing negative values of 
TNPI marginal propensities of marketed surplus (Table 5.32).
All the coefficients of FAMSZA inside Kemubu were negative and 
significant at least at the 5 per cent level. Farm families inside Kemubu 
were able to provide relative to farms outside Kemubu a higher consumption 
level for an additional increase in the family size.
The coefficients of dummy variable for Kota Bharu District (Dl) 
were significant and positive in all size groups. Kota Bharu District in 
relation to other districts has a higher productive characteristic that 
favours increased marketed surplus.
The coefficients of dummy variables for owner-operators and pure 
tenants were positive for < 1 acre size groups and negative for the larger 
area size groups. In relation to mixed owner tenant the pure tenant and 
owner—operator’s groups had lower productive characteristics for increasing 
marketed surplus.
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Chow Tests for equality of coefficients inside Kemubu showed the 
smallest size group were significantly different from the largest (Table 5.33). 
There were no significant differences between adjacent size groups.
The NPP marginal propensities to sell were high in all five area 
size groups ranging from 0.5 to 0.7. Farms inside Kemubu have higher 
responses to NPP compared to areas outside the project where the propensities 
were very low. The TNPI marginal propensities to sell were significant
and negative in three of the five equations. Thus, there was an increase 
in the number of variables that were significant inside the Kemubu then 
outside the project.
5.5 Location (District)
5.5.1 Marketable Surplus
Outside the Kemubu Project, the coefficients of TPP and TPPSQ were 
consistently significant and of low values (Table 5.34). The coefficients 
of TPP were positive for Kota Bharu and Bachok Districts but were negative 
for Pasir Mas and Pasir Puteh Districts. All coefficients of TPPSQ were 
significant which provided a countervailing effect in districts which have 
negative coefficients of TPP. Thus, the TPP marginal propensities to sell 
were positive in all the districts ranging from a low 0.242 in Pasir Puteh 
District to a high 0.658 in Bachok. Thus, farms in Bachok District had an 
exceptionally high response to marketable surplus of padi with increases in 
production, while in other districts the propensities to sell were low.
The coefficients of FAMSZA were non-significant though they were 
negative. Thus, at district level the addition of a family member did not 
significantly affect the level of marketable surplus in the single crop area.
The coefficients of dummy variables of pure tenants were generally 
positive and significant for the districts of Kota Bharu and Pasir Mas
TABLE 5.34
ESTIMATES OF MARKETABLE SURPLUS REGRESSIONS FOR OUTSIDE AND INSIDE 
THE KEMUBU IRRIGATION PROJECT AND POOLED SAMPLES BY LOCATION (DISTRICTS)
Equa tion Sample District Constant TPP
34.1 Outside Kota Bharu 40.706 0.203
(0.039)
34.2 Bachok -78.097 0.505
(0.117)
34.3 Pasir Mas -6.799 -0.112*
(0.086)
34.4 Pasir
Puteh
138.254 -0.188*
(0.132)
34.5 Inside Kota Bharu -22.543 0.901***
(0.046)
34.6 Bachok 297.139 0.462
(0.122)
34.7 Pasir
Puteh
70.755 0. 749 
(0.034)
34.8 Pooled Kota Bharu 49.255 0. 768 
(0.033)
34.9 Bachok 144.582 0.535
(0.081)
34.10 Pasir Mas -6.799 -0.112*
(0.086)
34.11 Pasir
Puteh
115.558 0.661
(0.056)
TPPSQ TOP I TOPISQ FAMSZA
***0.000170 -0.004 -0.000004 -4.348
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (4.768)
0.000100*** -0.020 0.000002* -15.537(0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (14.815)***0.000593 **0.020 -0.000002* -3.214
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (4.574)***0.000464 -0.021 0.000006 -4.748
(0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (11.978)***-0.000054 ***-0.044 0.000003* -54.113**
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (9.085)
0.000061*** -0.046 0.000004 -37.546**
(0.000) (0.051) (0.000) (18. 747)
neg. -0.070* 0.000003 -25.062
(0.045) (0.000) (21.700)
0.000002 **-0.046 **0.000002 -35.173**
(0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (7.062)***0.000050 -0.039* 0.000003 -35.203***
(0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (14.166)
0.000593*** **0.020 -0.000002 -3.214
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (4.574)
0.000013* **-0.038 neg. -20.719
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (16.662)
Tenant Operator S.E.
Sample
Size
(n)
R2
78.081*** **-55.675 95.839 92 0.97
(29.955) (23.910)
71.843 -22.910 138.870 50 0.89
(68.494) (45.648)**77.202 -5.390 7.918 84 0.80
(32.881) (16.613)
-23.156 **-107.714 117.598 42 0.81
(69.917) (47.126)
26.999 -82.359** 270.945 247 0.91
(59.173) (38.751)
-143.956* ***-268.673 353.053 109 0.84
(104.235) (79.428)
-128.038 -286.152 415.726 122 0.84(124.132) (92.555)
35.334 ***-80.430 261.580 341 0.92(46.595) (31.187)
-68.926 -177.554*** 305.384 159 0.85(75.441) (55.526)**77.202 -53.903 67.918 84 0.80(32.881) (16.613)**-165.270 ***-259.058 370.600 165 0.85(96.751) (70.044)
Notes: S.E. Standard errors of the regression equations.
Figures within parentheses are standard errors of the regression coefficients. 
Neg. Negligible.
* Significant at the 10 per cent level.
** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level.
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vis-a-vis mixed owner tenants. While the coefficients of owner-operators 
were generally negative in relation to mixed owner tenants.
The coefficients of TNPI were non-significant except in the 
district of Pasir Mas. The TNPI marginal propensities to sell were non- 
significant in Kota Bharu and Bachok and generally were small (Table 5.35).
TABLE 5.35
MARGINAL PROPENSITIES OF MARKETABLE SURPLUS WITH RESPECT 
TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY LOCATION (DISTRICTS)
(Based on Equations in Table 5.34)
Sample Farms Districts
Marginal Propensities w. r.t.
TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu Kota Bharu 0.392 ns ns
Bachok 0.658 ns ns
Pasir Mas 0.332 0.012 ns
Pasir Puteh 0.242 -0.006 ns
Inside Kemubu Kota Bharu 0.717 -0.034 -54.113
Bachok 0.652 ns -37.546
Pasir Puteh 0.749 -0.061 ns
Note: ns Non-significant at the 10 per cent level.
Chow Test of coefficients show all district samples were statistically 
significantly different from each other (Table 5.36).
Inside Kemubu, in regression equations 34.5 to 34.7, the 
coefficients of TPP were all significant and positive (Table 5.34). The 
coefficient values were also high except that of Bachok District. The 
coefficient of TPPSQ were significant in two of the three equations and the 
signs varied as expected. Example in Kota Bharu District equation, the 
coefficient of TPP was already high at 0.901, thus it was expected that the
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TABLE 5.36
TEST OF EQUALITY BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS OBTAINED FROM 
DIFFERENT DISTRICTS (CHOW TEST) FOR MARKETABLE
SURPLUS OF PADI
Outside Kemubu
Districts Bachok Pasir Mas Pasir Puteh
Kota Bharu k A *
Bachok A
Pasir Mas k
Inside Kemubu
Districts Bachok Pasir Puteh
Kota Bharu
Bachok ns
Pooled Sample
Districts Bachok Pasir Mas Pasir Puteh
Kota Bharu A k k
Bachok ns ns
Pasir Mas A
Notes: ns Non-significant.
* Significant at the 5 per cent level.
sign of TPPSQ would be negative. While in Bachok District it was expected
that the TPPSQ would be positive with a low coefficient of TPP of only 0.46, 
Thus in Kota Bharu District the results indicated that the productive
capacity of the farmers had reached or was reaching a maximum while in less 
productive districts the increase in TPP would lead to increasing marketable 
surplus. The marginal propensities to sell with respect to TPP were in the
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range of 0.652 and 0.749 (Table 5.35). Generally, the propensities were 
higher than those outside Kemubu, except in Bachok District where the 
marginal propensities to sell was as high outside Kemubu as inside.
More coefficients of TNPI were significant inside the Kemubu 
Project then outside. Also, the coefficients of FAMSZA were significant 
in two of the three equations. The coefficients of the dummy variables 
for owner-operators were negative and significant at least at the 5 per 
cnnt level in relation to mixed owner tenants. The coefficient of the 
dummy variable for pure tenants in Bachok was negative and significant at 
the 10 per cent level vis-a-vis mixed owner tenants.
Inside Kemubu, the TPP marginal propensities to sell were about 
0.7. Bachok District had the lowest propensities and was equal to Bachok 
District outside Kemubu (0.658). For Bachok District the Kemubu Project 
had changed very little the status of propensities to supply marketable 
surplus of padi. The TNPI propensities to sell were significant in two 
of the three districts but the highest value was in Kota Bharu District.
Chow Tests of equality of coefficients inside Kemubu showed that 
the Kota Bharu District was significantly different from the other two 
districts. Bachok and Pasir Puteh Districts were not significantly 
different from each other (Table 5.36).
5.5.2 Marketed Surplus (Using TPP)
Outside Kemubu, the regression coefficients of TPP were not 
significant across districts and they were negative, but significant at the 
10 per cent level and of low value for the districts of Kota Bharu and 
Pasir Mas (Table 5.37). The TPPSQ coefficients were all significant at 
least at the 5 per cent level and positive. The resulting marginal 
propensities to sell with respect to TPP were low and significant for Kota 
Bharu (0.086) and Pasir Mas (0.120) Districts (Table 5.38).
TABLE 5.37
ESTIMATES OF MARKETED SURPLUS (USING TPP) REGRESSIONS FOR OUTSIDE AND INSIDE 
THE KEMUBU IRRIGATION PROJECT AND POOLED SAMPLES BY LOCATION (DISTRICTS)
OumP Sample ?Equation Sample District Constant TPP TPPSQ TNPI TNPISQ FAMSZA Tenant r“ s.E. Size ROperator , v
37.1 Outside Kota Bharu 27.572 -0.045* ***0.000118 kk-0.016
(0.032) (0.000) (0.008)
37.2 " Bachok 39.10A neg. ***0.000184 0.002
(0.000) (0.019)
37.3 " Pasir Mas 39.899 **-0.188 ***0.000412 0.008
(0.088) (0.000) (0.11)
37.A " Pasir 37.216 -0.032 0.000082** -0.024
Puteh (0.061) (0.000) (0.020)
37.5 Inside Kota Bharu -161.818 0.576*** -0.000007 **-0.045
(0.532) (0.000) (0.019)
37.6 Bachok -65.385 0.325 0.000016 -0.011
(0.106) (0.000) (0.045)
37.7 " Pasir -178.854 0. 398 0.000005 -0.014
Puteh (0.072) (0.000) (0.038)
37.8 Pooled Kota Bharu -64.602 0.436*** 0.000015** ***-0.045
(0.037) (0.000) (0.015)
37.9 | Bachok -89.215 * **0.326 0.000018 0.004
(0.072) (0.000) (0.011)
37.10 " Pasir Mas 39.899 **-0.188 0.000412*** 0.008
(0.088) (0.000) (0.011)
37.11 " Pasir -108.642 0.351*** 0.000011* 0.004Puteh (0.047) (0.000) (0.028)
0.000001
(0.000)
-1.772
(3.985)
12.161
(25.038)
8.154
(19.985)
80.106 247 0.90
0.000003
(0.000)
-21.727*
(14.757)
neg. 15.893
(42.667)
140.204 50 0.78
-0.000001
(0.000)
-7.434*
(4.677)
-6.037
(33.622)
3.429
(16.987)
69.448 84 0.48
0.000005
(0.000)
A*
2.136
(5.572)
-52.652*
(32.523)
-39.052**
(21.523)
54.702 42 0.40
0.000004
(0.000)
-56.961***
(10.476)
-188.267***
(68.235)
279.251***
(44.685)
312.439 24 7 0. 77
0.000003
(0.000)
-21.635
(16.382)
-116.916*
(91.087)
87.261
(69.409)
308.519 109 0.63
-0.000002
(0.000)
-10.010
(18.555)
-23.338
(108.904)
106.316*
(79.325)
354.826 122 0.66
0.000004***
(0.000)
-32.782***
(7.964)
-115.512**
(52.549)
206.514***
(35.173)
295.008 341 0. 79
neg.
(0.000)
-20.922*
(12.529)
-74.724
(66.522)
74.924*
(48.879)
270.098 159 0.67
-0.000001
(0.000)
-7.434*
(4.677)
-6.037
(33.622)
3.429
(16.987)
69.448 84 0.48
-0.000003
(0.000)
-12.489
(13.986)
-72.113
(80.984)
64.349
(58.800)
310.206 165 0. 70
Notes: S.E. Standard errors of the regression equations.
Figures within parentheses are standard errors of the regression. 
Neg. Negligible.
* Significant at the 10 per cent level.
** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level.
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TABLE 5.38
MARGINAL PROPENSITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS TO 
TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY LOCATION (DISTRICTS) 
(Based on Equations in Table 5.37)
Sample Farms Districts
Marginal Propensities w.r.t.
TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu Kota Bharu 0.086 -0.011 ns
Bachok ns ns -21.727
Pasir Mas 0.120 ns -7.434
Pasir Puteh ns ns ns
Inside Kemubu Kota Bharu 0.552 -0.031 -56.961
Bachok 0.375 ns -21.635
Pasir Puteh 0.415 ns ns
Note: ns Non-significant at the 10 per cent level.
Other regression coefficients were consistently much less 
significant.
The TNPI marginal propensity to sell was only significant for the 
Kota Bharu District (-0.011). This indicates that only in Kota Bharu 
District which is a more commercialised district was marketed surplus 
production of padi affected by TNPI. The marginal propensity to sell with 
respect to FAMSZA was relatively high in Bachok District (-21.727) and this 
was of about the same value for Bachok District inside the Kemubu Project 
(Table 5.38).
Inside Kemubu, the regression coefficients of TPP were all 
significant at least at the 5 per cent level and of low values except for that 
of Kota Bharu (0.576) District (Table 5.37). The coefficients of TPPSQ 
were not significant. The TPP marginal propensities to sell were generally
TABLE 5.39
ESTIMATES OF MARKETED SURPLUS (USING NPP) REGRESSIONS FOR OUTSIDE AND INSIDE
THE KEMUBU IRRIGATION PROJECT AND POOLED SAMPLES BY LOCATION (DISTRICTS)
Equation Sample District Constant NPP NPPSQ TOP I TOPISQ FAMSZA Tenant Owner- S.E.
Sample
Size R2Operator (n)
39.1 *** ***Outside Kota Bharu 58.57A -0.315 0.000515 -30.328 neg. -4.503 18.410 neg. 54.416 92 0.96(0.036) (0.000) (0.002) (2.697) (15.664)
39.2 *** kkk kBachok 159.293 -0.385 0.000628 -0.019 0.000002 -18.894 neg. 14.172 106.608 50 0.87(0.156) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (11.241) (33.416)***39.3 Pasir Mas 20.241 -0.265 0.000679 0.015 -0.000002 -4.787 21.245 2.169 55.752 84 0.67(0.080) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (3.765) (27.356) (13.413)
39.A " Paslr 52.953 -0.052 0.000145 -0.030* 0.000006 4.637 -51.318* ***-62.871 62.011 42 0.23Puteh (0.113) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (6.294) (36.248) (23.976)*** **39.5 Inside Kota Bharu -98.964 0.911 -0.000040 -0.251 0.000001 -59.648 -17.998 7.335 233.830 247 0.87(0.051) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (7.836) (51.866) (32.473)
39.6 " Bachok 8.348 "kick0. 721 -0.000051 -0.072** 0.000009* kk-35.629 -139.428** kk-102.871 301.179 109 0.65(0.139) (0.000) (0.044) (0.000) (15.402) (89.494) (66.842)
39.7 " Pasir 76.545 0.524 0.000013 -0.049 0.000001 -17.702 -117.843 **-138.957 361.485 122 0.65Puteh (0.097) (0.000) (0.039) (0.000) (19.093) (110.575) (77.944)
Pooled -22.548 ***39.8 Kota Bharu 0. 719 -0.000002 -0.033 0.000002 -36.596 -13.163 10.235 232.304 341 0.87(0.038) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (6.276) (41.856) (27. 333)
39.9 - Bachok -42.728 0.691*** -0.000039 -0.033* 0.000002 kkk-32.153 - -72.274 -70.274 266.691 159 0.68(0.098) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (12.148) (66.403) (48.143)
20.241 ***39.10 Pasir Mas -0.265 0.000679 0.015 -0.000002 -4.787 21.245 2.169 55.752 84 0.67(0.080) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (3.765) (27.356) (13.413)
39.11 " Pasir 62.546 0.475 A 0.000024* -0.022 -0.000001 -14.939 -140.980* **-125.787 317.169 165 0.69Puteh (0.066) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (14.346) (82.849) (58.575)
Notes: S.E. Standard errors of the regression equations.
Figures within parentheses are standard errors of the regression coefficients. 
Neg. Negligible.
* Significant at the 10 per cent level.
** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
Significant at the 1 per cent level.***
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higher than districts outside Kemubu. They were highest in Kota Bharu 
District and followed by Pasir Puteh and Pasir Mas Districts.
The coefficients of TNPI and TNPISQ were only significant at 
the 5 per cent level for Kota Bharu District. The marginal propensity 
to sell with respect to TNPI in that district was -0.031 (Table 5.38).
Thus, unlike other districts, Kota Bharu District (inside and outside 
Kemubu) had TNPI affecting the supply of marketed surplus. Also, the 
FAMSZA marginal propensities to sell were significant in the districts 
of Kota Bharu and Bachok.
The regression coefficients of dummy variables for pure tenants 
in Kota Bharu and Bachok Districts were negative and significant at least 
at the 10 per cent level and in relation to mixed owner-operators. While 
in Kota Bharu and Pasir Puteh Districts the coefficients of dummy variables 
for owner-operators were positive and significant vis-a-vis mixed owner 
tenants.
5.5.3 Marketed Surplus (Using NPP)
Outside Kemubu, the coefficients of NPP and NPPSQ were all 
significant at the 1 per cent level except for the district of Pasir Puteh 
(Table 5.39). All the NPP coefficients were negative and that of NPPSQ 
were positive which results in positive marginal propensities to sell with 
respect to NPP (Table 5.40). The results indicated that with a quadratic 
model the propensities were shown to be positive which, as mentioned above, 
would be negative (the coefficients of NPP) if a linear model was used.
The coefficients of TNPI were significant in the three districts 
of Bachok, Pasir Mas and Pasir Puteh. The TNPISQ coefficients were only 
significant in the districts of Bachok and Kota Bharu. The resulting TNPI 
marginal propensities to sell were negative and low for the districts of
Bachok and Pasir Mas.
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TABLE 5.40
MARGINAL PROPENSITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS TO 
NPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY LOCATION (DISTRICTS) 
(Based on Equations in Table 5.39)
Sample Farms Districts
Marginal Propensities w.r.t.
NPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu Kota Bharu 0.073 ns -4.503
Bachok 0.326 -0.010 -18.894
Pasir Mas 0.171 -0.007 ns
Pasir Puteh ns ns ns
Inside Kemubu Kota Bharu 0.814 -0.248 -59.648
Bachok 0.609 -0.028 -35.629
Pasir Puteh 0.555 ns ns
Note: ns Non-significant at the 10 per cent level.
The marginal propensities to sell with respect to FAMSZA were 
negative and significant only for Kota Bharu and Bachok Districts.
The coefficients of dummy variables for pure tenants and owner- 
operators in Pasir Puteh were negative and significant in relation to mixed 
owner tenants. Thus, in Pasir Puteh District the mixed owner tenants 
performed better in production of marketed surplus of padi.
Inside Kemubu, all district regression coefficients of NPP were 
significant at the 1 per cent level but those of NPPSQ were significant 
only in Kota Bharu District (Table 5.39). The NPP marginal propensities 
to sell were generally high compared to districts outside Kemubu especially 
in Kota Bharu District (0.814) as shown in Table 5.40.
The coefficients of TNPI were negative and significant in two 
districts of Kota Bharu and Bachok, and the TNPI marginal propensities to 
sell were high compared to districts outside Kemubu.
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In Bachok and Pasir Puteh the coefficients of dummy variables for 
pure tenants and owner-operators were negative and significant indicating 
that mixed owner tenants were better in increasing production of marketed 
surplus.
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CHAPTER 6
ELASTICITIES OF MARKETABLE AND 
MARKETED SURPLUSES
The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss the short run 
elasticities of marketable and marketed surpluses with respect to TPP, NPP, 
TNPI and FAMSZA, for areas inside and outside the Kemubu Project. These 
elasticities are estimated and discussed according to aggregate levels, 
tenancy groups, net padi operational area size groups, total farm 
operational area size groups and location (districts). Also, in the last 
section of this chapter a comparison of the elasticities obtained with other 
similar studies will be made.
6.1 Aggregate Level
The short run elasticities of marketable and marketed surpluses 
with respect to TPP, NPP, TNPI and FAMSZA were calculated at the means 
(Table 6.1). Generally, the elasticities with respect to output (TPP and 
NPP) were greater than unity which implies that an increase in production 
is accompanied by a more than proportionate increase in marketable and 
marketed surpluses. The elasticities of output were slightly larger for 
inside than outside the Kemubu Irrigation Project, using TPP as the output 
variable, but were considerably larger with NPP and the marketed surplus 
as the dependent variable (1.48 as against 0.92). Thus, while the 
irrigation project raises short run supply response elasticities by all 
measures, it does so to the greatest extent for marketed surplus from 
production, i.e. net of other disposal commitments on the farm.
The negative elasticity estimates for TNPI of marketable and 
marketed surpluses were low, in a range of from -0.055 down to -0.161.
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TABLE 6.1
ESTIMATES OF MARKETABLE AND MARKETED SURPLUSES 
WITH RESPECT TO TPP (NPP), TNPI AND FAMSZA 
AT AGGREGATE LEVELS
Sample Dependent
Elasticities With Respect to
Variable TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu MX 1.259 -0.055 -0.143
Inside Kemubu 1.275 -0.071 -0.191
Pooled Sample 1.313 -0.085 -0.196
Outside Kemubu MS 1.351 -0.161 -0.444
Inside Kemubu 1.457 -0.084 -0.281
Pooled Sample 1.465 -0.086 -0.290
NPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu MS 0.915 -0.116 -0.494
Inside Kemubu 1.476 -0.103 -0.336
Pooled Sample 1.546 -0.125 -0.356
Those for family size were also negative but were lower in the range of from 
-0.143 down to -0.494. There were no striking differences between inside 
and outside estimates for marketable surplus (MX), probably because of the 
influence of the fixed commitments of rent, wages and zakat included in the 
dependent variable. However, the two estimates for marketed surpluses 
showed substantially higher elasticities outside Kemubu, undoubtedly 
reflecting the greater demand from domestic consumption as a disposal 
category in the single crop area.
6.2 Tenancy
Outside Kemubu, the elasticities of marketable surplus with respect 
to NPP (Table 6.2) were all greater than one without major variation amongst 
tenure groups (range 1.02 to 1.40). There was much more variation with 
elasticities of marketed surplus with respect to TPP (Table 6.3) where the
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TABLE 6.2
ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITIES OF MARKETABLE SURPLUS
WITH RESPECT TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY TENANCY GROUPS
Sample Tenancy
Elasticities With Respect to
Status TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu Pure Tenants 1.059 -0.101 -0.150
Owner-Operators 
Mixed Owner
1.024 -0.177 -0.308
Tenants 1.404 -0.007 -0.027
Inside Kemubu Pure Tenants 1.179 -0.103 -0.161
Owner-Operators 
Mixed Owner
1.342 -0.106 -0.252
Tenants 1.264 ns -0.154
Pooled Sample Pure Tenants 1.206 -0.066 -0.151
Owner-Operators 
Mixed Owner
1.327 -0.123 -0.259
Tenants 1.272 -0.054 -0.153
TABLE 6.3
ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS
WITH RESPECT TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY TENANCY GROUPS
Sample Tenancy
Elasticities With Respect to
Status TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu Pure Tenants 1.549 +0.662 -1.041
Owner-Operators 
Mixed Owner
0.640 +0.058 -0.337
Tenants 1.588 -0.148 -0.610
Inside Kemubu Pure Tenants 1.298 -0.104 ns
Owner-Operators 
Mixed Owner
1.427 -0.132 -0.324
Tenants 1.491 -0.009 -0.383
Pooled Sample Pure Tenants 1.295 -0.090 ns
Owner-Operators 
Mixed Owner
1.423 -0.142 -0.328
Tenants 1.479 ns -0.357
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range was from 0.64 to 1.59, and even more with marketed surplus with respect 
to NPP (Table 6.4) for which the range was from 0.50 to 1.81.
TABLE 6.4
ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS 
WITH RESPECT TO NPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY TENANCY GROUPS
Sample Ten an ry —
Elasticities With Respect to
Status NPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu Pure Tenants 1.808 +1.432 -1.198
Owner-Operators 
Mixed Owner
0.498 +0.039 -0.637
Tenants 1.357 -5.958 -0.345
Inside Kemubu Pure Tenants 1.285 , i1.469 <a) -0.230 -0.262Owner-Operators 
Mixed Owner
-0.119 -0.373
Tenants 1.541 -0.057 -0.360
Pooled Sample Pure Tenants 1.384 -0.182 -0.249
Owner-Operators 
Mixed Owner
1.464 -0.141 -0.388
Tenants 1.592 ns -0.338
The effect of the project on elasticities was quite variable 
(i.e. comparing outside with inside Kemubu). The most important impact was 
in a narrowing in the range of elasticities with respect to TPP for all 
measures of surplus. For marketable surplus, the range of elasticities was 
reduced from 1.40 - 1,02 to 1.34 1.18 (Table 6.2). For marketed surplus
it was reduced from 1.59 0.64 to 1.49 „ 1.30, for TPP, and from 1.81 -
0.50 to 1.54 - 1.29 for NPP. Thus an important effect of the project was
to introduce a more marked similarity in short run output responses amongst 
tenancy groups. It greatly increased the elasticities of marketed supply
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responses (NPP) of owner-operators, while those of the other groups rose 
or fell more modestly. The output elasticities of marketed surplus (TPP 
and NPP) were somewhat higher than those of marketable surplus in all 
categories of tenancy groups inside the Kemubu Project whereas this was 
not true for all categories outside Kemubu (e.g. owner—operators)
The signs for the elasticities of marketable and marketed surpluses 
of padi with respect to TNPI were negative for all tenancy groups inside 
Kemubu, but outside the project, they were positive for the pure tenant 
and owner-operator tenancy groups. This latter result for these two 
groups in the single crop area was probably linked with the negligible 
quantities of surplus padi actually sold by these groups. With the 
increased output and surplus provided by the second padi crop inside Kemubu, 
the signs of the coefficients behaved as expected (negative).
The family size elasticities for marketable surpluses were negative 
and uniformly lower than those for marketed surpluses both inside and outside 
Kemubu, presumably because of the inclusion of fixed disposal commitments in 
the former. The family size elasticities for marketed surplus of the pure 
tenant group outside Kemubu were greater than unity, but these estimates can 
be ignored since the actual marketed surplus, for this group was negligible. 
The elasticity of the marketable surpluses for this group outside the 
project (-0.150) was influenced by disposal categories other than sales, 
especially rent payments.
6.3 Size Groups of Net Padi Operational Area
In the single padi crop area, outside Kemubu, padi sales were 
negligible on farms with 2.acres of padi or less, so elasticities of 
marketable surpluses with regard to output in the two smallest categories 
comprised rent or rent and zakat only (Table 6.5). Since marketed surpluses 
were close to zero for most farmers, elasticities for these (TPP and NPP)
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TABLE 6.5
ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITIES OF MARKETABLE SURPLUS 
WITH RESPECT TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY NET 
PADI OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
Sample
Padi Operational 
A;rP<fl
Elasticities With Respect to
(acres) TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu < 1 a 0.612 +0.135 -0.189
1.1-2 a 1.295 +0.025 -0.178
2.1-3 1.273 +0.064 -0.150
3.1-4 1.111 -0.129 -0.158
> 4 1.504 +0.087 ns
Inside Kemubu < 1 1.466 -0.113 -0.355
1.1-2 1.527 -0.057 -0.241
2.1-3 1.232 -0.100 -0.133
3.1-4 1.146 -0.166 -0.142
> 4 1.162 -0.017 -0.159
Pooled Sample < 1 1.280 -0.092 -0.336
1.1-2 1.425 -0.044 -0.252
2.1-3 1.223 -0.101 -0.146
3.1-4 1.227 -0.195 -0.189
> 4 1.121 -0.005 -0.192
Note: a Negligible sales in these two groups and most of the production 
were used as rent payment.
ns Non-significant at the 10 per cent level.
groups can be disregarded. For size groups larger than 2 acres, the 
elasticities were positive and highly variable (Tables 6.6 and 6.7). 
Elasticities of marketable surpluses were all greater than unity. For 
marketed surplus, elasticities were greater than unity for the 2.1-3 and 
more than 4 acre groups but less than unity for the 3.1-4 acre group.
Inside the Kemubu Project, elasticities could be estimated for 
all size groups since all groups made sales. Somewhat unexpectedly, the 
elasticities of marketable and marketed (TPP and NPP) surpluses with regard 
to output for the smaller size groups were considerably greater than those
15 6
TABLE 6.6
ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS 
WITH RESPECT TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY NET 
PADI OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
Sample
Padi Operational 
Area
Elasticities With Respect to
(acres) TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu < 1 a 5.321 +1.093 -1.810
1.1-2 a 1.171 -0.172 -1.165
2.1-3 1.285 +0.302 -0.110
3.1-4 0.307 -0.655 -0.173
> 4 1.331 +0.130 -0.831
Inside Kemubu < 1 1.710 -0.360 -0.127
1.1-2 1.784 -0.147 -0.1391
2.1-3 1.328 -0.076 -0.374
3.1-4 1.244 -0.104 -0.311
> 4 1.369 +0.048 -0.119
Pooled Sample < 1 1.361 -0.296 -0.566
1.1-2 1.648 -0.077 -0.143
2.1-3 1.438 -0.024 -0.425
3.1-4 1.358 -0.158 -0.298
> 4 1.188 +0.008 -0.195
Note: a Negligible sales in these groups.
for the larger size groups, and indeed the two largest size groups 
consistently showed the lowest elasticities. This suggests that the 
smaller padi farms might have used more intensive production methods and 
obtained higher yields and indeed this was the case inside Kemubu (see 
Shand, et al, 1982, p.203). This finding is contrary to those of Lim (1973) 
but agrees with most studies carried out in developing countries.
Elasticities of marketable and marketed surpluses with regard to 
total non padi income by net operational padi area for size groups larger 
than 2 acres outside the Kemubu Project were positive in sign (small) in
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TABLE 6.7
ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS 
WITH RESPECT TO NPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY NET 
PADI OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
Sample
Pad! Operational
Area —
Elasticities With Respect to
(acres) NPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu < 1 a 2.848 ns -1.769
1.1-2 a 1.361 ns -1.133
2.1-3 2.703 ns -0.163
3.1-4 0.986 -0.507 -0.505
> 4 1.622 +0.206 -0.339
Inside Kemubu < 1 1.816 -0.267 -0.614
1.1-2 1.676 -0.117 -0.388
2.1-3 1.378 -0.100 -0.293
3.1-4 1.295 -0.215 -0.325
> 4 1.183 -0.004 -0.231
Pooled Sample < 1 1.426 -0.224 -0.614
1.1-2 1.612 -0.088 -0.423
2.1-3 1.415 -0.105 -0.329
3.1-4 1.432 -0.266 -0.383
> 4 1.110 -0.013 -0.328
Note: a Negligible sales in these groups.
ns Non-significant at the 10 per cent level.
the 2.1-3 and more than 4 acre groups in a range from -0.129 to 0.064. In 
the estimated equations, however, this variable was not significant in these 
size group and can be disregarded. In the only significant group, the 
elasticity was negative, as could be expected. Inside Kemubu, this variable 
was significant for virtually all size groups except over 4 acres, both for 
marketable and marketed surpluses. In the largest group, elasticities were 
positive, small, non-significant, and could be ignored. In all size groups 
in which the estimating equations were significant, the sign of the 
elasticities was negative and generally quite small, though notably, the
i r.o 1 Ju
elasticities were typically high or highest for the smallest size group 
(< 1 acre) for both surplus types. Clearly, one impact of the project
was to establish a clear inverse relation between marketable and marketed 
surpluses and non padi income for all size groups except the largest.
As Shand, et al showed, (1982, p.361), there was a strong inverse 
association between padi operational area and off farm income, which would 
thus appear to be linked to this inverse relation with marketable and marketed 
surpluses. Negative elasticities were consistently recorded for marketable 
and marketed surpluses with regard to family size both inside and outside 
Kemubu. There was also some tendency for higher elasticities in the 
smallest size groups which would be consistent with the relatively lower 
production levels and thus higher demands of domestic consumption in these 
smaller size groups.
6.4 Size Groups of Total Farm Operational Area
Elasticities of marketable and marketed surpluses outside Kemubu 
in the two smallest size groups of total operational area can be disregarded 
as quantities marketed were negligible as they were for padi operational 
size groups (Tables 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10). For size groups above 2 acres, 
outside Kemubu, elasticities of both surpluses were all positive and variable 
but greater than unity, and occasionally very high (over 2). Inside the 
project, the two smallest size groups (0-2 acres) again showed highest 
marketable surplus elasticities and were higher for marketed than for 
marketable surplus, at well over unity. Elasticities in higher size groups 
were lower, and also lower than their corresponding values outside the project.
There were four instances where non padi income had a significant 
influence on marketable or marketed surpluses in the estimated functions 
outside Kemubu. However, in almost every case where it did, the elasticity
TABLE 6.8
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ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITIES OF MARKETABLE SURPLUS 
WITH RESPECT TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY TOTAL 
FARM OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
Sample
Total Farm 
Operational Area —
Elasticities With Respect to
(acres) TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu < 1 0.564 +0.039 -0.339
1.1-2 1.062 +0.205 -0.171
2.1-3 1.456 -1.833 +0.142
3.1-4 1.595 -0.313 -0.192
> 4 1.519 +0.095 -0.222
Inside Kemubu < 1 1.498 -0.090 -0.249
1.1-2 1.428 -0.071 -0.242
2.1-3 1.186 -0.058 -0.156
3.1-4 1.121 -0.138 -0.227
> 4 1.132 -0.035 -0.165
Pooled Sample < 1 1.255 -0.079 -0.245
1.1-2 1.365 -0.064 -0.237
2.1-3 1.175 -0.030 -0.162
3.1-4 1.391 -0.171 -0.168
> 4 1.211 ns -0.227
was in fact negative. In many of the non-significant cases, the sign of 
the elasticities was positive. Elasticities among size groups inside 
Kemubu with respect to non padi income were all negative where the variable 
was significant in the estimating equations. Values of coefficients were 
generally low.
The family size elasticities of marketable and marketed surpluses 
for total farm operational area size groups were small and all negative 
where the variable was significant both inside and outside Kemubu (Tables 
6.8, 6.9 and 6.10). They were all well below unity except in the two
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TABLE 6.9
ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS 
WITH RESPECT TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY TOTAL 
OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
Sample
Total Farm 
Operational Arpa
Elasticities With Respect to
(acres) TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu < 1 1.916 +0.777 -1.826
1.1-2 1.168 -0.119 -1.404
2.1-3 1.602 +0.064 -0.593
3.1-4 2.017 -1.659 -0.248
> 4 1.898 +0.252 -0.375
Inside Kemubu < 1 1.754 -0.305 -0.017
1.1-2 1.795 -0.184 -0.054
2.1-3 1.269 +0.012 -0.380
3.1-4 1.455 -0.099 -0.446
> 4 1.235 ns -0.265
Pooled Sample < 1 1.323 -0.263 -0.643
1.1-2 1.673 -0.146 -0.097
2.1-3 1.288 -0.023 -0.371
3.1-4 1.443 -0.157 -0.286
> 4 1.249 -0.019 -0.329
smallest size groups outside Kemubu. But these two groups could be ignored 
as their marketable or marketed surpluses were zero or negligible.
6.5 Location (Districts)
The output elasticities outside Kemubu varied considerably 
(Tables 6.11, 6.12 and 6.13). For marketable surpluses, the range was 0.83 
to 1.62. For marketed surpluses (TPP) it was 0.89 to 1.54 (Tables 6.11,
6.12 and 6.13), while for marketed surpluses (NPP) it was greater, from
0.52 to 1.89. In all of these, Bachok and Pasir Mas had the highest elasticities
and Kota Bharu and Pasir Puteh the lowest levels. Inside Kemubu, there was
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TABLE 6.10
ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS 
WITH RESPECT TO NPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY TOTAL 
FARM OPERATIONAL AREA SIZE GROUPS
Sample
To tal Farm
Onpra fi nnp1 A-r^a
Elasticities With Respect to
(acres) NPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu < 1 2.705 +0.689 -1.899CN1rHrH 3.326 +0.721 -1.523
2.1-3 1.592 ns -0.548
3.1-4 1.865 -1.473 -0.408
> 4 1.599 +0.210 -0.343
Inside Kemubu < 1 1.722 -0.197 -0.407
1.1-2 1.601 -0.152 -0.359
2.1-3 1.274 -0.049 -0.286
3.1-4 1.319 -0.207 -0.464
> 4 1.169 -0.033 -0.287
Pooled Sample < 1 1.270 -0.157 -0.437
1.1-2 1.555 -0.141 -0.387
2.1-3 1.307 +0.009 -0.295
3.1-4 1.416 -0.256 -0.334
> 4 1.285 -0.043 -0.399
little change in the values for Bachok but the elasticities for Kota Bharu 
and Pasir Puteh were much increased. The overall effect was to raise 
elasticity values and to narrow the interdistrict range for values both of 
marketable and marketed surplus elasticities.
Total non padi income elasticities of marketable and marketed 
surpluses for various districts inside and outside the Kemubu Project were 
almost all low inside the project and ranged from -0.009 to -0.140 (Tables 
6.11, 6.12 and 6.13). Outside Kemubu, they were more strongly negative 
ranging from-0.016 down to -1.023. Interestingly the elasticities by
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TABLE 6.11
ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITIES OF MARKETABLE SURPLUS 
WITH RESPECT TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA 
BY LOCATION (DISTRICTS)
Sample District
Elasticities With Respect to
TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu Kota Bharu 0.967 -0.019 -0.099
Bachok 1.624 -0.086 -0.182
Pasir Mas 1.550 -0.279 -0.171
Pasir Puteh 0.825 -0.067 -0.138
Inside Kemubu Kota Bharu 1.293 -0.055 -0.218
Bachok 1.173 -0.050 -0.184
Pasir Puteh 1.304 -0.092 -0.103
Pooled Sample Kota Bharu 1.248 -0.080 -0.187
Bachok 1.261 -0.065 -0.207
Pasir Mas 1.550 -0.279 -0.171
Pasir Puteh 1.264 -0.070 -0.108
TABLE 6.12
ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS
WITH RESPECT TO TPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA
BY LOCATION (DISTRICTS)
Sample District
Elasticities With Respect. to
TPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu Kota Bharu 0.891 -0.508 -0.169
Bachok 1.675 -0.016 -0.600
Pasir Mas 1.540 -0.277 -1.088
Pasir Puteh 1.055 -0.746 +0.444
Inside Kemubu Kota Bharu 1.537 -0.079 -0.402
Bachok 1.373 -0.009 -0.216
Pasir Puteh 1.394 -0.026 -0.079
Pooled Sample Kota Bharu 1.401 -0.122 -0.317
Bachok 1.467 -0.015 -0.254
Pasir Mas 1.540 -0.277 -1.088
Pasir Puteh 1.386 +0.018 -0.130
163
TABLE 6.13
ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITIES OF MARKETED SURPLUS 
WITH RESPECT TO NPP, TNPI AND FAMSZA BY LOCATION (DISTRICTS)
Sample District
Elasticities With Respect to
NPP TNPI FAMSZA
Outside Kemubu Kota Bharu 0.518 -0.138 ^ -0.429
Bachok 1.404 -0.213 -0.522
Pasir Mas 1.891 -0.563 -0.700
Pasir Puteh 0.885 -1.023 +0.965
Inside Kemubu Kota Bharu 1.578 -0.056 -0.421
Bachok 1.565 -0.140 -0.333
Pasir Puteh 1.333 -0.135 -0.140
Pooled Sample Kota Bharu 1.487 -0.103 -0.354
Bachok 1.721 -0.118 -0.391
Pasir Mas 1.891 -0.563 -0.700
Pasir Puteh 1.354 -0.066 -0.156
district inside Kemubu, showed negative coefficients more strongly for 
Kota Bharu followed by Bachok and Pasir Puteh.
Family size elasticities of marketable and marketed surpluses 
were negative for all districts except the Pasir Puteh district outside 
Kemubu, but in the estimated regression equations the family size variable 
was not significant in this case.
6.6 Comparison of Elasticities With Other Studies
The short run output, family size and income elasticities of 
marketable and marketed surpluses for the Kemubu Project obtained in the 
present study are compared to the corresponding elasticities of marketable 
and marketed surplus responses obtained from other studies in Table 6.14.
This table shows that, the output (which is usually TPP) elasticities
are positive and greater than unity in studies by other authors, as in this
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TABLE 6.14
COMPARISON OF OUTPUT, FAMILY SIZE AND INCOME 
ELASTICITIES OF MARKETABLE AND MARKETED SURPLUS 
RESPONSES AMONG DIFFERENT STUDIES
Short Run ElasticitiesNo. Crops Country Authors of Supply With Respect to
Output Family Size Income
1 Rice Malaysia Abdul Fatah
Marketable Surplus (1982)
(TPP)
Non-irrigated 1.259 -0.143 -0.055
Irrigated 1.275 -0.191 -0.071
Pooled Sample 1.313 -0.196 -0.085
Marketed Surplus
(TPP)
Non-irrigated 1.351 -0.444 -0.161
Irrigated 1.457 -0.281 -0.084
Pooled Sample 1.465 -0.290 -0.086
Marketed Surplus
(NPP)
Non-irrigated 0.915 -0.494 -0.116
Irrigated 1.476 -0.336 -0.103
Pooled Sample 1.546 -0.356 -0.125
2 Rice India Mandal and 1.53 to
Ghosh(1968) 2.52
3 Rice Malaysia Lim (1973) 0.14 to 
1.17 - -
4 Rice Philippines Toquero,et 
al (1975)
1.4 - -
5 Rice and India Krishna(1965) 1.04 to
Wheat 2.55
6 Padi India Bhargava and 1.19 to
Rustogi(1972) 2.18
7 Wheat Pakistan Qureshi(1974) > 1 - -
8 Millet India Sharma and 
Gupta (1970)
1.74 -0.65
9 Sorghum
Grains
Sudan Medani(1975) — 0.23
10 Food Pakistan Raquibuzzaman 1.9 -2.9 -
Grains (1966)
11 Food
Grains
India Bardhan(1970) 1.7
12 Food
Grains
India Haessel(1975) > 1 "
13 Food Pakistan Khan and 1.60 - -
Crops Chowdhury(1962)
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study. This present study provides the bigger dimension of marketable and 
marketed surplus elasticities both for single and double cropped areas and 
for pooled data (single plus double cropped areas). One striking result 
was that, in this study, the elasticity in the single cropped areas for 
marketed surplus (NPP) was low (0.915). This was probably due to the rent, 
wages and zakat which were taken out of TPP leaving NPP as one of the 
explanatory variables of marketed surplus production.
The income elasticities are relatively small as compared with those 
obtained by Medani in Sudan in 1975 (0.23) and are opposite in sign.
Medani's income variable was expected normal income of a farm family.
Also the family size elasticities obtained in this study are 
small in absolute values in comparison to other findings by Sharma and Gupta 
in India in 1970 (-0.65) and Raquibuzzaman in Pakistan in 1966 (-2.9).
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
One of the major objectives of Malaysian government policy is to 
achieve self-sufficiency in padi and rice. The most important policy 
instruments to achieve this in the post independence period has been 
investment in irrigation facilities to enable intensification of padi 
production in selected areas of the country.
7.1 Objectives of the Study
This study examined the extent to which intensification of padi 
production in Kemubu the second largest of the irrigation areas in Malaysia, 
in Kelantan in northeast Malaysia contributed to the marketed surplus of 
rice.
The study concentrated on two dependent variables, i.e. the 
marketable and marketed surpluses of padi. The main aim was to identify 
the determinants of these surpluses and to measure the responses that 
determined the supply of padi from padi producers in the area. It is 
hoped that this study contributes to a better understanding of the overall 
economic implications of current rice policies in Malaysia.
The desired measurements were attempted primarily by means of a 
comparative analysis at field level of a control group of single padi crop 
farmers outside the project boundaries, who had not benefited from the 
project, with a sample group from those within the project area who had 
benefited. It is thus a with and without (project) analysis. Also, 
since a baseline socio-economic survey was conducted prior to the project 
in 1968, a before and after comparison was possible. These comparisons
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enabled project effects to be determined separately from other changes over 
the period.
7.2 Research Procedures
The economic model developed was a quadratic function which 
incorporated the determinant variables of output (TPP and NPP), total non 
padi income (TNPI), family size in male adult units (FAMSZA), tenancy, 
location (district) and irrigation. The model was also used to test the 
explanatory power of these variables in relation to marketable and marketed 
surpluses of padi for whole samples of farmers, and for sub-groupings of 
sample farmers, according to tenure categories, padi operational area size 
groups, total farm operational area size groups and districts. This was 
made possible by the availability of an exceptionally large data set from 
a sample survey undertaken to measure the impact of the Kemubu Irrigation 
Project. This was carried out by a team of researchers from the Universiti 
Pertanian Malaysia for the World Bank and the Government of Malaysia.
The main research procedure used in analyzing the marketable 
and marketed surpluses of padi in Kemubu was to: (1) develop the economic 
and statistical models; (2) identify relationships; (3) organise the 
necessary data; (4) perform statistical analysis; and (5) interpret the 
results. In the selection of variables, price was found to be constant 
and so was omitted. The yield variable was found to be insignificant and 
was strongly correlated with output, and was also omitted. The output 
variables used were total padi production (TPP) and net padi production 
(NPP), the latter was total padi production minus rent, wages, 
religious contributions and storage. A number of income variables were 
tried and it was found that padi disposal decisions were best explained by 1
1 Price of padi was fixed by government under the Guaranteed Minimum 
Price (GMP) Scheme.
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total non padi income (TNPI) . This comprised total off farm income and 
total non padi farm income. Two versions of surpluses were used in the 
analysis. One was marketed surplus which comprised padi output actually 
sold in the market. The other was marketable surplus which comprised 
marketed surplus plus output transferred or paid in kind as rent, religious 
contributions (mainly zakat), tax etc. in this particular location. This 
in kind component was substantial in the Kemubu area. In other situations, 
many of these items are transferred or paid in cash, and there is only a 
minor difference between marketable and marketed surpluses. In the Kemubu 
context it was thought worthwhile to test whether the relationships of 
variables with marketable and marketed surpluses differed.
7.3 Summary of Conclusions
Some of the major findings in relation to the whole samples of 
farmers, and to the important sub-groups, are as follows,
7.3.1 Whole Samples
(i) The most important predictors of marketable and marketed 
surpluses of padi both for inside and outside Kemubu were the output 
variables, TPP and NPP. Generally, the elasticities of supply of marketable 
and marketed surpluses with respect to TPP and NPP were greater than one, 
which was consistent with findings of other studies on rice. In this study, 
the TPP elasticities for marketable surplus ranged from 1.26 to 1.31, and 
for marketed surplus, they ranged from 1.35 to 1.47. The NPP elasticity 
of marketed surplus was in the range of from 0.92 to 1.55. There was no 
significant difference between elasticities with respect to TPP or NPP for 
inside and outside Kemubu, but in absolute terms the values of TPP and NPP 
inside Kemubu were substantially greater than outside.
The marginal propensities of marketable and marketed surplus with 
respect to TPP and NPP were higher inside Kemubu than outside. These
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measures of response at the margin showed that farms inside Kemubu could 
achieve a greater increase in marketable and marketed surplus than was 
possible outside for a given increase in TPP or NPP.
(ii) The TNPI elasticities of marketable and marketed surpluses 
were negative and generally small for both inside and outside the Kemubu 
Project. For the marketable surplus they ranged between -0.05 and -0.08. 
For the marketed surplus (using TPP) the range was between -0.08 and -0.16. 
Suggesting the in kind transfers of rent, wages, zakat, were not, or were 
less, influenced by TNPI. Also, for both inside and outside Kemubu, 
using NPP for the marketed surplus, the elasticities were in the range of 
-0.10 to —0.13. Only in marketed surpluses was there an increase of the 
elasticities with the provision of the project.
The TNPI marginal propensities of both marketable and marketed 
surpluses increased greatly with the Kemubu Project. For example, in 
the marketable surplus the value of TNPI marginal propensities was -0.005 
outside Kemubu and -0.047 inside. The effect of the project was to 
greatly increase the production of surpluses. As a result, diversion of 
labour resources to non padi income employment produced a greater reduction 
in marketed surplus of padi.
This study has been able to look at the effect of TNPI on the 
marketable and marketed surpluses of padi which had not been looked into 
in previous studies. The study is the first of its kind to look at the 
influence of TNPI with the provision of an irrigation project.
(iii) The marginal propensities of marketed and marketable 
surpluses with respect to family size variable, FAMSZA, were negative and 
substantially larger inside Kemubu than outside indicating the high 
consumption levels reached inside Kemubu. Also, the values of FAMSZA 
elasticities of the surpluses were high, large and negative at between
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0.1A and 0.49. Thus, in this respect, the impact of Kemubu Project was 
to induce larger reductions in marketed surpluses as a result of the higher 
levels of per capita consumption enabled by higher production. The net 
effect of an increase in family size would depend upon the marginal 
contribution to output resulting from the additional family member.
This study is one of the few that uses family size measurements. 
Also, the study is the only one which examines the change in relationship 
which occurs with modernization and intensification of padi production with 
an irrigation project.
7.3.2 Tenancy Sub-Groups
In the marketable surplus functions, the output (TPP) elasticities 
for all tenancy categories were greater than unity. Inside Kemubu, owner- 
operators showed the highest elasticities (despite lack of rental payments) 
followed by mixed owner tenants and then pure tenants. Outside Kemubu, 
owner-operators had the lowest output elasticities while mixed owner 
operators recorded the highest value. With the marketed surplus function, 
output elasticities were also generally greater than one, except for the 
owner-operator groups outside Kemubu, for which it was about 0.64. This 
was as expected, since with low production, the amount sold was very small.
With irrigation, there was a general narrowing of differences in 
surplus responses between tenure groups, as compared with those apparent 
for single cropping tenure groups without irrigation. In particular, 
while the Kemubu Irrigation Project improved the responses of all groups, 
it raised those of the pure tenant and owner-operator groups to a level 
similar to those of the mixed owner tenants with regard to the production 
both of marketable and marketed surpluses. Such a relative improvement in 
this capacity to respond was clearly a positive substantial developmental 
benefit for previously disadvantaged groups of farmers.
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7.3.3 Operational Padi Area Size Groups
Outside Kemubu, TPP and NPP regression coefficients increased 
with padi operational area, but inside Kemubu there was no consistent trend. 
TPP and NPP marginal propensities to sell were higher for all size groups 
with provision of the Kemubu Irrigation Project. Hence, with the project, 
most padi area size groups benefited and were able to increase their 
surpluses given the increase in padi production greater than farmers outside 
the project.
The responsiveness at the margin inside Kemubu in production of 
marketable and marketed surpluses of padi with respect to total non padi 
income (TNPI) showed a consistent inverse relationship with padi area.
With an increase in TNPI, there was an associated decrease in both 
marketable and marketed surpluses. The size of the negative coefficient 
increased consistently with increases in padi area in Kemubu. The larger 
study of the Kemubu Project found that there was also an inverse 
relationship between TNPI and padi area groups, i.e. the smallest size 
groups had the largest TNPI. Thus, although a lower TNPI was earned in 
the larger size groups, there was a progressively greater reduction in 
marketable and marketed surpluses incremental increase in TNPI. This 
strongly suggests that in larger padi area size groups, the demand for 
labour for padi becomes more competitive with that for earning TNPI, and 
thus increases the negative coefficient in the direct relationship between 
surpluses and padi area.
7.3.4 Total Farm Operational Area
Inside Kemubu, the levels of response, or elasticities, of 
marketable and marketed surpluses with respect to TPP, NPP, TNPI and FAMSZA 
were similar across the same size groups of net padi operational areas and 
total farm operational areas. From this result it can be concluded that
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other, non padi, farm activities undertaken by a number of Kemubu farmers 
(e.g. rubber, tobacco growing) did not affect the marketable or marketed 
surplus response of farmers double cropping with padi. This was also 
true for farmers outside Kemubu. Thus, the provision of irrigation and 
a second padi crop did not lead to a problem of choice between allocating 
resources to padi and to other farm enterprises. At least to this extent 
that diversification of farm enterprises by combining padi with other crops 
and activities was feasible. This may well have been due to the generally 
small scale of padi farming and of other crop and livestock production.
7.3.5 District
The output variables were the only consistently significant 
variables in production of marketable and marketed surpluses in all 
districts. Also, the marginal propensities to sell with respect to TPP, 
NPP, TNPI and FAMSZA were higher for all districts inside Kemubu than 
outside. Inter-district differences inside Kemubu were small. They were 
more pronounced outside the project. Notably, outside Kemubu, Bachok 
District had a considerably higher value of TPP and NPP propensities to 
sell then the others. Thus, one effect of the project was to narrow such 
inter-district variations.
7.4 Policy Implications
Empirical results obtained in this study have important policy 
implications for the formulation and implementation of padi and rice 
programs to achieve the goal of self-sufficiency in Malaysia, and also for 
regional rural development schemes.
7.4.1 Total Padi Production (TPP)/Net Padi Production (NPP) and 
Marketable and Marketed Surpluses
It was shown that TPP/NPP were most important variables influencing 
the production of marketable and marketed surpluses of padi and hence so were
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their elasticities. In single crop areas it was shown that elasticities 
of TPP and NPP were mostly quite high and greater than unity. But, since 
the average levels of TPP/NPP were low, so too were those of marketable 
and marketed surpluses. Hence, in absolute terms, the response in 
marketable and marketed surpluses from increasing TPP/NPP amongst these 
farmers was very limited.
The irrigation project, by adding a crop and increasing yields 
for each padi crop, greatly raised the average output level of padi. The 
elasticities of TPP/NPP were found to be still, and more consistently, 
greater than one. Hence, with much higher average output levels of TPP/NPP, 
the absolute surplus responses were very substantial and much higher than 
outside Kemubu.
This achievement of the project is further reinforced with reference 
to the marginal propensities for marketable and marketed surpluses with 
respect to TPP/NPP variables. Outside Kemubu these were low, thus showing 
the limits of single cropping technology without irrigation. Inside, with 
irrigation and modern technology, the marginal propensities were quite high. 
Thus, further measures to raise TPP/NPP will serve to boost marketable and 
marketed surpluses substantially, e.g. better irrigation, further 
improvements in padi technology etc.
Similar results and conclusions were found by Toquero, et al (1975) 
for rice in the Philippines.
Related to this were the elasticities and marginal propensities 
of TPP/NPP for padi operational area size groups. It was shown in the 
single crop area that what little marketable and marketed surpluses there 
were, came almost exclusively from the larger area size groups. The smaller 
groups < 2 acres and especially < 1 acre, sold little or none. These
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farmers were almost purely subsistence oriented. With irrigation, all 
groups benefited, and all produced a surplus. It was found that 
elasticities of TPP/NPP for marketable and marketed surpluses were high 
and greater than one for all size groups. Thus, although average TPP/NPPs 
per farm differed, all groups contributed substantially to marketable and 
marketed surpluses. Notably, the smallest size groups showed the highest 
yields, which boosted average TPP/NPPs per farm in these groups. Also, 
marginal propensities were high for all size groups. Hence again, all 
have the potential at the margin for contributing to higher marketable and 
marketed surpluses if policy measures are able to raise TPP/NPP for all 
size groups.
The fact that even the smallest size groups and all groups did 
secure such benefits,and furthermore there is the potential for all to 
continue to do this, is a major positive impact of the Kemubu Project. In 
this sense the small size of farms in this area has not acted as a constraint 
on production despite its effect on the level of marketable and marketed surplust
Outside Kemubu, some surpluses were obtained by owner-operator 
tenants but no surpluses were obtained by pure tenants. A little by owner- 
operators. For owner-operator tenants the surplus included rent and so 
left little as actually marketed surplus. Inside Kemubu, all tenure 
groups recorded substantial average TPP/NPP levels, high TPP/NPP elasticities 
of marketable and marketed surplus (greater than one) and hence all 
contributed substantially to the production of surpluses, Also, marginal 
propensities were high for all tenure groups, and hence all could again 
benefit from new innovations which raise TPP/NPP. The project thus 
benefited all tenure groups and improved the responsiveness of tenants and 
owner-operators relative to mixed tenure farmers.
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The TPP/NPP elasticities were high for districts both inside and 
outside the project but the average level of surpluses inside were of 
course considerably higher. The marginal propensities to sell with respect 
to TPP/NPP were higher in the districts inside than outside. Thus, 
further improvements in padi technology will benefit farmers more inside 
Kemubu in terms of marketable and marketed surpluses. The consistently 
high district elasticities inside Kemubu indicate the project spread 
benefits throughout the project area.
7.4.2 Total Non Padi Income
Shand, et al (1982, Ch.11) found that increased padi output has 
substantially increased farm and total income of Kemubu households. However, 
a very large proportion of these farmers, even with a second crop and higher 
yields, earned levels of padi income well below the existing poverty line.
Only the small proportion of farmers with the largest padi areas (4 acres 
and more) approached the poverty line with padi earnings alone. Other 
farm income did help to boost this for some, but a very large proportion 
were forced to seek off farm employment to supplement padi and farm income.
The question as to whether such off farm earnings, and the 
allocative resources (especially labour) to them, affected padi surplus 
production is a very important policy issue.
The foregoing study showed that there was, in fact, an inverse 
relation, that this was significant both inside and outside Kemubu, but more 
so inside the project.
The fact it was significant outside was of lesser importance because
(a) surpluses were small anyway; and
(b) coefficients were very small in the regression equations, 
the TNPI elasticities and marginal propensities were low.
Hence, in absolute terms, the negative impact of higher
off farm income was small.
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Inside Kemubu, the regression coefficients of TNPI were still 
quite low and elasticities of the surpluses were not high, but the sacrifice 
in marketable and marketed surpluses are greater with increasing TNPI, as 
the average levels of marketable and marketed surpluses are much greater 
than outside. Marginal propensities were also higher inside, and this 
means that further increases in TNPI would have a considerably greater 
negative effect on marketable and marketed surpluses. This poses an 
important question for policy.
Ceterns paribus, if farmers allocate more labour to raise off farm 
earnings, there will be an increasing sacrifice in marketable and marketed 
surpluses and furthermore the negative marginal propensities may increase. 
Conversely, if further measures are implemented to raise TPP/NPP, these may 
require more labour and may lead to lower TNPI owing to the need for labour 
transfer from off farm work. Thus, whilst the coefficients are not now 
high, the inverse relation is a significant one, and must be taken into 
account by policy makers. There is a possibility that many households 
have reached an income ceiling with the existing allocation of household 
labour supply between padi and non padi activities.
If we relax ceterus paribus there are other possibilities. First, 
there may still be some family labour unused (e.g. in small size groups) 
which could be pressed into either activity (padi and non padi). Second, 
further labour saving innovations could be introduced to padi growing to 
reduce demands. Three come to mind:
direct seeding in the field to replace transplanting, 
mechanical harvesting to replace manual harvesting, 
mechanical threshing to replace manual threshing.
All the above three tasks are currently labour intensive and cause 
seasonal peaks in demand for farm household labour. With these innovations,
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mors labour could be allocated to non padi activities. Such changes would, 
of course, depend on opportunity costs.
The above points with respect to TNPI apply to all size group 
of padi operational holdings. But since regression coefficients rise with 
padi area the policy implications have greater force in the larger size groups.
The strength of the inverse relation between TNPI and marketable 
and marketed surpluses in terms of marginal propensities to sell was 
greatest in Kota Bharu District. This suggests the scope for introducing 
(demand for) labour saving technologies in padi production may be greatest 
in this district. They could, therefore, be tried first on a pilot basis 
in Kota Bharu.
7.4.3 Family Size
Introduction of irrigation greatly introduced the FAMSZA coefficient 
in the regression functions and the marginal propensities of marketable and 
marketed surpluses. This result is welcome in the sense that it implies
much improved nutrition among Kemubu households. However, it also means 
a much increased reduction in marketable and marketed surpluses for each 
additional family member. It is important of course to note that there is 
also a potential increase in TPP/NPP from an extra family member (if of 
working age) but production function analysis currently in progress in the 
larger Kemubu Research Project indicate that the marginal productivity of 
labour is low, so the reduction in marketable and marketed surpluses would 
outweigh extra TPP/NPP obtained.
The above argument applies to the various padi and total farm 
operational area groups and to the tenancy sub-groups.
The result does point to the need for policy to discourage increases 
in farm family size if marketable and marketed surpluses are to be maintained,
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e.g. through improved off farm employment opportunities, and through effective 
family planning measures.
7.5 Comments on the Analytical Model and the Study
7.5.1 Explanatory Power
The foregoing analysis showed that the predictability of marketable 
and marketed surpluses with the functions used was greatly enhanced by the 
nature of the project itself, i.e. with irrigation. The equations for 
inside Kemubu had much higher adjusted coefficients of determination (R2), 
there were more significant variables, thus giving them greater explanatory 
power.
The marginal propensities of marketable and marketed surpluses 
with respect to TPP, NPP, TNPI and FAMSZA were greater in absolute terms 
inside Kemubu than outside. This reflects the transformation that took 
place in the project area from subsistence oriented to semi-market oriented 
farming. From a policy viewpoint, these changes are advantageous in that 
there are more variables with the project, and responses are greater and 
more predictable in terms of marketable and marketed surpluses.
7.5.2 Specification
(i) The quadratic model was found to be more appropriate in the 
various estimations of marketable and marketed surpluses than the linear 
model. In a large proportion of functions estimated the quadratic terms 
were significant, indicating the importance of the rate of change of variables 
for the marketable and or marketed surpluses.
(ii) The use of the marketed concept enabled comparisons with other 
studies which mostly used immediate sales as the dependent variables. The 
use of marketable surplus functions as well gave a consistency in definition
of variables with those in other studies.
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It was observed that with respect to marginal propensities of the 
variables used, the marketable and marketed surplus functions did not differ 
much. In future the marketed surplus functions for Kemubu may well tend 
to converge with the marketable surplus functions, as the rural economy 
becomes more monetised and commercialised. Thus, rent may be paid in cash, 
zakat given and tax paid in cash. Outside the project, however, the 
proportions of rent, zcckat and tax in marketable surplus will remain high.
(HI) Comparisons of marketed surplus functions using TPP and 
NPP showed that the adjusted coefficients of determination (R^) were higher 
with the use of NPP than with TPP. Also, the NPP marginal propensities 
and elasticities to sell were greater than that of TPP. Given the fixed 
commitments of rent, wages, zakat and consumption components are decided 
in advance, NPP appears better in explaining the performance of marketable 
and marketed surpluses of padi than TPP.
7.5.3 Comments on the Study
This study provides an analysis in the change in dynamic 
environment of padi production with new padi technologies and partial 
mechanisation brought about by the Kemubu Irrigation Project. Also, the 
study is the first of its kind to quantity these changes of technologies 
not only at aggregate level but also important in analysis of sub-groupings 
of farmers by tenancy categories, padi operational area size groups, total 
operational area size groups, and location (districts). This enables us to 
determine the distribution pattern of benefits amongst the farmers in a 
detailed way.
This study is also the first to try to determine marketable and 
marketed surplus response functions in one attempt. The study shows what 
differences there are in farmers' response. Though the differences are 
not very substantial the study provides a better understanding of the effects
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of various determinants using the two definitions of marketable and marketed 
surpluses of padi.
7.6 Limitations of the Study and Need for Further Research
In this study ordinary least squares regression was used with the 
basic assumption that the error variance is constant over the range of the 
observations. With cross-sectional data, however, this assumption is open 
to question. This is particularly so in a survey where the measurement 
of the independent variables cannot be assumed to be totally free from error.
No risk component was incorporated in the marketable and marketed
surplus functions studied. It is assured that the Kemubu farmers do face
risk and uncertainty in yield and non padi incomes. This can be expected
particularly in the single cropping area which is rainfall dependent and 
-2indeed the low R s probably reflect this. With irrigation, the major risk 
element was minimised and hence the omission of risk was probably not a 
serious weakness.
These survey results on surpluses could usefully be supplemented 
first, with a motivation survey which could serve to test or validate the 
responses measured in this study.
A second, useful area of research would be an appraisal of the 
welfare gains and losses of the various participants in increasing marketable 
and marketed surpluses vis-a-vis other economic activities, and of the 
relative costs and benefits to society as a whole of alternative means of 
increasing output (e.g. price support versus agricultural research and 
extension).
A third important area for further research pertains to the 
aggregate labour supply of the farm family. Related to this issue is the 
question of outmigration, which could cause labour scarcity or relieve
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population pressure. There is also a need for a study of relative benefits 
and costs of investment in further gains in productivity and marketed 
surpluses in Kemubu versus promoting greater off farm income opportunities 
locally and elsewhere in Malaysia (with outmigration).
More research is also needed to identify the determinants of the 
performance of particular tenure groups, and of particular districts, 
e.g. why the performance of Kota Bharu is superior and what factors have 
constrained performance in the other two districts. Factors like irrigation 
efficiencies, soil and infrastructure variations may have contributed to this.
This study has served also to underline and quantify the 
limitations of single crop padi production in the pursuit of a policy of 
expanding the marketed surplus of padi. It has indicated how low overall 
surpluses are and the limits within size groups and tenure groups of 
surplus responses.
It has also shown the need to reconsider expensive subsidy schemes 
given to stimulate surpluses but ineffective in doing so among single crop 
producers who market little or no surplus. At best, increases are absorbed 
on higher domestic intake of farm households.
This study covers only one single year, so coefficients could 
change under different conditions, e.g. with drought, where irrigation is 
not guaranteed. There is, thus, a need for a time series study of the 
performance of marketable and marketed surplus production.
Finally, this study has served its objectives and obtained a 
substantial body of results in variety and depth in findings in relation to 
the impact of the Kemubu Irrigation Project. It would be useful to see 
this type of analyses be repeated in other irrigation areas to see the 
results comparable or different.
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APPENDIX 1
THE IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURE IN 
MALAYSIAN AGRICULTURE
The agricultural sector of Malaysia, in 1980,employed about 40 per 
cent of the total labour force and contributed a third of total value 
added (Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981). Although its share of gross domestic 
product (GDP) has declined from 31 per cent in 1970 to 22 per cent in 1980 
the sector is still an important one. Its average annual growth rate
from 1971—80 was 4.3 per cent. During the 1961—71 period the average 
annual growth rate of agricultural output was about 6 per cent, among the 
highest anywhere in the developing world (Young et al,1980, p.30).
With a ratio of merchandise exports to gross domestic product 
of almost 50 per cent, Malaysia is heavily dependent on the export sector 
(Hassan, 1980, p.25). This results in Malaysia being vulnerable to
fluctuations in international terms of trade and causes cyclical instability 
in her domestic growth and development (Mehmet, 1978, p.95).
Agricultural exports continued to account for a large share of 
total commodity exports during the 1970-80 decade, although their share 
declined from 52.1 per cent in 1970 to 35.8 per cent in 1980. Exports
of agricultural commodities grew by 9.1 per cent per annum during 1971-75
and by 19.7 per cent per annum during 1976-80, amounting to an average 
annual growth rate of 14.3 per cent for the decade. Rubber exports
accounted for 41.8 per cent of this growth, saw-logs accounted for 23.9 per
cent and palm oil 30.8 per cent (Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981, p.19).
With an emphasis in national development policy on diversification, 
the structure of agricultural exports changed considerably (Courtenay, 1981, 
pp.1-6). The share of rubber exports, which accounted for 33.4 per cent
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of total commodity exports in 1970, declined to 17.1 per cent by 1980.
The agricultural sector has progressively diversified its economic 
activities, commencing with oil palm which started from scratch in the 
1950te and expanded to make Malaysia a world leading producer and exporter 
of palm oil, accounting for more than 40 per cent of world output in 1980. 
Concurrently, there was also a push for increased productivity in the 
rubber industry.
Rice output doubled between 1960 and 1976, and was another source 
of growth in agriculture, even though rice now accounts for less than a 
tenth of the value added in agriculture.
Although the rate of growth of agricultural production was high, 
the growth of real incomes during the 1960's and 1970's was not more than 
2 per cent a year. This was mostly due to falling prices of export 
commodities. Despite the apparent success of the policies of government 
for promoting small scale agriculture the income disparity between the 
traditional agricultural sector and the rest of the economy in Peninsular 
Malaysia widened from 1:2.5 in 1960 to more than 1:3 in 1970 (Young, 1980,p.31).
Agriculture in Malaysia is not predominantly subsistence-oriented. 
There are three main organisational types of agriculture in Malaysia, namely 
private smallholdings, private estates and public land development schemes.
Of the total cultivated area of 7.75 million acres in 1980, about 93 per 
cent of the land was under four main crops, namely rubber, oil palm, padi 
and coconut. The resources employed in agriculture reflect the importance 
of the sector.
Compared to other South East Asian agriculturally-based countries, 
Malaysia enjoys a relatively high standard of living. Its annual 1981 
Gross National Product (GNP) per capita of US$1,620 was about twice that of 
Thailand or the Philippines (World Bank, 1982, cited in Asiaweek.
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10 September 1982). Its average annual growth rate of GNP per capita 
during 1960 and 1978 was 4.9 per cent. Despite that there is absolute 
poverty, relative poverty and distinct inequalities in income distribution 
between rural and urban population, between regions and between ethnic 
groups (Lim, 1978; Shaari, 1979; Anand, 1980; and Snodgrass, 1980).
In 1980, about 443,700 households or about 66 per cent of the 
poor1 were in the agricultural sector compared to 74 per cent, 582,400 
households in 1970. Within the agricultural sector, in 1980, most of the 
poor were rubber smallholdings (175,900), padi growers (83,200) or other 
agricultural producers (110,500) followed by a second group consisting of 
fishermen (19,400) and coconut smallholders (13,300) (Fourth Malaysia 
Plan, 1981, p.33; and Lim, 1981, p.10).
The incidence of poverty, defined as percentage of total 
households that are poor, was high in other types of agriculture and padi 
smallholdings. In 1970, the incidence of poverty for padi farmers and 
in other types of agriculture was 92 per cent and 88 per cent respectively 
and though it decreased to 64 per cent and 55 per cent respectively in 
1980, it was clearly very persistent in the padi smallholding sector. 
Recognizing this, the government has invested considerable effort and 
capital to improve the padi farmers.
The importance of agriculture and rural development is reflected 
by the amount of sectoral development expenditure devoted to it. The 
amount usually represents between 20—25 per cent of total development 
expenditure in every Malaysia Plan and it has consistently ranked first 
in priority (Ness, 1967; and Peacock, 1981).
1 The poor are those below the poverty line, which is defined as the level 
of income that meets minimum food requirements and minimum needs with 
respect to clothing, consumer durables and transport services to sustain 
a decent standard of living (Third Malaysia Plan, 1976, p.5). This was 
estimated at between M$41 and M$55 per capita per month in 1979 (Anand, 
1980).
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APPENDIX 2
THE PADI AND THE RICE ECONOMY 
IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
2.1 Padi Acreage
In 1982 the total acreage of padi in Peninsular Malaysia was
861,000 acres, which accounted for 11.4 per cent of total cultivated area. 
In acreage terms, it ranked third behind rubber and oil palm, but padi is 
cultivated in all of the eleven states. Owing to climate and soil 
conditions, as well as to historical development patterns in the country, 
padi is geographically concentrated in the coastal plains of the northern 
states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Province Wellesley and Perak (Zaharah, 
1970, Jackson, 1973, p.77, Hill, 1977 and Takaya et al, 1978) (Figure 2.1).
The padi areas of Kedah and Kelantan alone comprise half of the 
total rice land cultivated in Peninsular Malaysia, while the state of 
Kedah (333,800 acres) contributes a third of the total padi land. This 
regional concentration of padi is not likely to change within the 
foreseeable future.
There are two types of padi planted in Peninsular Malaysia: wet 
and dry padi. Only wet padi will be considered in the discussion since
unbunded or dry padi constitutes only a negligible proportion of total 
production (1 per cent). About 87 per cent of the wet padi areas are 
double cropped (Ministry of Agriculture, 1981). Agronomically, wet padi
cultivation can be divided into:
(1) main season crop; and
(2) off season crop.
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FIGURE 2.1
MAP OF PENINSULAR MALAYSIA SHOWING DISTRIBUTION 
OF MAIN RICE GROWING AREAS
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The calendar dates for padi crops are variable but generally they 
can be represented as in Table 2.1 where the main season crop usually 
coincides with the prevailing monsoon seasons (Grist, 1968; and Lim, 1954).
TABLE 2.1
CALENDAR DATES FOR PADI CROPS ON EAST AND WEST 
COASTS OF PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
Main Season Crop Off-Season Crop
Monsoon Seasons
Planting Harvesting Planting Harvesting
West Coast August/ February 
September
March August South West 
(June to October)
East Coast September/ March 
October
April September North East 
(September to 
January)
Figure 2.2 shows the trend of padi acreage during the period 
1955-80. Until 1964, most padi in Peninsular Malaysia was planted in the 
main season. After that, with new padi varieties and irrigation development 
(especially the Muda and Kemubu Irrigation Schemes located in Kedah and 
Kelantan States respectively), the off-season area has steadily increased 
with a compound average annual growth rate of about 20 per cent from 1962 
to 1977. In 1981 the off-season accounted for about 45 per cent of 
Malaysian production.
From 1975 to 1980 there was a substantial decline in cropped areas 
of padi in nine of the eleven states in Peninsular Malaysia, while cropped 
areas in Kedah and Perils stabilised or even increased slightly (World Bank, 
1981, Annex 1, p.l). In general, declines in these states seemed to represent
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ACREAGE OF PADI PLANTED IN 
PENINSULAR MALAYSIA, 1955-1980
Main Season
: Monthly Statistical Bulletin of West Malaysia.
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a retreat to the larger pad! areas where padi production is higher and 
more remunerative.
2*2 Padi Production, Rice Consumption and Self Sufficiency
In 1980/81, padi production of 1,727,000 tonnes in Peninsular 
Malaysia accounted for 86 per cent of Malaysia's total output (Bank Negara, 
1981, p.99).
Padi production has undergone distinct changes in response to 
government efforts to meet self sufficiency goals, through the dissemination 
and adoption of new fast maturing high yielding varieties that were developed 
locally as well as imported from India and the Philippines (Dalrymple, 1978). 
Figure 2.3 shows the growth of padi production, consumption and imports from 
1955 to 1980. The twin sources of growth in the expansion of padi 
production have been increases in yields and area double cropped. Various 
studies to determine the contribution of these factors to growth are 
summarised in Table 2.2. The increase in total padi production and yield 
started in 1964 with the introduction of off-season irrigated padi planting.
While production has increased, rice consumption per capita in 
Peninsular Malaysia has remained low by Southeast Asian standards at 105 kgs 
per annum and static (Timmer and Falcon, 1965, p.375; and World Bank, 1981b). 
The level of per capita availability has declined during the years 1976-81 
(Table 2.3).
2.3 Farm and Farmer's Characteristics
In Peninsular Malaysia, padi farms have a mean size of 3.4 acres 
(Table 2.4). One-third of padi farms are below 2 acres, about a half are 
between 2 and 5 acres and those of more than ten acres are very rare.
Though there are differences between states and regions, they are not great, 
and it is possible to generalize that most padi farms are small.
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FIGURE 2.3
PADI PRODUCTION, CRUDE CONSUMPTION, AND IMPORTS 
FOR PENINSULAR MALAYSIA, 1955-1976
Tons ('000)
Consumption
1600
Production
1200
Imports
1955 75 76
Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin of West Malaysia.
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TABLE 2.2
AVERAGE COMPOUND ANNUAL GROWTH RATES 
IN TOTAL PADI OUTPUT
Authors Period of Study
Average 
Annual 
Compound 
Growth 
(per cent)
Area
Component
(per cent)
Yield
Component
(per cent)
Crosson (1966) 1950/51 - 1962/63 5.2 _
Ani (1968) 1952/53 - 1964/65 5.3 38 62
Bhati (1973) 1952 - 1971 4.3 56 44
Sabariyah (1977) 1959/60 - 1974/75 6.6 - —
Herdt et al (1977/ 
78) 1965 - 1973 5.7 67 33
Yim (1978) 1955 - 1973 5.4 68 32
Asian Development 
Bank (1978) 1955 - 1973 5.9 67 33
Taylor (1981) 1950/51 - 1960/61 4.0 40 60
1962/63 - 1976/77 5.2 65 35
Source: Crosson (1966, p.121); Ani (1968, p.37); Bhati (1973, p.25);
Sabariyah (1977, p. 48); Herdt et al (1977/78, p.186); Yim (1978);
Asian Development Bank (1978, p.348; and Taylor (1981, P•36).
TABLE 2.3
CRUDE ESTIMATES OF RICE CONSUMPTION IN
PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
Domestic Rice 
Production
Net
Imports
Total
Availability
Estimated
Population
Per Capita 
Availability
('000 tons) ('000 tons) (1000 tons) (millions) (kg)
1976 1,136 116 1,252 10.14 123
1979 1,169 101 1,270 10.88 117
1980 1,145 25 1,170 11.14 105
Source: World Bank, 1981, Annex 1, Table 3.
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TABLE 2.4
PADI AREA OPERATED PER FARM, SELECTED PADDY 
DOUBLE-CROPPED AREAS, MALAYSIA
Region, Scheme, State Year of Study
Average 
Area of 
Paddy 
Per Farm 
(ha)
Reference
Northwest
Muda Scheme, Kedah-Perlis 1955 1.81 Wilson (1958,79)
Mu da Scheme, Kedah-Perlis 1964-65 1.71 Kuchiba and Tsubouchi (1967)
Muda Scheme, Kedah-Perlis 1966 1.71 MAC (1967)
Muda Scheme, Kedah-Perlis 1966 1.64 Jegatheesan (1977,11)
Muda Scheme, Kedah-Perlis 1967 1.98 Horli (1972)
Muda Scheme, Kedah-Perlis 1973 2.01 Jegatheesan (1976,30)
Perlis State 1975 1.23 Ouchi,et al (1976,10,17)
Muda Scheme, Kedah-Perlis 1975 1.64 Jegatheesan (1977,28)
West Central
Province Wellesley 1968 1.38 Tan and Weaver (n.d.,25)
Province Wellesley 1969 1.34 Selvadurai and Ani (1969)
Province Wellesley 1972 1.26 Bhati (1973,8)
Province Wellesley 1978 0.98 Fujimoto (1980,77)
Krian Scheme, Perak 1971 1.26 Selvadurai (1972b,16)
Seberang Perak Scheme,Perak 1974 1.17 MAF (1974,15)
Sg Manik and Changkat Jong
Schemes, Perak 1977 1.56 Nik Fuad (1978,6)
Tg Karang Scheme, Selangor 1963 1.12 Agarwal (1964,65)
Tg Karang Scheme, Selangor 1967 1.82 Narkswasdi and Selvadurai
(1967a)
Tg Karang Scheme, Selangor 1975-76 1.21 Fredericks (1977,8)
Tg Karang Scheme, Selangor 1978 1.58 Funahashi (1979,10)
Southwest
Malacca State 1965-66 0.89 Narkswasdi and Selvadurai 
(1967b,65)
Bachang Scheme, Malacca 1966-67 1.51 Narkswasdi and Selvadurai
(1967c)
Northeast
Kemubu Scheme, Kelantan 1969 0.89 Selvadurai, Ani and
Nik Hassani (1969)
Pasir Mas and Lemal
Schemes, Kelantan 1978 0.67 Fujimoto (1980,77)
Kemubu Scheme, Kelantan 1979-80 0.85 Shand, et al (1982,43)
East Central
Pahang State 1975 0.89 Ouchi, et al (1976,26)
All Studies n/a 1.37 n/a
Note: n/a = not applicable.
Source: Taylor (1981, p.61) and Shand, et al (1982, p.43).
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The padi land tenure system is complex as it is in other parts 
of Asia. Broadly, about 44 per cent are owner-operators, 23 per cent are 
owner-tenants and 33 per cent are pure tenants (Table 2.5). While tenancy 
is extensive, it is generally not oppressive, as much of it is a reflection 
of kinship relations linked by the domestic life cycle (Fujimoto, 1980, p.239).
The mean age of the farmers is 47 years and average household 
size is 5.6 (Taylor, 1981, pp.57-9). The average age appears to be 
increasing with time, owing to the migration of rural youths out of the 
padi sector (Corner, 1981a; and Chan, 1979). Though this has helped to 
relieve pressure of population on land, it has also created a chronic 
labour shortage in recent years, especially during the peak periods of 
labour demand, such as transplanting and harvesting (Barnard, 1979, p.89;
1981, p.208; Jegatheesan, 1980, pp.1-2; and Lim, 1982, p.l).
Some salient characteristics of padi households are given in 
Table 2.6. The main problem of padi farmers is low income, which is due 
to small farm size and low productivity. It is estimated that about 60 per 
cent of farmers in the Muda Project (Lai, 1978, pp.51-3), and about 85 per 
cent in the Kemubu Scheme (Shand, et al, 1982, p.418) are below the poverty 
line which is defined in the footnote on page 184. The low level of padi 
income can be expected to persist for a long time (Bell, 1979, p.225;
Corner, 1981c, p.14; and De Koninck, 1979, p.287) relative to other incomes.
The average value of the Gini coefficient of distribution of total income 
and wealth amongst farmers in all double cropped areas in Peninsular Malaysia 
from various studies has been calculated to be 0.34 (Taylor, 1981, p.70) 
and that the distribution of total operational padi area among growers 
inside Kemubu in 1979/80 is 0.33 (Shand, et al, 1982, p.54).
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TABLE 2.5
PADI FARMERS, BY TENURE STATUS, SELECTED 
PADDY DOUBLE CROPPED AREAS, MALAYSIA
Region, Scheme, State Year of Study
~ Owner-Owners tenants Tenants Reference
(per cent of 
paddy farmers)
Northwest
Kedah-Perlis States 1960 35 17 48 Tan and Weaver 
(n.d.,27)
Muda Scheme, Kedah-Perlis 1966 44 15 41 MAC (1967)
Muda Scheme, Kedah-Perlis 1967 29 23 48 Horii (1972)
Muda Scheme, Kedah-Perlis 1973 42 28 30 Lim,et al(1974,81)
Perlis State 1975 46 33 21 Ouchi,et al
(1976,14,18)
Muda Scheme, Kedah-Perlis 1975 54 18 28 Jegatheesan(1976,29)
Muda Scheme, Kedah-Perlis 1976 37 28 35 MADA (1977,7)
Muda Scheme, Kedah-Perlis n. d. 42 24 34 Afifuddin(1978,24)
West Central
Province Wellesley 1963 9 52 39 Purcal(1964,280,281)
Province Wellesley 1969 44 17 39 Selvadurai and Ani 
(1969)
Province Wellesley 1972 20 25 55 Bhati (1973,8)
Province Wellesley 1978 39 24 37 Fujimoto (1980,77)
Perak State 1960 51 11 38 Tan and Weaver 
(n.d.,27)
Krian Scheme 1971 37 22 41 Selvadurai(1972b,7)
Seberang Perak Scheme,Perak 1974 77 2 21 MAF (1974,19)
Sg Manik Scheme, Perak 1977 60 30 10 Nik Fuad (1978,6)
Tg Karang Scheme, Selangor 1967 62 23 15 Narkswasdi and 
Selvadurai (1967a)
Southwest
Malacca State 1960 71 8 21 Tan and Weaver 
(n.d.,27)
Malacca State 1965-66 52 18 30 Narkswasdi and 
Selvadurai(1967b,81)
Bachang Scheme, Malacca 1966-67 21 54 25 Narkswasdi and 
Selvadurai (1967c)
Johore State 1963 37 29 34 Nussein (1964)
Northeast
Kelantan State 1960 34 40 26 Tan and Weaver(n.d., 
27)
Kemubu Scheme, Kelantan 1969 58 22 20 Selvadurai,Ani and 
Nik Hassani (1969)
Pasir Mas and Lemal
Schemes, Kelantan 1978 47 26 27 Fujimoto(1980, 77)
Kemubu Scheme, Kelantan 1979-80 56 30 14 Shand,et al(1982,81)
East Central
Pahang State 1975 84 8 8 Ouchi,et al(1976,30)
All studies n/a 44 23 33 n/a
Note: n/a = not available.
Source: Taylor (1981, p.62) and Shand, et al (1982, p.81).
TABLE 2.6
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THE SALIENT CHARACTERISTICS OF PADI FARM 
HOUSEHOLDS IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
Area
Characteristics
Mud a ProvinceWellesley Krian Kemubu
1972/73 1974/75 1967/68 1971 1971 1967/68
Average Farm Size
(acres) 4.6 n.a. 4.1 n.a. 3.8 3.0
Average Padi Area
(acres) 4.0 4.0 3.3 3.1 3.1 2.2
Proportion Rented 0.45 n.a. 0.51 0.56 0.48 0.37
Average Household Size 5.6 5.6 5.8 5.2 5.8 5.2
Average Household
Income 2,405 4,,001 1,314 1,578 1,111 647
Proportion From Padi 0.78 0.78 0.68 0.72 0.62 0.42
Proportion From
Off-Farm Sources 0.10 0.09 -.23 0.16 0.27 0.44
Average Per Capita
Household Income b 557 714 312 406 257 171
Notes: a Current M$.
b 1975 M$, using the consumer price index as deflator. 
Source: Bell (1980, p.212).
2.4 Rice Policies and Programs
Historically, rice was mainly a subsistence crop. With British 
colonialisation of Peninsular Malaysia there was development of the rubber 
and mining industries accompanied by an immigration of workers from overseas 
which increased the need for rice as the staple food (Lee, 1973; Goldman,
1975; Rudner, 1975; Lim, 1977; and Shamsul Amri, 1979a). As the Malaysian 
economy became monetised the generation of marketable and marketed surpluses 
of padi served the major purpose of providing food for this fast increasing 
population, and also of providing money income for the padi farmers. However,
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full self sufficiency in rice was not attained nationally and even now the 
total requirement of rice for the Peninsular Malaysia is still barely met 
by imports.
Along with a primarily export-oriented strategy for agricultural 
production, focussing on crops such as rubber for which Peninsular Malaysia 
had a comparative advantage, the self sufficiency concept in rice was 
promoted throughout the British colonial era as an important secondary 
objective (Lim, 1977, pp.181-90).
2.4.1 Objectives of Rice Policies
Against a background of:(a) small size of padi farmers; (b) a 
role for padi as a main source of livelihood for many farmers; (c) low rates 
of return and incomes from the crop; and (d) the preponderance of Malays in 
padi farming (Bhati, 1976, p.7), a set of objectives for padi policy was 
evolved by the Malaysian government, taking account of social, economic and 
political considerations (Van, 1975, p.17; and Mokhtar, 1977, p.l).
These currently are:
(1) To enable padi growers who were previously producing padi for 
subsistence to produce a marketable surplus and raise rural 
incomes.
(2) To reduce risks attached to overdependence on foreign sources 
of supply.
(3) To ensure quality of rice at reasonable prices to consumers 
and at minimum cost to government.
(4) To increase rice production to meet the target of 100 per cent 
self sufficiency.
(5) To save foreign exchange.
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2.4.2 Policy Instruments and Achievements
(a) Research and Extension
Research and extension have had a long history in Malaysia 
and were the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture prior to 1969, 
and subsequently the Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development 
Institute (MARDI) which increased research on padi vis-a-vis other crops, 
except for rubber and oil palm.
Varietal improvement work had been carried Out even before the 
Second World War, and continued during the Japanese occupation (Van, 1948, 
pp.119-26; and Palmer, 1974, pp.292-5), when short duration varieties 
(Japomca) were introduced. However, the research was confined to Sungai 
Kulim Irrigation Area and to Province Wellesley.
Since World War II high yielding varieties have been developed by 
the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines and the 
Cuttack Rice Research Institute in India, for irrigated padi areas.
Other agronomic, engineering economic and social research has 
been carried out by MARDI at their main research station at Bumburg Lima 
in Province Wellesley and at other stations located in Alor Setar, Kota 
Bharu, Parit and Tanjung Karang. No major analysis has yet been made of 
the research performance and the impact of MARDI on the rice programs.
Since its inception, MARDI has been sending officers for training and has 
built up its research capacity especially with the assistance of a World 
Bank loan in 1974.
A program of agricultural extension to produce and distribute 
seeds of locally adapted high-yielding varieties and to provide technical 
training to Junior Agricultural Assistants and other local public service 
agents has been carried out by the Department of Agriculture. Agricultural 
extension work is closely integrated with the provision of irrigation
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infrastructure, and has made possible the adoption of high yielding varieties, 
first in Province Wellesley and Tanjung Karang, and later in other padi areas.
The Department of Agriculture is currently being strengthened in 
its activities and programs with the formation of an Extension Liaison 
Unit, a National Seed Project and a National Extension Project. This has 
been made possible by loans from the World Bank (Fourth Malaysia Plan,
1981, p.272).
(b) Credit and Input Subsidies
About three-quarters of padi farmers are in debt, and most 
of the loans are taken for consumption purposes (Selvadurai, 1979, p.58).
The credit market can be divided into formal and informal sectors, the 
latter providing the main sources. The informal credit market comprises 
relatives and friends, and moneylenders who include shopkeepers, merchants, 
landlords and wealthy farmers (Barnard, 1973, p.127; and Wells, 1981, p.170). 
Before the credit market became relatively competitive, a farmer could be 
charged an interest rate of 200 per cent per annum for a loan (AID, 1973,p.27). 
It is argued that there is increasing evidence that this high cost of non­
ins titutionalised credit primarily reflects the high risks and administrative 
costs involved in lending to the smallholder sector (Wells, 1975, pp.233-49; 
and Yokes, 1979, p.203).
The growing demand for credit led to the establishment of 
institutions like the Rural Co-operative Credit Societies, Farmers Associations 
and the Agricultural Bank of Malaysia since 1950. In double cropping padi 
areas, the Farmers Association Authority's offices act as local credit 
centres for loans provided by the Agricultural Bank, besides administrating 
credit from Farmers Co-operatives.
The Agricultural Bank of Malaysia was established in 1969. Its 
main functions are to co-ordinate and supervise credit disbursement for
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agricultural purposes, and to provide short and long term credits for all 
aspects of agriculture and animal husbandry. It has contributed 
significantly towards meeting total agricultural credit requirements 
(Wells, 1978, pp.8-9). The padi production credit scheme is confined to 
selected double cropping areas namely Muda, Kemubu, Besut, Tanjung Karang, 
Sabak Bernam and Krian.
Production subsidies in the form of fertilizers, seeds, plant 
protection inputs and mechanisation have been provided by the federal and 
state governments with varying intensities at different times from 1952 
onwards (Mokhtar, 1978, p.2). Since 1979 the government has provided 
fertilizer at no cost to padi farmers through the Farmers Organisation 
Authority and the Department of Agriculture.
(c) Price and Marketing Policies
The marketed surplus of padi in Peninsular Malaysia has been 
estimated at about 60 per cent of total production, but the proportion 
retained in the villages varies in different parts of the country (Selvadurai, 
1979, p.53; Narkswasdi, 1968, p.93; and Shand et al, 1982). Over the last 
30 years, padi marketing and distribution institution and policies have 
evolved to meet the country's requirements.
In order to achieve the main component of the rice policy, i.e. to 
assure consumers of quality rice at reasonable prices and at minimum cost to 
the authority, the government, through its agencies, has controlled the 
price of both padi and rice, has maintained buffer stocks, an import quota 
and a variable tariff and has required compulsory sales of rice by millers 
(Brown, 1975, pp.98-102; and Meyanathan, 1979, pp.223-6).
The Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority (FAMA) was established 
in 1965 to improve padi and rice marketing. In 1972 the newly formed 
National Padi and Rice Board (LPN) assumed FAMA's responsibilities with
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regard to padi. The board uses a combination of all the control devices 
listed above in a concerted effort to control the price and supply of rice.
A buffer stock was established in 1946 to safeguard the country 
against the effects of natural catastrophies on domestic supply and any 
disruption to rice imports (Khatijah, 1967 and 1968; Rudner, 1975, pp.6-7; 
and Goldman, 1975, p.259). With the introduction of a guaranteed minimum 
price (GMP), the buffer stock, since then, has been used to stabilise the 
floor price of padi and to improve padi farm income.
The GMP has increased from M$14 per pikul in 1955 to M$40 in 
1980 (Figure 2.4). GMP is paid for padi that comprises fully matured 
grains of not more than 13 per cent moisture, and free of dirt, empty grains, 
husk, straw or other foreign matter. Deductions are made for excess 
moisture, other faults and for delivery at a distance from a licensed mill. 
Despite some riots in Alor Setar in 1980 and accusations of mismanagement 
(New Straits Times, 3 December, 1981), LPN has been able to provide a 
competitive and stable price and income to producers, and to sell at a 
reasonable price to consumers (Review of Third Malaysian Plan, 1979, p.136).
(d) Water Management and Padi Land Development
Water management is the key to success in increasing the padi 
production in Peninsular Malaysia. By the end of 1981, about 87 per cent 
of the total 861,000 acres of padi areas were double cropped. This was 
made possible by the capacity created to plant off-season padi and enabled 
drier areas which had inadequate water supply to grow a crop of padi at 
least in one crop season.
Since water management and irrigation are important factors in the 
implementation of rice policies in Peninsular Malaysia, these will be dealt 
with in a separate section below. The discussion will concentrate only on 
the post-independence period.
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FIGURE 2.4
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GUARANTEED MINIMUM PRICE OF RICE FOR 
THE YEARS 1955-1982
(40)
(30)
10
(16)
(15)
(14)
1955 60 65 70 75 80 82
Sources: (1) Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority, Malaysia.
(2) The National Padi and Rice Board, Malaysia.
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2.5 Water Management and Padi Area Development After Independence
In 1957, the year of independence, the government decided to 
pursue complete self sufficiency in rice amongst other policy objectives.
At that time, Peninsular Malaysia produced only 61 per cent of its domestic 
rice requirements. By 1972, the share of local production had increased 
to 91 per cent. Before 1960, increased production was achieved with the 
opening up of new padi land, and by yield improvement in the main padi 
season. Double cropping was widely introduced after 1960, and by now it 
accounts for about 45 per cent of total domestic output. The remarkable 
change in Malaysian padi production was achieved at considerable expense 
(Table 2.7).
TABLE 2.7
ALLOCATIONS AND EXPENDITURES ON IRRIGATION 
AND DRAINAGE PROJECTS IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA 
(M$ Million)
Development
Plan
Planned
Allocation
Actual
Expenditures
As a Percentage of 
Actual Expenditure 
on Agricultural and 
Rural Development
1956-60 90.8 36.3 17
1961-65 109.0 127.8 23
1966-70 328.5 338.0 36
1971-75 257.4 217.8 12
1976-80 778.6 554.8 12
1981-85 860.3 - ioa
Note: a Based on planned expenditure.
Source: Various Malaya and Malaysian Plans.
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Throughout the First Five Year Plan (1956-60), with funds 
representing 17 per cent of total expenditure on Agriculture and Rural 
Development, the DID enabled 21,000 acres of padi land to be double cropped, 
mainly in Penang and Province Wellesley.
In the Second Five Year Plan (1961-65) the area under the off­
season crop was increased to 89,840 acres. This off-season crop area was 
expanded in parts of the Krian and Tanjung Karang Schemes.
The First Malaysia Plan (1966-70) saw the largest proportion of 
the budget (36 per cent) given to irrigation and drainage since independence. 
In 1970, 572,000 acres of main season crops were irrigated and 325,930 
acres of padi land were double cropped.
During this plan the Kemubu Project in Kelantan was started 
(in 1968) with the objective of enabling double cropping on 47,000 acres 
of padi land. There was a major increase in off-season output after 1969 
with the completion of Phase I of the 232,000 acre Muda Irrigation Project 
in Kedah and Perlis. Double cropping work was also being extended in the
50,000 acre Tanjung Karang Scheme.
In the Second Malaysia Plan, an additional 165,000 acres were 
provided with irrigation facilities, and 57 per cent of the total padi land 
was double cropped. In 1972, the first dry season crop was planted in the
47,000 acre Kemubu Irrigation Project. The Muda Irrigation Scheme was 
completed in 1974 and it enabled 152,000 acres to be double cropped.
In the Third Malaysia Plan (1975-80) the work of the Second Plan 
was continued in all of the padi areas. The sizeable investments in the 
Muda and the Kemubu Scheme facilitated double cropping and enabled increases 
in padi yields in Muda from 1,448 gantangs per crop hectare in 1970 to
1 1 Gantang = 2.5 kilos = 5.6 pounds.
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1,909 gantangs per crop hectare in 1980, and in Kemubu from 1,071 gantangs 
per crop hectare to 1,624 gantangs per crop hectare.
The development of rice production in Peninsular Malaysia, as in 
other developing countries, is from a subsistence-oriented environment to 
a commercially-oriented enterprise. The factors that influence padi 
disposal in the market by the padi producers have been consciously or 
unconsciously incorporated in the formulation and implementation of the 
Malaysian rice policy. This dissertation aims to explore some of these 
factors.
APPENDIX 3-A
RECOMMENDED INTAKES OF NUTRIENTS
Age
Body
Weight Ener gy Protein
Vitamin
A
Vitamin
D Thiamine
Ribo-
flavine Niacin
Folic
Acid
Vitamin
B12
Ascorbic
Acid Calcium Iron
kilo­
grams
kilo­
calories
mega­
joules grams grams
micro­
grams
milli­
grams
milli­
grams
milli­
grams
micro­
grams
micro­
grams
milli­
grams grams
mllli-
Children
< 1 7.3 820 3.4 14 300 10.0 0.3 0.5 5.4 60 0.3 20 0.5-0.6 5-10
1-3 13.4 1360 5.7 16 250 10.0 0.5 0.8 9.0 100 0.9 20 0.4-0.5 5-10
4-6 20.2 1830 7.6 20 300 10.0 0.7 1.1 12.1 100 1.5 20 0.4-0.5 5-10
7-9 28.1 2190 9.2 25 400 2.5 0.9 1.3 14.5 100 1.5 20 0.4-0.5 5-10
Male adolescents
10-12 36.9 2600 10.9 30 575 2.5 1.0 1.6 17.2 100 2.0 20 0.6-0.7 5-10
13-15 51.3 2900 12.1 37 725 2.5 1.2 1.7 19.1 200 2.0 30 0.6-0.7 9-18
16-19 62.9 3070 12.8 38 750 2.5 1.2 1.8 20.3 200 2.0 30 0.5-0.6 5-9
Female adolescents
10-12 38.0 2350 9.8 29 575 2.5 0.9 1.4 15.5 100 2.0 20 0.6-0.7 5-10
13-15 49.9 2490 10.4 31 725 2.5 1.0 1.5 16.4 200 2.0 30 0.6-0.7 12-24
16-19 54.4 2310 9.7 30 750 2.5 0.9 1.4 15.2 200 2.0 30 0.5-0.6 14-28
Adult man
(Moderately active) 65.0 3000 12.6 37 750 2.5 1.2 1.8 19.8 200 2.0 30 0.4-0.5 5-9
Adult woman
(Moderately active) 55.0 2200 9.2 29 750 2.5 0.9 1.3 14.5 200 2.0 30 0.4-0.5 14-28
Pregnancy
(Later half) +350 +1.5 38 750 10.0 +0.1 +0.2 +2.3 400 3.0 50 1.0-1.2 (9)
Lactation
(First 6 months) +550 +2.3 46 1200 10.0 +0.2 +0.4 +3.7 300 2.5 50 1.0-1.2 (9)
Source: Passmore, et al (1974).
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APPENDIX 3-B
The following method had been used for transforming a family into 
male adult unit equivalents based on energy intake (Appendix 3-A) in 
relation to adult man:
Children = 0.,52 male adult unit
Male adolescents = 0..95 II 11 |l
Female adolescents = 0.,79 II II II
Adult man = 1,.00 II II 11
Adult women, pregnancy
and lactation = 0..79'^ II 11 11
Note: a Based on a weighted average of about
60 per cent of adult women not pregnant 
or lactating, 20 per cent pregnant and 
20 per cent lactating.
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